IRAN'S BANK SEPAH: U/S LEVEY DISCUSSIONS IN ROME

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 ROME 003378 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS TREASURY FOR U/S LEVEY; STATE E/B ESC, PAUL SIMONS; STATE EUR/WE, AYOUNG AND KOPSTRUP E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2016 TAGS: ECON EFIN PTER IR LE IT SUBJECT: IRAN'S BANK SEPAH: U/S LEVEY DISCUSSIONS IN ROME WITH GOI OFFICIALS 12-21-2006 REF: A. ROME 2622 ¶B. ROME 1892 ROME 00003378 001.2 OF 005 Classified By: ECMIN THOMAS DELARE FOR REASONS 1.4 B and D. Summary -------------- ¶1. (S) Treasury U/S Stuart Levey called on the Italian Ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs and the Bank of Italy (BOI) December 20 to press Italy to close local branches of Bank Sepah. The U/S keyed his remarks to the report of a recent BOI investigation that had uncovered clear financial flows between the Iranian bank and proliferation efforts by the Iranian Aerospace Agency (AIO). The report described the bank's behavior as intentionally non-transparent and non-prudential in its conduct and reporting. GOI counterparts agree that Bank Sepah's presence in Rome is a nuisance, but the GOI is hesitant to take the lead in acting against the bank for fear of retaliation against Italian economic interests in Iran. Interlocutors at the Ministry of Finance downplayed Bank Sepah "irregularities" and drew attention to a recently issued, but non-specific Bank Advisory that flagged Bank concern about commercial relations with entities engaged in proliferation or terrorist activities. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was outwardly more cooperative, but also stressed the utility of appropriate UNSC action and warned that public USG use of BOI report could expose the inspection process to outside scrutiny and public debate. The Bank of Italy also asked that the USG not publicize its report in order to ensure future cooperation. They also offered that a UNSC resolution would be the best means of dealing with Bank Sepah. ¶2. (S) All of the U/S interlocutors emphasized that a move against Bank Sepah would be a major political decision. The Italians have scheduled a major interagency review of economic relations with Iran for early January, but the final word on Iran policy will come from the very top, from the foreign minister and prime minister. In parting, U/S Levey left no doubt in all his meetings that the USG will be acting against Bank Sepah, preferably with a UNSC Resolution, but without, if necessary. End Summary Ministry of Finance - Nothing Italy Can Do Legally -------------- -------------- ¶3. (S) U/S Levey opened his discussion with Finance Ministry Director General Grilli and Directo for Financial Crimes Maresca, by complimenting the Italians for the BOI's recent report on the proliferation finance efforts of Bank Sepah,s Rome branch. He said the USG found the BOI report very helpful, especially the conclusions that Bank Sepah was quickly losing its ability to operate on a commercial basis, the danger the branch posed to the financial system because of management's failure to scrutinize suspicious transactions and record certain activities, and especially, the branch's deliberate non-transparency, e.g., requesting financial partners not to identify Bank Sepah in documentation forwarded through SWIFT. U/S Levey then took stock of USG options to react to the report, but underscored that the USG preferred to work in concert with Italy (as the source of information on Bank Sepah) and thereby avoid the perception of unilateralism. ¶4. (S) Grilli declined to characterize the Rome branch of Bank Sepah's transgressions as serious. He conceded that Bank Sepah's activities were "not in line with rules and regulations," but claimed that Italy would be "without banks," if the rules were applied so rigorously. He added that Bank Sepah must take care of these "minor ROME 00003378 002.2 OF 005 irregularities" and added that the BOI would follow up (at an unspecified point). Attempting to soften his unhelpful response, Grilli then described the contents of a BOI bank advisory (septel) issued to every bank in Italy. He said the advisory, although it did not name Bank Sepah, flagged the need for concern for commercial relations with any entity engaged in terrorist or proliferation activities. The advisory also warned that a U.S. Executive Order on this same subject could have negative implications for financial firms engaging in terrorist/proliferation activities and also operating in the United States. ¶5. (S) U/S Levey forcefully pushed back. He challenged the Grilli,s characterization of Bank Sepah,s activities as "non-serious" and the onus placed on the USG as the source of pressure on Italian banks via the advisory. In response, Grilli conceded that the problem needed to be dealt with at the highest political level -- i.e., by PM Prodi. Even then, he cautioned that, without a UN resolution of "appropriate form ...it would be almost an act of war" to shut down Bank Sepah's Italian branches. ¶6. (S) In that regard, Grilli said that listing the Iranian Aerospace Agency (AIO) as a proscribed entity could have the effect of basically shutting down Bank Sepah activities in Italy. He and Maresca quickly ran through a list of other potential hurdles to a UN listing of Bank Sepah: the MFA's alleged fear about Russian pressure to delete specific entities from any proscribed list and the precedent of terrorist finance listings, which require EU consensus to designate financial firms of concern. ¶7. (S) U/S Levey closed by noting that the United States will move