Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ROME956
2006-03-29 16:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rome
Cable title:
ITALIANS OPEN TO EU VISA BAN AGAINST LUKASHENKA,
how-toVZCZCXRO5943 OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHRO #0956 0881605 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 291605Z MAR 06 FM AMEMBASSY ROME TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4242 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE IMMEDIATE 1261 RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN IMMEDIATE 6851 RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES IMMEDIATE 1326 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 000956
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2016
TAGS: PREL PHUM CVIS EUN BO IT
SUBJECT: ITALIANS OPEN TO EU VISA BAN AGAINST LUKASHENKA,
BUT WORRY ABOUT UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
REF: STATE 46976
Classified By: Classified by David D. Pearce, Political Minister Counse
lor, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 000956
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2016
TAGS: PREL PHUM CVIS EUN BO IT
SUBJECT: ITALIANS OPEN TO EU VISA BAN AGAINST LUKASHENKA,
BUT WORRY ABOUT UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
REF: STATE 46976
Classified By: Classified by David D. Pearce, Political Minister Counse
lor, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary. On March 27, Poloff met with Antonino
Cascio of the Eastern European Department of the Italian
MFA to deliver reftel points. Cascio said the MFA is
concerned that an extended visa ban, including a ban on
Lukashenka, could prove to be ineffective and could
backfire if Lukashenka decides to crack down further on the
opposition. Cascio said Italy would not be opposed in
principle to an expanded EU visa ban list that would
include Lukashenka, but would wait to consult with other EU
allies before making a final decision. End Summary.
2. (C) On March 27 Poloff delivered reftel points to Cascio
and asked for Italian support in the EU to implement an
extended visa ban, including a ban on Lukashenka and his
family. Cascio stated that Italy had no opposition in
principle to the expansion of the visa ban list but
questioned whether it would produce any tangible results.
Cascio's reservations were fourfold: even though the
election was deplored by the EU and OSCE, Lukashenka
probably does, in fact, enjoy the support of the majority
of the Belarussian public; the opposition has not developed
to the point where it can effectively challenge Lukashenka
in the event international pressure begins to erode his
grip on power; Italy does not want to lose contact with or
lose the support of the Belarussian people; and the ban is
likely to be ineffective against a group of people who have
shown no interest in traveling to the EU. Nevertheless,
Cascio stated that Italy wanted to send an important signal
to the GOB that its behavior during the elections was
unacceptable. Cascio told Poloff that the GOI would debate
the pros and cons of a visa ban prior to the EU working
group discussions in Brussels on March 30.
3. (C) Poloff urged Cascio to take a determined line
against Lukashenka. He noted that repression does not
equate to stability and the opposition had been denied the
opportunity to give the public a viable alternative. The
US was also committed to maintaining robust contact with
the opposition, with the Belarussian people, and to a
certain extent, with the GOB. The visa ban, however, would
send a strong signal that the international community does
not tolerate Lukashenka's undemocratic behavior, would show
support for the democratic opposition, and would erode
support for Lukashenka among those who have joined him for
purely personal gain.
4. (C) On March 28 PolMinCouns spoke with PM Berlusconi's
deputy diplomatic advisor Francesco Talo to lobby in favor
of the expanded restrictions. He said a visa ban that did
not include Lukashenka would not be taken seriously. As
for public support, Pol M/C reinforced poloff's points and
noted that Hafiz al-Asad of Syria and Saddam Hussein in Iraq
had also enjoyed impressive electoral majorities, but this
did not equate to a legitimate popular mandates. Talo
subsequently forwarded a copy of the EU declaration on
Belarus, noting that some restrictive measures, including
against Lukashenka, were pending. Talo added that Italy's
official position was still under consideration but including
Lukashenka on the visa ban list was a strong possibility.
5. (C) A follow-up discussion with Cascio on March 29
confirmed that the MFA had agreed that restrictive measures
that did not include Lukashenka would not be effective. At
the very least, Italy would not oppose such a measure if it
were recommended by the EU working group on March 30.
