Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SANAA1832
2006-06-24 13:15:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sanaa
Cable title:
SALEH ADVISES GEN ABIZAID ON SOMALIA'S "NEW
how-toVZCZCXRO9596 PP RUEHDE DE RUEHYN #1832/01 1751315 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 241315Z JUN 06 FM AMEMBASSY SANAA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4425 INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0152 RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA PRIORITY 0573 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0614 RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI PRIORITY 0489 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0155 RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0345 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0147 RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0001 RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0027 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001832
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER MOPS SO YE
SUBJECT: SALEH ADVISES GEN ABIZAID ON SOMALIA'S "NEW
TALIBAN"
REF: SANAA 1773
SANAA 00001832 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: AMBASSADOR THOMAS C. KRAJESKI, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (
D).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 001832
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER MOPS SO YE
SUBJECT: SALEH ADVISES GEN ABIZAID ON SOMALIA'S "NEW
TALIBAN"
REF: SANAA 1773
SANAA 00001832 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: AMBASSADOR THOMAS C. KRAJESKI, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (
D).
1. (C) SUMMARY: President Saleh told visiting CENTCOM
Commander GEN John Abizaid on June 18 that Yemen had invited
members of the Somali Islamic Courts (IC) and the
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to Sanaa for talks.
The IC leadership answered that they would come "within a
week." Saleh said if they do not come to Sanaa, it would be
a clear indicator that they intend on becoming the "New
Taliban." He disclaimed rumors that Yemen was sending
weapons to the TFG and said he believed Egypt and Libya were
supporting the Courts in order to destabilize Ethiopia.
Saleh pleaded for more help from coalition naval assets
patrolling the Gulf of Aden in stopping boats filled with
Somali refugees destined for the Yemeni coast. END SUMMARY
2. (C) Saleh opened a cordial meeting with GEN Abizaid with
a discussion of the current situation in Iraq, but quickly
turned to Somalia. Saleh opined that fears of an Ethiopian
invasion were exaggerated. Addis Ababa is aware that the
Islamic Courts would use any incursion as a pretext to rally
the people against foreign intervention, which would only
strengthen the hands of the Islamists. Responding to a
question from GEN Abizaid, Saleh said even an Ethiopian raid,
rather than a full invasion, might not weaken the Courts
because the "Somali people are stubborn." The religious
extremists within the Islamic Courts have a great deal of
sympathy among Somalis, and even in Yemen, although it is
more "hidden" here than in Somalia.
3. (C) The Islamic Courts represent a "New Taliban," Saleh
advised, but if they learned the lessons of the Afghan
regime, they will not be as confrontational with their
neighbors and the west. In that regard, Saleh said his
invitation to the Courts and the TFG to come to Sanaa for
talks would be an important test of the Courts' intentions.
"They said they would come within a week," he explained, "but
if they were sincere, they would have accepted much earlier."
Saleh said the Courts were likely just stalling for time in
order to achieve more victories on the ground and then come
to talks from a "position of strength" or even reject talks
with the TFG altogether.
4. (C) Indirectly referencing recent media reports that
Yemen had sent several planeloads of weapons to Baidoa
destined for the TFG, Saleh said such rumors were not true,
and were only drummed up by the Courts in order to whip up
nationalist support from Somalis. Saleh noted that Yemen had
provided food and clothing to the TFG President and
Parliament Speaker after their successful negotiations in
Aden earlier in the year, but "we are not sending anything
now," he claimed.
5. (C) In Saleh's opinion, it is the Courts, not the TFG,
who are receiving outside assistance. Egpyt's intelligence
services, he asserted, were supporting the Courts on the
ground "not as terrorists, but because they want war between
Somalia and Ethiopia" in order to gain greater influence over
the Ethiopia's use of the Nile. Likewise Libya's Qadafi was
sending support to the Courts' Chairman through former Somali
President Abdul Qasam Salad because Qadafi is "not on good
terms" with Ethiopia and because he wants to "create trouble
for U.S. forces in the Horn of Africa" (NFI).
6. (C) Seizing upon the presence in the meeting of RDML
Richard Hunt, Commander of the Combined Joint Task Force -
Horn of Africa (CJTF HOA),Saleh said Yemen was "suffering
from Somalia's problems," particularly because of the daily
flow refugees into Yemen. "We have more than 150,000 Somalis
here," he claimed, "and we are concerned about them not only
for humanitarian reasons but also because we have caught
SANAA 00001832 002.2 OF 002
smugglers bringing weapons here, possibly for terrorist
attacks." Saleh pleaded with Hunt to "stop the refugees from
getting closer to our shores." GEN Abizaid and RDML Hunt
said that through better coordination between the Yemeni
Coast Guard, CTF-150, and NAVCENT, more could be done to
combat smuggling of people and weapons between Somalia and
Yemen.