unilaterally, if necessary, and will use the BOI information in a manner that demonstrates international cooperation on proliferation financiers, even if we have to say that our partners' "different legal systems" might result in different national responses to Bank Sepah proliferation finance activities. Grilli responded that there must be either a "supranational change of rules" and/or changes in EU member state positions. And in a final barb directed to a near-by neighbor, he rhetorically asked if anything was going to be done about the headquarters of Bank Sepah on the Place Vendome, next to the French Ministry of Justice and the Ritz. MFA -- Eager to Help, but Sensitive to Being Out Front -------------- -------------- ¶8. (S) U/S Levey met at the MFA with Giulio Terzi, Director General for Multilateral Political Affairs and Human Rights; Claudio Spinedi, Vice Director of the Office of Multilateral Economic and Financial Cooperation; Giacomo Sanfelice, Deputy Director General of Multilateral Political Affairs and Human Rights; and Giampaolo Cantini, Director of the Office for G8 and Global Issues. U/S Levey began by outlining the strong U.S. concern about Bank Sepah's proliferation-related activities. The bank,s branch exists in Rome, basically, for one customer -- AIO, which is likely to be designated on a UN list. The U.S. intends to act, preferably in concert with Italy. U/S Levey had just heard at the Ministry of Finance that there is no legal framework in Italy to shut down Bank Sepah's Rome branch, but what about publicizing its activities? U/S Levey pointed out that an upcoming UN resolution would provide Italy not only with legal authority, but an obligation, to act. In particular U/S Levey pointed out paragraph six of the draft resolution which calls for the states to prevent the provision to Iran of investment, brokering or other financial services related to its proliferation activities. He underlined how Italy could make the case against Bank Sepah using this provision of the resolution. ROME 00003378 003.2 OF 005 ¶9. (S) Terzi responded that the BOI had already distributed a bank advisory to Italian banks. As for the UN resolution, if it were to pass, the MFA would need to review it, look at the designated entities, and review the situation of Bank Sepah, legally, as well as its dubious practices. Terzi stated that the MFA would present the issue to Foreign Minister D'Alema. As for publicizing the Rome branch's activities, the MFA would need to discuss it with the BOI. If the UN resolution were not to pass, then Terzi agreed that going public could be a way of reinforcing the BOI bank advisory. ¶10. (S) U/S Levey reminded Terzi that primary evidence of Bank Sepah's bad business transactions originate in its Rome branch and that the U.S. would appreciate Italy's support in nominating the bank to the UN list of designated entities. U/S Levey noted that, if necessary, the U.S. intends to unilaterally designate Bank Sepah worldwide under E.O. 13382 -- and not just the Rome branch. In explaining this decision publicly, the U.S. would want to refer to BOI report findings on Bank Sepah's Rome branch, since those findings will be an important factor in the U.S. decision. ¶11. (S) Terzi wanted the U.S. to understand the high political visibility of going after Bank Sepah -- not just in Italy, but in the Muslim world, where Italy has vital economic interests and political concerns. This political factor must be carefully evaluated and presented to the Foreign Minister. At the same time, Italy would have to ensure that any action it takes is well-grounded and based on clear evidence. As for making the BOI report public, Terzi noted the sensitivity of the matter -- it would expose the inner dealings of the BOI inspection procedure. Publicizing the report itself could also trigger public and parliamentary debate, and be used by anyone who wants to make political trouble for the government. Terzi noted that the GOI has scheduled an interagency discussion in early January to discuss Italy's economic relations with Iran, the implementation of an UN resolution, and credit insurance, among other matters. Cantini pointed out that while blocking bank accounts is one thing, closing Bank Sepah altogether "is a different story." Sanfelice then noted that the EU will also need to play a role. ¶12. (S) U/S Levey reminded the meeting participants that if there is no UN list accompanying a resolution, then the U.S. will unilaterally designate Bank Sepah -- but would seek to do so in a way that appears not to be against Italy. Any U.S. public statement would note that the U.S. had discussed the matter at length with its allies and that, while the GOI shares USG proliferation concerns, Italy has different legal authorities. ¶13. (S) Terzi replied that adding Bank Sepah to the UN resolution's designation list would be "easier for everyone." However, Terzi added, any designations outside the UN process could be challenged in the courts -- by Iran and/or by others. Cantini noted in this regard the possibility of legal challenges by Italian companies that had been negatively affected. He said, however, that approving the resolution and designating AIO is would give Italy a basis from which to act against Bank Sepah. Terzi also said he foresaw no difficult working subsequently in the context of the Sanctions Committee to get Bank Sepah designated. It would be a UN context, and a collective process. Meanwhile, he would not challenge the U.S. national right to act; he would inform his minister and others in the GOI of U.S. views, and promised to inform us immediately, if