AVIAN INFLUENZA: POST CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 000018 SIPDIS FROM THE U.S. MISSION TO THE UN AGENCIES IN ROME FOR S/ES-O/CMS, CA/OCS/ACS/EUR, OES/IHA AND IO/EX E.0. 12598: N/A TAGS: AMGT ASEC CASC AMED KFLO AEMR IO UN AVIAN INFLUENZA SUBJECT: AVIAN INFLUENZA: POST CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND TRIPWIRES US Mission UN ROME REF: A) 05 ROME 4188 B) 05 STATE 219189 -------------- -------------- SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION -------------- -------------- ¶1. Embassy Rome's response (Ref A) to the Department's ref B action request regarding Avian Influenza (AI) contingency planning and tripwires includes logistical and other related plans for the entire Rome tri-mission community. This message provides US Mission UN Rome- specific considerations and planning. ¶2. In formulating operational requirements in such a contingency, we note that the Rome-based UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) is the lead UN agency responsible for working the animal-related aspects of Avian Influenza. We anticipate that this Mission would continue to be the primary USG liaison with FAO in the event of an epidemic. We would also expect to both participate in any FAO working group efforts to deal with a local or global outbreak as well as to bring FAO expertise to the tri-mission planning process. This will affect our tripwire responses differently than at the Embassy, particularly in how we structure the Mission in the event of reduced staffing. ¶3. In addition, the World Food Program (the UN's emergency feeding organization, heavily supported by U.S. tax dollars) is also concerned that an AI outbreak could lead to severe food pipeline disruptions, endangering the lives of millions of people dependent on WFP food assistance. WFP is also the lead UN Agency for logistics, and could be called upon to organize and support a broader UN response to an AI crisis. We assume that should such an event occur, this Mission might also continue to have critical liaison requirements with WFP. ¶4. Our plans for drawdown of staff, who would remain on a "skeleton crew," and how we would function in the event of a drawdown are based on these assumptions. -------------- TRIPWIRES -------------- ¶5. For local logistical and planning purposes, including the provision of medical and emergency supplies as well as liaison with the GOI, we will rely heavily on the Embassy's management section, RSO, and Health Unit, as outlined in Ref A. ¶6. Tripwire 1: a spike in the number and/or broadening geographic spread of animal to human cases or sustained human-to-human transmission in a neighboring country US Mission UN Rome Responses to Tripwire 1: ¶A. Keep Mission community including families and dependents informed; disseminate any travel warnings issued by the Department or those posts affected. ¶B. No travel to affected areas; recall any employees traveling in areas in or near the region of outbreak. ¶C. Consider drawdown to skeleton-staff, with the realization that this may not be desirable nor possible. At a minimum keep on duty those officers with liaison duties with FAO and WFP. ¶D. Encourage staff to stockpile water, food, blankets, and medicines to be used under quarantine status of in case of a run on local markets. ¶E. Ensure mechanisms (such as the FOB) are in place to allow work from offsite locations. ¶F. Make a determination on evacuation of dependents and any employees with relevant health problems. ¶7. Tripwire 2: a spike in the number and/or broadening geographic spread of animal to human cases or sustained human-to-human transmission in any area of Italy US Mission UN Rome Responses to Tripwire 2: ¶A. Once EAC confirms that tripwire has been crossed, inform and provide latest information to all employees and dependents. Coordinate briefings with Embassy. ¶B. Make determination on whether to move to skeleton staffing. At a minimum keep on duty those officers with principal liaison responsibilities for FAO and WFP. ¶C. Maintain close collaboration with FAO and WFP expertise in any response strategy or emergency response capability. Participate in any FAO and WFP AI Working Group meetings. ¶D. No unofficial travel to affected areas. Recall or re- direct to the U.S. any staff traveling worldwide. ¶E. Consider an ordered departure of non-essential staff and family members, again with the realization that this may not be either desirable or possible. (Coordinated with Tri-Mission team) ¶F. Contribute to coordinated tri-mission issuance of public announcement and travel warning to include expert advise from FAO. ¶G. Contribute to coordinated tri-mission press guidance. ¶H. Require any employee with flu-like symptoms to take mandatory sick leave and assure that Health Unit is alerted. ¶I. Ensure staff is stockpiling water, food, blankets, and medicines to be used under quarantine status of in case of a run on local markets. ¶J. Issue protective equipment (gloves, masks),following MED guidance. ¶8. Tripwire 3: a sharp further spike in the number and/or broadening geographic spread of animal to human cases or sustained human-to-human transmission near or within Rome US Mission UN Rome Responses to Tripwire 3: ¶A. Once EAC confirms that tripwire has been crossed, inform and provide latest information to all employees and dependents. Coordinate briefings with Embassy. This may have to be done by phone or e-mail, in coordination with Embassy. ¶B. Reduce to skeleton staffing to include only Executive Office and FAO/WFP liaison officers. Instruct all non- essential staff to remain home on administrative leave, and for children to remain home from school. Limit movement of all personnel and dependents in the city. ¶C. Maintain close collaboration with FAO and WFP expertise in any response strategy or emergency response capability. Participate in any FAO and WFP AI Working Group meetings (again, possibly by phone or e-mail). ¶D. Cancel any incoming official travel not related to investigation or containment. ¶E. Coordinate with Embassy and FAO on travel warning and press guidance to ask that any non-essential travel be deferred. ¶F. "Home quarantine" any individuals or individuals with cold or flu symptoms. ¶G. Coordinate with Embassy on home visits to sick individuals from health unit for monitoring and medication. Consider delivery system for any essential supplies (groceries, water, etc.). ¶H. Coordinating with Health Unit and MED, consider prophylactic Tamiflu treatment. -------------- TRIPS INPUT -------------- ¶7. DCM J. Michael Cleverley, Management/Political Officer Bruce Berton and/or OMS Alison Lewis will be responsible for TRIPS input. CLEVERLEY