7. (C) COMMENT: Saleh is clearly concerned about the Islamic
Courts' military successes in Somalia (reftel). As one of
the few regional actors with access to all of Somalia's
regional and factional leaders, Saleh is keen to use his
influence to moderate the Islamic Courts. That said, Saleh's
tone in this meeting indicated that he believes it may be too
late to exert meaningful influence over the Courts as they
gain military and political strength on the ground. As for
Saleh's refutation of arms shipments to the TFG, post has
nothing thus far to confirm or discredit these reports, but
we note that Saleh has in the past defied the UN arms embargo
to send arms to the TFG.
8. (U) GEN Abizaid has cleared this message.
Krajeski
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2016
TAGS: PREL PTER MOPS SO YE
SUBJECT: SALEH ADVISES GEN ABIZAID ON SOMALIA'S "NEW
TALIBAN"
REF: SANAA 1773
SANAA 00001832 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: AMBASSADOR THOMAS C. KRAJESKI, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (
D).
1. (C) SUMMARY: President Saleh told visiting CENTCOM
Commander GEN John Abizaid on June 18 that Yemen had invited
members of the Somali Islamic Courts (IC) and the
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to Sanaa for talks.
The IC leadership answered that they would come "within a
week." Saleh said if they do not come to Sanaa, it would be
a clear indicator that they intend on becoming the "New
Taliban." He disclaimed rumors that Yemen was sending
weapons to the TFG and said he believed Egypt and Libya were
supporting the Courts in order to destabilize Ethiopia.
Saleh pleaded for more help from coalition naval assets
patrolling the Gulf of Aden in stopping boats filled with
Somali refugees destined for the Yemeni coast. END SUMMARY
2. (C) Saleh opened a cordial meeting with GEN Abizaid with
a discussion of the current situation in Iraq, but quickly
turned to Somalia. Saleh opined that fears of an Ethiopian
invasion were exaggerated. Addis Ababa is aware that the
Islamic Courts would use any incursion as a pretext to rally
the people against foreign intervention, which would only
strengthen the hands of the Islamists. Responding to a
question from GEN Abizaid, Saleh said even an Ethiopian raid,
rather than a full invasion, might not weaken the Courts
because the "Somali people are stubborn." The religious
extremists within the Islamic Courts have a great deal of
sympathy among Somalis, and even in Yemen, although it is
more "hidden" here than in Somalia.
3. (C) The Islamic Courts represent a "New Taliban," Saleh
advised, but if they learned the lessons of the Afghan
regime, they will not be as confrontational with their
neighbors and the west. In that regard, Saleh said his
invitation to the Courts and the TFG to come to Sanaa for
talks would be an important test of the Courts' intentions.
"They said they would come within a week," he explained, "but
if they were sincere, they would have accepted much earlier."
Saleh said the Courts were likely just stalling for time in
order to achieve more victories on the ground and then come
to talks from a "position of strength" or even reject talks
with the TFG altogether.
4. (C) Indirectly referencing recent media reports that
Yemen had sent several planeloads of weapons to Baidoa
destined for the TFG, Saleh said such rumors were not true,
and were only drummed up by the Courts in order to whip up
nationalist support from Somalis. Saleh noted that Yemen had
provided food and clothing to the TFG President and
Parliament Speaker after their successful negotiations in
Aden earlier in the year, but "we are not sending anything
now," he claimed.
5. (C) In Saleh's opinion, it is the Courts, not the TFG,
who are receiving outside assistance. Egpyt's intelligence
services, he asserted, were supporting the Courts on the
ground "not as terrorists, but because they want war between
Somalia and Ethiopia" in order to gain greater influence over
the Ethiopia's use of the Nile. Likewise Libya's Qadafi was
sending support to the Courts' Chairman through former Somali
President Abdul Qasam Salad because Qadafi is "not on good
terms" with Ethiopia and because he wants to "create trouble
for U.S. forces in the Horn of Africa" (NFI).
6. (C) Seizing upon the presence in the meeting of RDML
Richard Hunt, Commander of the Combined Joint Task Force -
Horn of Africa (CJTF HOA),Saleh said Yemen was "suffering
from Somalia's problems," particularly because of the daily
flow refugees into Yemen. "We have more than 150,000 Somalis
here," he claimed, "and we are concerned about them not only
for humanitarian reasons but also because we have caught
SANAA 00001832 002.2 OF 002
smugglers bringing weapons here, possibly for terrorist
attacks." Saleh pleaded with Hunt to "stop the refugees from
getting closer to our shores." GEN Abizaid and RDML Hunt
said that through better coordination between the Yemeni
Coast Guard, CTF-150, and NAVCENT, more could be done to
combat smuggling of people and weapons between Somalia and
Yemen.
7. (C) COMMENT: Saleh is clearly concerned about the Islamic
Courts' military successes in Somalia (reftel). As one of
the few regional actors with access to all of Somalia's
regional and factional leaders, Saleh is keen to use his
influence to moderate the Islamic Courts. That said, Saleh's
tone in this meeting indicated that he believes it may be too
late to exert meaningful influence over the Courts as they
gain military and political strength on the ground. As for
Saleh's refutation of arms shipments to the TFG, post has
nothing thus far to confirm or discredit these reports, but
we note that Saleh has in the past defied the UN arms embargo
to send arms to the TFG.
8. (U) GEN Abizaid has cleared this message.
Krajeski