KOSOVO: ITALIAN MFA CONCERNED ABOUT LACK OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 000383 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/SCE E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV SR YI IT SUBJECT: KOSOVO: ITALIAN MFA CONCERNED ABOUT LACK OF CONTACT GROUP UNITY IN MESSAGES TO BELGRADE Classified By: Classified by David D. Pearce, Political Minister Counse lor, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. The Italian MFA is concerned that US and UK messages to Belgrade regarding the final status of Kosovo may be creating high expectations among Kosovar Albanians and anxiety in Belgrade that could complicate negotiations. The Italians have the impression that US and UK messages may gone beyond their understanding of the agreed Contact Group line. As a result, MFA Political Director Terzi is considering a trip to Belgrade to affirm the GOI view that Kosovo's final status has yet to be determined. End Summary. ¶2. (C) On February 7, MFA Director of Balkan Affairs Raimondo De Cardona briefly raised with visiting PDAS Volker GOI concern that a recent message delivered to the Belgrade leadership by US Special Envoy Wisner (septel) had left the impression that the US believed Kosovar independence would be the most likely outcome of the negotiations. De Cardona cautioned that, if this was indeed the message, it went beyond what was agreed at the last Contact Group meeting. ¶3. (C) On February 9, De Cardona followed up with poloff, noting that a recent high-level UK delegation had told the Belgrade leadership that it must begin to prepare the Serbian public for a change in Kosovar status. According to De Cardona, this message was poorly received in Belgrade and has caused some backlash against the international community's efforts to lead negotiations on Kosovo. ¶4. (C) According to De Cardona, the GOI impression of the Contact Group's agreed message was that Ahtisaari would urge both sides to prepare for the compromises that would be necessary to ensure the success of the status talks. Cardona noted that, while "everyone knows where the talks will lead". But, he said, sending a message in advance of negotiations that the international community expects the final result to be phased independence provides little incentive for Belgrade to be helpful on important issues other than status that must be worked out between the parties. In the worst-case scenario, De Cardona fears that the fragile Belgrade government could collapse in advance of, or during, the discussions, further complicating the process. ¶5. (C) De Cardona noted that he believes the message delivered by the UK represents a British attempt to take control of the policy direction the EU is taking on the issue - partly out of impatience with the pace of the process and partly for political reasons. The GOI will attempt to exert its influence on the process beginning with a hastily organized trip by MFA Political Director Terzi to Belgrade on February 14 or 15 to affirm the GOI view that no decision has been made on the final status of Kosovo. ¶6. (C) Comment. The GOI pays close attention to all developments in the Balkans, and has worked hard to maintain CG unity on the Kosovo issue. Through meetings, contacts, and even a letter from FM Fini to the Secretary, the GOI has tried to coordinate with the USG and other CG members on this issue. De Cardona's evident concern was to urge the US and UK to keep Italy squarely in the policy loop as the international community engages with the parties on Kosovo. SPOGLI