OLMERT REJECTS ITALIAN PUSH ON SHEBAA FARMS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 003320 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL XF IR LE IT SUBJECT: OLMERT REJECTS ITALIAN PUSH ON SHEBAA FARMS ROME 00003320 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Charge' d'Affaires Anna M. Borg, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) . Summary -------------- ¶1. (C/NF) Israeli PM Olmert visited Italy December 13 and talks focused on Lebanon, the Middle East peace process, and Iran. He deflected calls by both the Italian PM and FM for a gesture on Shebaa Farms to buttress embattled Lebanese PM Siniora. Olmert noted this would be seen as a nod to Syria, not support for Siniora. In any case such a move would be premature since delineation of the border was now before the UN; Israel will support what the UN decides. He told the Italians the real test for UNIFIL was preventing arms from getting to the south. Concerned that the Italians may be misinterpreting the US midterm election results, Olmert stressed there was no daylight between him and President Bush regarding next steps on the peace process. He was ready to make many concessions in talks with the Palestinians, but Gilad Shalit had to be released first, and credit for any prisoner releases must accrue to Abu Mazen, not Hamas. Olmert rejected a suggestion by the FM of Israeli contacts with Hamas. On Iran, he told Italian leaders that he understood their trade concerns in the context of possible UN sanctions on the nuclear issue, but such concerns should not come at Israel's expense. End Summary. Lebanon: No Dice on Shebaa Farms Move -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Israeli Ambassador Gideon Meir, accompanied by DCM Elazar Cohen, December 15 briefed Ambassador, DCM, Pol M/C and poloff on Israeli PM Olmert's December 13 visit to Rome. After meeting with the Pope, Olmert met PM Romano Prodi one-on-one. He then had lunch with Prodi and Deputy PM and FM Massimo D'Alema, accompanied by Israeli Ambassador Meir. In addition to a second meeting with D'Alema, Olmert met with Italian President Giorgio Napolitano, Deputy PM and Minister of Culture Francesco Rutelli, former FM/Deputy PM and opposition National Alliance party-leader Gianfranco Fini, and members of the Jewish Community. He spoke on the phone with former PM Silvio Berlusconi, who was in Milan. ¶3. (C) Meir said the talks focused on Lebanon, the Palestinian issue, and Iran. The Italians were concerned about the stability of Lebanese PM Siniora's government and the safety of Italian UNIFIL troops. Both PM Prodi and FM D'Alema raised the idea of an Israeli withdrawal from Shebaa Farms as a gesture of support to Lebanese PM Siniora. Olmert rejected this, noting such a move would be interpreted as an overture to Syria, not support for Siniora. When the UN makes a decision on the border between Syria and Lebanon in the context of UNSCR 1701, Israeli will comply, but not beforehand. ¶4. (C) Olmert told the Italians Israel knows UNIFIL won't fight or disarm Hizballah, nor can it monitor the Syrian border. The real test will be whether it can prevent arms from being smuggled into southern Lebanon. Meir said it was important for the Italians to hear the same message from the U.S. The Ambassador said they have. Overflights Not Raised -------------- ¶5. (S/NF) Meir noted the issue of overflights was not raised in Olmert's meetings. However, Meir had had meetings prior to the visit on the subject and had told the Italians that Israel had reduced its missions, although it continued some intelligence-gathering flights. The ambassador said he told the Italians that Israel might be prepared to stop overflights altogether, if the U.S. supplied the required intel. ¶6. (S/NF) Meir also discussed intel-sharing with the Italians prior to the Olmert visit, suggesting to Italian CHOD Giampaolo Di Paola that he travel to Israel to coordinate with his counterpart. Di Paula reportedly had agreed in principle, but voiced concern over the need to do so in a "most discreet" fashion. Meir said he understood Di Paola's concerns, given the need to avoid the impression that a UN troop contributing country was taking sides, and had suggested to Tel Aviv that the Israeli chief of staff come to ROME 00003320 002.2 OF 002 Rome instead. Prodi: One Foreign Policy, and I Decide -------------- ¶7. (C) Meir said he had warned the Israeli prime minister that some in the government apppeared to be misreading the results of the US midterm elections, so Olmert made it very clear to Prodi and D'Alema that there was no daylight between him and President Bush on next steps in the peace process. Olmert reportedly told Prodi and D'Alema that he was in close contact with Abu Mazen and was willing to make many concessions, even the release of prisoners with blood on their hands. But Corporal Gilad Shalit would have to be released first. And it was essential to ensure that the credit for such a gesture accrue to Abu Mazen, not Hamas. ¶8. (C) Olmert reportedly rejected suggestions by FM D'Alema that Israel, in Meir's words, "bring Hamas into the party". The ambassador noted, with some disdain, that D'Alema had argued that Hamas was part of Palestinian society and could not be ignored. There were some moderate voices in Hamas, willing to accept coexistence with Israel. Olmert responded that sidebar talks with Hamas would serve only to undermine Abu Mazen and that there could be no short cuts in resolving the Israeli/Palestinian issue. A two-headed government would be totally unacceptable. But if Abu Mazen wants new elections or a change in the constitution, Olmert said, Israel will do everything in its power to support him. ¶9. (C) In contrast to D'Alema's run at Olmert on contacts with Hamas, Prodi went out of his way to underline continued support for the three Quartet conditions for contact with a Palestinian government. And the PM was emphatic. "There is no change, and I'm determined on this," he said, thumping his fist on the table. He added that Italy had only one foreign policy and "I decide". Prodi also stated privately and publicly (for the first time) his support for Israel retaining its Jewish character, a comment that has drawn some criticism here on grounds that it could undermine Palestinian assertion in future negotiations of the right of return for refugees. Iran: Don't Trade Away Israeli Interests -------------- ¶10. (C) On Iran, Olmert told Prodi and D'Alema that he understood Italy's trade concerns, in the context of possible UN sanctions on the nuclear issue, but this position should be maintained at Israel's expense. Meir also commented to us that he had been surprised at the degree of access enjoyed by the Iranian ambassador in Italy. He said his message to his Italian contacts would be that this is not in keeping with Iran's actions; there should be some sign that it's not business as usual with Iran. The unwritten subtext of the widespread entree of the Iranian envoy sends precisely the opposite message. Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) The Israelis appear to be satisfied with the visit, despite the Shebaa Farms disagreement and D'Alema's Hamas probe. They seem to think PM Prodi is saying the right things, and were clearly pleased with the statement about Israel retaining its Jewish character. But they remain quite skeptical about D'Alema's mindset. On an Italy-watcher level, the most revealing aspect of the readout was story of Prodi thumping the table, declaring Italy had only one foreign policy, and that he was the decider. It would appear that the Israelis are not the only ones concerned about D'Alema. BORG