ROME VISITS HIGHLIGHT BALKAN ISSUES

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 001851

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV IT SR YI RO
SUBJECT: ROME VISITS HIGHLIGHT BALKAN ISSUES


Classified By: Classified by Jonathan R. Cohen, Acting Political Minist
er Counselor, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. In separate visits to Rome June 20 by UN
Special Envoy for Kosovo and Romanian FM Razvan Ungureanu
raised the issues of Italian-Romanian cooperation in Iraq,
Romanian entry into the EU and Kosovo. Italian FM D'Alema
told Ungureau that Italy supported Romanian entry into the EU
in 2007. D'Alema also thanked Romania for its support of the
Iraq mission and stated that Italy would remain committed to
Iraqi reconstruction and security training through NATO. On
Kosovo, D'Alema reiterated Italian support for Ahtisaari and
the Contact Group mechanism. Ungureanu told D'Alema that
Serbia's neighbors were concerned that a hasty decision on
Kosovo could destabilize Serbia. Ahtisaari told D'Alema that
he sensed Chinese and Russian reluctance on pushing for a UN
solution on Kosovo that was not acceptable to Belgrade. End
Summary.

Italy supports Romanian accession into EU in 2007
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2. (C) D'Aleman told Ungureanu that Italy supported Romanian
entry into the EU on January 1, 2007 and would work to
encourage other EU nations to send a clear signal to
Bucharest that its bid for early entry would be accepted.
D'Alema also thanked the Romanians for their contributions in
Iraq and pledged that Italy would remain engaged in Iraq.
D'Alema told Ungureanu that Italy would remain engaged in the
NATO training mission and civilian reconstruction and
development efforts - possibly even through Italian
participation (but not leadership) of a PRT. The details of
Italian troop withdrawal, however, would be worked out by the
military.


3. (C) Ungureanu told D'Alema that Romania was concerned
about possible instability in Serbia in advance of a Kosovo
status decision. Romania preferred an "unrushed" approach to
the status talks and feared that a quick and imposed solution
would spell disaster for pro-Western democratic political
forces in Belgrade. Ungureanu noted that many of Serbia's
neighbors shared this view. D'Alema reiterated Italy's strong
support for the Contact Group mechanism and stood behind
Ahtisaari, but privately also held concerns about a rapid and
imposed solution to Kosovo's status.

Ahtisaari Given Assurances of Italian Support
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4. (C) D'Alema told Ahtisaari that the Prodi government was
committed to the Contact Group and fully supported the work
of UNOSEK. D'Alema told Ahtisaari that Italy was fully aware
that the process was headed toward Kosovar independence but
wanted to ensure the Serbian side received fair treatment of
its concerns over minority rights and cultural sites.
Ahtisaari told D'Alema that he appreciated the Contact
Group's policy of having him be the focal point for the CG's
work on Kosovo but added that he would occasionally turn to
the CG countries to work with Pristina and Belgrade to
maintain momentum on the talks.


5. (C) Raimondo De Cardona, Director of the Balkan Office of
the Italian MFA, told visiting EUR/WE Office Director
Allegrone that the Italian MFA noted that Ahtisaari was more
sensitive to Serbian concerns and was worried about the
stability of the current Serbian government. Additionally,
Ahtisaari, who had recently traveled to Moscow and Beijing to
discuss the issue of Kosovar independence, noted some
reluctance among the Russians and Chinese on granting Kosovar
independence without Serbian participation.


6. (C) Comment. The GOI is poised to remain a committed and
close ally both on the political level and on the ground in
the Balkans. Any concerns the Italians have about the pace
of negotiations and the possibility of an imposed solution
will likely be secondary to their goal of maintaining Contact
Group unity.
SPOGLI