6. (C) Comment. The GOI recognizes that a Belarus under
Lukashenka is not in the interests of Italy or the EU. We
have urged them to recognize that a common US-EU approach
in denying him credibility after the most recent sham
elections is the first step in dealing with Europe's last
dictator.
SPOGLI
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2016
TAGS: PREL PHUM CVIS EUN BO IT
SUBJECT: ITALIANS OPEN TO EU VISA BAN AGAINST LUKASHENKA,
BUT WORRY ABOUT UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
REF: STATE 46976
Classified By: Classified by David D. Pearce, Political Minister Counse
lor, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary. On March 27, Poloff met with Antonino
Cascio of the Eastern European Department of the Italian
MFA to deliver reftel points. Cascio said the MFA is
concerned that an extended visa ban, including a ban on
Lukashenka, could prove to be ineffective and could
backfire if Lukashenka decides to crack down further on the
opposition. Cascio said Italy would not be opposed in
principle to an expanded EU visa ban list that would
include Lukashenka, but would wait to consult with other EU
allies before making a final decision. End Summary.
2. (C) On March 27 Poloff delivered reftel points to Cascio
and asked for Italian support in the EU to implement an
extended visa ban, including a ban on Lukashenka and his
family. Cascio stated that Italy had no opposition in
principle to the expansion of the visa ban list but
questioned whether it would produce any tangible results.
Cascio's reservations were fourfold: even though the
election was deplored by the EU and OSCE, Lukashenka
probably does, in fact, enjoy the support of the majority
of the Belarussian public; the opposition has not developed
to the point where it can effectively challenge Lukashenka
in the event international pressure begins to erode his
grip on power; Italy does not want to lose contact with or
lose the support of the Belarussian people; and the ban is
likely to be ineffective against a group of people who have
shown no interest in traveling to the EU. Nevertheless,
Cascio stated that Italy wanted to send an important signal
to the GOB that its behavior during the elections was
unacceptable. Cascio told Poloff that the GOI would debate
the pros and cons of a visa ban prior to the EU working
group discussions in Brussels on March 30.
3. (C) Poloff urged Cascio to take a determined line
against Lukashenka. He noted that repression does not
equate to stability and the opposition had been denied the
opportunity to give the public a viable alternative. The
US was also committed to maintaining robust contact with
the opposition, with the Belarussian people, and to a
certain extent, with the GOB. The visa ban, however, would
send a strong signal that the international community does
not tolerate Lukashenka's undemocratic behavior, would show
support for the democratic opposition, and would erode
support for Lukashenka among those who have joined him for
purely personal gain.
4. (C) On March 28 PolMinCouns spoke with PM Berlusconi's
deputy diplomatic advisor Francesco Talo to lobby in favor
of the expanded restrictions. He said a visa ban that did
not include Lukashenka would not be taken seriously. As
for public support, Pol M/C reinforced poloff's points and
noted that Hafiz al-Asad of Syria and Saddam Hussein in Iraq
had also enjoyed impressive electoral majorities, but this
did not equate to a legitimate popular mandates. Talo
subsequently forwarded a copy of the EU declaration on
Belarus, noting that some restrictive measures, including
against Lukashenka, were pending. Talo added that Italy's
official position was still under consideration but including
Lukashenka on the visa ban list was a strong possibility.
5. (C) A follow-up discussion with Cascio on March 29
confirmed that the MFA had agreed that restrictive measures
that did not include Lukashenka would not be effective. At
the very least, Italy would not oppose such a measure if it
were recommended by the EU working group on March 30.
6. (C) Comment. The GOI recognizes that a Belarus under
Lukashenka is not in the interests of Italy or the EU. We
have urged them to recognize that a common US-EU approach
in denying him credibility after the most recent sham
elections is the first step in dealing with Europe's last
dictator.
SPOGLI