D'ALEMA, LEBANON, AND ENGAGING ITALY

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 002429

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2021
TAGS: PREL PGOV IT
SUBJECT: D'ALEMA, LEBANON, AND ENGAGING ITALY


Classified By: Ambassador Ronald P. Spogli, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Foreign Minister Massimo D'Alema is emblematic of
both the possibilities and challenges posed by Italy's
center-left government. Prickly. Ex-Communist.
Europeanist. Critic of Iraq war. Critic of alleged US
unilateralism. Political opponent of former Prime Minister
Silvio Berlusconi. Political exponent of "equal closeness"
to Arabs and Israelis (often translated as pro-Arab).
President of Democrats of Left (DS) party. Member of
Parliament since 1987. Prime Minister 1998-2000. Foreign
Minister. Possible future PM, possible future President.
Pragmatic. Sometimes overconfident. Coalition
disciplinarian. Someone Berlusconi says he can deal with.
Risk-taker. Not afraid to engage. Willing to be team
player. Not afraid to use force. Backed Balkans bombing
when PM. Driving force on current Lebanon mission.
Political strongman in Italy's ruling center-left coalition.


2. (C) This government came to power trumpeting that it
would not be a US lackey, the way Berlusconi supposedly was.
To be sure, we heard privately that equal value would be put
on Transatlantic and European relations; it was even in the
platform. But there were nevertheless concerns that the new
Italian lineup would have a Gaullist tinge. The foreign
policy road would pass through Brussels, not Washington. And
this general campaign tone carried on for a few months after
the election.


3. (C) But then, given a chance to work with us on Lebanon,
pragmatism took over from rhetoric. They concluded they
could help themselves, the EU, and us by coordinating both
with us and in the EU context. In fact, Lebanon showed that
this government had deliberately not opted on a policy
self-consciously independent of Washington. Quite the
contrary. They decided that the connections were good, and
they advertised it.


4. (U) D'Alema told interviewers that a Sicilian fisherman
overheard him say "bye-bye Condi" (when he was concluding a
call on his yacht 'Ikarus'),and exclaimed, "Your Honor, you
weren't really talking with Rice? I don't believe it!" A
columnist in the right-wing daily Il Giornale, noting reports
that D'Alema had had some difficulty maneuvering his yacht
that day, gibed: "Shouldn't someone who says 'bye-bye Condi'
and charms the fishermen of Marettimo perhaps be more careful
to keep his 'Ikarus' from banging into the pier? But he was
too busy at the helm of the world to mind that of his own
boat..."


5. (C) Perhaps the alignment of interests on Lebanon could
be dismissed as just dumb luck. But even before Lebanon,
D'Alema had responded to a request by the Secretary on Iraq,
in their initial Washington meeting, deciding to reverse
position and maintain a civilian presence in Iraq. And no
doubt, Italy surprised itself by the way it stepped up to the
plate on Lebanon. But, at bottom, the US made it possible.
We asked them to host the Rome Conference. Our leadership
engaged theirs at critical moments on the follow up. And it
was only after that this government chose to see US support
as the essential lever for joint action with EU partners.


6. (C) But to keep this in a positive groove will require
careful tending. D'Alema will be key. We may quite often be
in alignment with the Italians on ends, but just as often we
may differ on the means. This is because the instinct of
D'Alema, and Prodi, as with their own domestic coalition, is
to be inclusive. They will be inclined to reach out faster
and further to Syria and Iran, to involve them, to try to
give them a stake in success. They will focus more on
carrots than sticks. The alignment on Lebanon is in many
ways favorable, but we cannot yet call it typical. The GOI
is going to want a bigger role on Iran issues in the future,
and we should expect differences of approach to come into
play there, too.


7. (C) Even so, the Lebanon case suggests it is well worth
the effort to keep the Italian leadership effectively
engaged. It also makes sense to do so well before Italy
takes up its UN Security Council seat in January. The
center-left government wants Italy to matter, and
D'Alema/Prodi believe that Europe only matters when it is
united. They have shown they are willing to put in a
tenacious effort to achieve European cohesion, especially
when they sense US support. They want Europe to be an
effective team, but they also appear to want Europe and the
United States to be an effective team.

SPOGLI