ITALIANS TO DAS BRYZA: RUSSIA NOT READY FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 000933 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2016 TAGS: PREL PARM NATO IT RU GG UP SUBJECT: ITALIANS TO DAS BRYZA: RUSSIA NOT READY FOR AUSTRALIA GROUP MEMBERSHIP, WILL WORK WITH U.S. ON GEORGIA AND NATO REF: STATE 41331 Classified By: Classified by David D. Pearce, Political Minister Counse lor, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. On March 17, DAS Bryza met with Deputy Diplomatic Advisor to PM Berlusconi Francesco Talo and MFA Director General Giulio Terzi to discuss Caucasus security issues and Russian Australia Group (AG) membership. Bryza told his interlocutors that the USG believed that Russian membership in the AG was not appropriate and Russia had not been a constructive partner in other nonproliferation control regimes. Bryza asked the GOI not to raise this at G8 meetings, but rather allow Russian candidacy to be discussed in AG fora. Bryza also told the Italians that closer engagement with Georgia, including a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP),could be useful in helping resolve tension around the South Ossetia and Abkhazia issues. Bryza encouraged Italy and the EU to support Ukraine if it should decide to revisit its recent gas supply deal with Russia. While this could cause some short-term supply problems for Europe, a more transparent arrangement would benefit the Euroatlantic community(septel). Both Talo and Terzi agreed that Russia was not at the point where it could be a productive member of the AG but Talo commented that it was better to have Russia involved in as many control regimes as possible. Terzi added that the AG might consider extending an offer to Russia with clear conditionality with regard to other regimes. Both agreed that the G8 was not the appropriate forum for this discussion. On Georgian NATO membership, Terzi and MFA NATO advisor Gianni Bardini told Bryza that MAP would create clear expectations that Georgia would be extended an early invitation to join NATO, something the GOI believed was premature. End summary. PM's office: No to Russian AG membership, concerned about Georgian NATO membership -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) DAS Bryza met with Talo on March 17 to discuss energy security and its implications on regional security. Bryza told Talo that the U.S. sought a mutually beneficial energy relationship with Russia, and to channel Gazprom toward more constructive, market-based behavior. The Georgian government was convinced (rightly or wrongly) that the explosion of Russian gas pipelines to Georgia in January marked a deliberate attempt to pressure Georgia, including to sell a strategic gas pipeline to Gazprom. The January 1 gas cutoff to Ukraine similarly reflected an effort to use energy as a political weapon, and to pressure Ukraine to sell key portions of its pipeline infrastructure to Gazprom as well. The USG hoped that the EU would support Ukraine and Georgia in their efforts to resist such pressures while enhancing Europe,s own energy security by inject more market forces into the energy sector through diversification of supply, focusing on the Caspian Sea(septel). On Georgia, Bryza told Talo that if Georgia continued to advance its defense and democratic reforms, a Membership Action Plan (MAP) in the near-term could change the strategic map in a positive way, bolstering GOG confidence, and thereby helping the GOG to resist to provocations from Russia and South Ossetian and Abkhaz separatists. ¶3. (C) Talo agreed that Russia would not be an appropriate member of the Australia Group (AG),and in fact, had not officially requested candidacy. The GOI believed that nonproliferation regimes were better off bringing in as many countries as possible rather than leaving them out, and that it would be useful to have Russia in, but only after it fulfilled necessary criteria. Bryza replied that this mirrored the U.S. position. Talo agreed that the G8 was not an appropriate setting for a discussion on Russian AG membership. On Georgia, Talo expressed the need for Georgia to advance its defense reforms before considering NATO membership. He agreed that Russia needed to refrain from stirring the pot in Georgia,s separatist conflicts. He concurred with the strategy outlined by Bryza for South Ossetia, involving: Euroatlantic support for Georgia,s action plan; participation by the U.S., Russia, EU, and OSCE in a South Ossetia donors, conference in May; and eventual evolution of the donors, conference into a forum for negotiating a political settlement. Talo agreed that the existing Joint Control Commission was inadequate for negotiating a political settlement for South Ossetia. He noted that Russia suffered from an outdated strategic mindset that had not yet adjusted to the idea that failed states and border disputes on its periphery were not in its interests. ¶4. (C) Bryza outlined for Talo our emerging ideas on working with Europe to counter Islamic extremism. Bryza stressed our search for ways to counter not only European Muslims, secular alienation (through poverty reduction, education, job creation, and fighting prejudice), but spiritual alienation as well. The latter arose among Europe,s second- and third-generation Muslims, who know they are Muslims but have never been taught their about their families, Muslim traditions. The result is a vacuum of yearning for some sense of Islamic identity, which extremist recruiters seek to exploit. To counter such recruiters, the Euroatlantic community might explore ways to reconnect second- and third-generation Muslims with their tolerant Muslim traditions. Talo said he was intrigued by this approach, and would explore it with a range of colleagues in the GOI. MFA: Open to Russian AG membership, cautious on NATO Membership -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Bryza raised the same issues with MFA DG for Multilateral Affairs Terzi. Terzi agreed that Russian AG membership was premature and stated that the GOI was in full unity with the rest of the AG. He noted that Russia had not officially requested candidacy and agreed that the G8 was not the appropriate forum for discussion of AG membership for Russia. He added, however, that the AG should not oppose Russian candidacy on principle alone. The MFA believed that nonproliferation regimes functioned better when there was greater inclusiveness. One option would be to grant Russian membership with strict conditionality that could include results in other nonproliferation regimes. On Georgian NATO membership, MFA NATO director Bardini, told Bryza that the GOI was concerned that a Membership Action Plan for Georgia might create expectations for early membership. Terzi countered that the GOI looked forward to explore with the U.S. and other NATO partners how best to advance Georgia,s NATO aspirations, including the possibilities of both Intensified Dialogue and MAP. ¶6. (C) Bryza also walked Terzi and Bardini briefly through our Eurasian gas strategy, and our desire to find an appropriate Euroatlantic forum for geo-political discussions on energy. Bryza described the briefing offered the previous day to the NAC/R by Assistant Secretary Wayne. Terzi and Bardini agreed that such consultations were useful on an ad-hoc basis. But the GOI wanted to make preserve the integrity of the NATO-Russia council (NRC). The NRC was useful if it constituted a discussion among 27, not 26 vs. 1, with Russia in an adversarial position. ¶7. (U) This cable was cleared by DAS Bryza SPOGLI