there were any change in the MFA position, as he had laid out. ROME 00003378 004.2 OF 005 ¶14. (S) The Embassy's Political Minister Counselor said there was a larger political point to consider -- that Iran feels its current policies are succeeding; it therefore has little incentive to change its policies or return to the negotiating table. That is why applying the right kinds of financial pressure could help bring Iran back to the table. And Italy may be in as good a position as any country to help on this. In reply, Terzi repeated Italy's commitment to rein in Iran's proliferation activities and noted that, while skeptical of the value of immediate major economic or oil-related sanctions against Tehran, the MFA endorses the current approach of the international community as the best way to get Iran back to negotiations. BOI - Bank Sepah's Presence in Rome Is "a Nuisance" -------------- -------------- ¶15. (S) U/S Levey thanked Director General Fabrizio Saccomanni, and Banking Supervision Chief Giovanni Carosio, for their report on Bank Sepah's Rome branch and repeated the same USG concerns about Bank Sepah's Rome branch, expressed earlier to the Finance Ministry and MFA. U/S Levey emphasized that the conduct of Bank Sepah's Rome branch was "dangerous and deceptive." ¶16. (S) Saccomanni began, "In Rome, we (the government) are like gladiators, each with a different weapon," adding that no one weapon was sufficient to deal effectively with Bank Sepah. Implying that the BOI weapon might include tough consultations, Saccomanni stated that he had summoned Iran's Central Bank Deputy Governor earlier in the week. Saccomanni warned the Iranian about the activities of Bank Sepah's Rome branch and said that, while Italy had given Bank Sepah a license to operate as a bank in Italy, the Rome branch was no longer acting like a bank. ¶17. (S) Carosio stated that, while it was true that the BOI report found that Sepah's Rome branch was not properly organized to detect suspicious transactions, the finding in itself did not carry "serious consequences" and was an issue separate from conclusions about the branch's transactions with AIO. Carosio noted that the BOI expects that Sepah's Rome branch will take corrective action in response to the BOI report. However, BOI,s bottom line is that Sepah's Rome branch is not a bank with a viable structure, and that BOI would like to see the Rome branch disappear. "But if the bank is disappearing and shrinking anyhow, we have to ask ourselves if that justifies us taking action against them?" Carosio asked. Saccomanni said that if Bank Sepah were to leave Rome, it would not be a loss to the Italian banking system. "They're a nuisance." (Note: At one point during the exchange, when U/S Levey and Saccomanni discussed the possibility of the GOI shutting down Bank Sepah's Rome branch, Carosio, typically reserved and discrete, muttered aloud under his breath, "Yes, shut them down.") ¶18. (S) Saccomanni and Carosio then produced a copy of the BOI's bank advisory, citing UNSCR 1540 and E.O. 13382 and warning banks of the consequences of dealing -- knowingly or unknowingly -- with proliferators. In Saccomanni's view, the advisory was "sufficient" to discourage banks from working with proliferators. ¶19. (S) Saccomanni and Carosio asked the U.S. not to make public the BOI report to ensure confidentiality and future information sharing with the U.S. Both BOI officials were eager to know what actions the U.S. had taken with Bank Sepah branches in other EU nations and emphasized again that a UN resolution would best enable Italy and the BOI to effectively deal with Bank Sepah. ROME 00003378 005.2 OF 005 COMMENT -------------- ¶20. (S) Our GOI counterparts agree that Bank Sepah's presence in Rome is a nuisance and contributes nothing to the Italian economy. Nevertheless, the GOI is hesitant to be seen as publicly taking the lead in acting against the bank -- for fear of retaliation against Italian economic interests in Iran. That said, the MFA is very mindful that Italy takes up a UNSC seat in a few weeks and wants to be seen as playing a constructive role in the international management of the Iran nuclear issue. The political and financial authorities here have practical legal, political, and financial concerns regarding the Bank Sepah case. But even if they do not have the domestic legal tools to unilaterally shut down the Rome branch of Bank Sepah, they will have a basis to freeze AIO accounts when and if the UNSCR designates it. Meanwhile, if the U.S. moves unilaterally to designate Bank Sepah, the public handling of any reference to Italy or the BOI investigation will be highly sensitive for them, and they will want us to coordinate it carefully. Looking ahead, Terzi indicated that Italy, as a UNSC member, would be prepared to cooperate in the Sanctions Committee context to get Bank Sepah designated. Even with a UN resolution, any move against a major Iranian bank here will be a major political decision, given Italy's trade and investment with Iran. So it is no surprise that they have schedule a major interagency review of economic relations with Iran for early January. But the final word on Iran policy will come from the very top, especially from the foreign minister and prime minister. Given that Italy will take up a UNSC seat in a few weeks and wants to play a constructive role in the Iran nuclear issue, we will need to carefully coordinate with the GOI the public handling of any reference to Italy, if the US moves to unilaterally designate Bank Sepah. End comment. ¶21. (U) This cable has been cleared by U/S Levey. SPOGLI