Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ROME1757
2006-06-13 16:44:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Rome
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER: YOUR 6/16 MEETING WITH ITALIAN FM

Tags:  PREL PGOV NATO OVIP IT SR YI IZ IR AF 
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OO RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHFL RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV
DE RUEHRO #1757/01 1641644
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 131644Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5065
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0228
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0299
RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 1479
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 7224
RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 1547
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 001757 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO OVIP IT SR YI IZ IR AF
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: YOUR 6/16 MEETING WITH ITALIAN FM
D'ALEMA

REF: A. ROME 1755


B. ROME 1753

C. ROME 1741

D. BAGHDAD 2003

E. KABUL 2624

ROME 00001757 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Classified by Ronald P. Spogli, Ambassador, for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)

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Summary
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 001757 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO OVIP IT SR YI IZ IR AF SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: YOUR 6/16 MEETING WITH ITALIAN FM D'ALEMA REF: A. ROME 1755 ¶B. ROME 1753 ¶C. ROME 1741 ¶D. BAGHDAD 2003 ¶E. KABUL 2624 ROME 00001757 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Classified by Ronald P. Spogli, Ambassador, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (S/NF) FM (and Deputy PM) Massimo D'Alema is a key political powerhouse in the new Italian government, a nine-party coalition including the Greens and the Communists, with a razor-thin majority in the Senate. The Prodi government is trying to align Italy with what it believes is the EU line, apparently content to downplay the importance of U.S.-Italy relations and to limit Italian military commitments exclusively to initiatives under NATO, the EU or the UN. In contrast to previous assurances, Prodi is ceding to the extreme left's demands for complete troop withdrawal from Iraq, including those we had expected to provide force protection for an Italian-led PRT. Unless we can find a formula under which another nation provides force protection, Italy is unlikely to have a PRT in Iraq. D'Alema confirmed to the Ambassador June 13 that Italy does intend to increase its contributions to the NATO training mission in Iraq and wants to play a role in civilian assistance. Prodi has told us he is very worried about Afghanistan's future, though Italy's commitment there remains solid. You should share with D'Alema our assessment of progress in Afghanistan. On Iran, Italy wants political clout at the bargaining table to match its status as Teheran's largest European trading partner. Italy joins the UNSC beginning in January 2007. End Summary. -------------- New Italian Political Realities -------------- ¶2. (C/NF) Massimo D'Alema is a former Prime Minister and leader of the Democrats of the Left (DS),the strongest party in PM Prodi's nine-member coalition. Without a party affiliation, Prodi became the compromise leader for the Center Left, but D'Alema is the real political power behind the new government and has ambitions to return as PM. D'Alema and Prodi have a razor-thin majority in the Senate and a fractious coalition that includes Greens and Communists, who are demanding immediate withdrawal of Italian troops from Iraq. As they promised
during the election campaign, D'Alema and Prodi are trying to align Italian foreign policy with what they view as the EU line, although it strikes us as rhetorically at least four years out of date, downplaying the importance of their relations with the U.S. and speaking of a new relationship with us based on mutual respect, as opposed to what they considered Berlusconi's subservience to us. The Center Left was elected on pocketbook issues, and Prodi's main goal appears to be stimulating the economy and conforming to EU debt limits, but the radicals in the government may block attempts at significant economic reform. To keep the government from falling, Prodi and D'Alema will continue to need to satisfy the far left. You will find D'Alema direct and open to serious discussion; he considers himself equally, if not more, qualified to lead than Prodi. -------------- Iraq -------------- ¶3. (S/NF) As senior Italian diplomats told Deputy S/I Stephenson June 9, and as FM D'Alema confirmed for the Ambassador June 13, Italy will withdraw all of its troops from Iraq before the end of 2006, but plans to remain engaged in reconstruction efforts there. Without Italian troops for force protection, the Italians are pessimistic about their ability to lead a PRT in Dhi Qar province. They have agreed to keep under consideration a PRT, or contributions to a PRT, provided appropriate security arrangements can be found that do not involve Italian troops. They plan to increase their ROME 00001757 002.2 OF 003 participation in the NATO training mission in Iraq and will advocate broadening NATO's participation there. -------------- Afghanistan -------------- ¶4. (C/NF) Although PM Prodi has complained that he lacks a clear view of the way ahead in Afghanistan, the new Italian government is planning to increase Italy's substantial military presence there. Italy already commands the Herat PRT and participates in ISAF Kabul; the new Italian plan would increase troop numbers with a variety of new capabilities. MFA U/S Vernetti will visit Afghanistan the week of June 19 to discuss concrete additional steps Italy can take with Afghan leaders and Amb. Neumann. Italy's economic and reconstruction assistance has not kept pace with its military contribution. In particular, Italy needs to do more in crucial justice sector reform. You will want to thank D'Alema for Italy's important contributions in Afghanistan, share our confident vision of Afghanistan's future, and urge increased economic and reconstruction support. While welcoming the additional Italian military contribution there, you will also want to make it clear that there is no trade-off for continued support in Iraq. -------------- Iran -------------- ¶5. (C/NF) D'Alema issued a strong statement of support for your May 31 announcement on Iran, saying Italy was ready to contribute to international efforts to reach a lasting solution to the conflict. However, Italy wants political clout at the bargaining table to match its status as Teheran's largest European trading partner. Prodi has continued the Berlusconi government's push to be included in EU-3 discussions on Iran and would welcome U.S. efforts to include Italy in Iran discussion at the G-8 or other fora before Italy becomes a member of the UNSC in January 2007. Despite the economic pain, we expect Italy will support eventual UN sanctions if the EU agrees. -------------- MEPP -------------- ¶6. (C/NF) D'Alema has vigorously denied allegations that he is anti-Israel, and sent MFA U/S Vernetti on a May 30 visit to Israel to establish early government contacts. Despite Prodi's mistaken decision to accept a congratulatory call from Hamas, he also has established contacts with PM Olmert. We expect this government to follow the EU lead on the MEPP with no major policy changes. They are unlikely, however, to be as forward-leaning as the Berlusconi government in defending Israel's interests. -------------- Balkans -------------- ¶7. (C/NF) Italy has long considered the Balkans to be its backyard and the Prodi government has made clear its intention to remain an influential power in the region. D'Alema who supported NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia in 1999, will continue to support strong Italian participation in the efforts of the Contact Group to find a lasting solution to the region's problems, a continued NATO presence, and an EU/NATO future for the countries of the former Yugoslavia and Albania. -------------- Russia/Democracy/Energy Security -------------- ¶8. (C/NF) Without Berlusconi's personal relationship with Putin influencing Italian policy, the new Italian government insists it will criticize Russia when necessary on pro-democracy and civil rights issues. However, Italy imports 30% of its natural gas supply from Russia and was hard hit this winter by the disruption of supplies caused by the Russian-Ukrainian dispute. This has created an ROME 00001757 003.2 OF 003 atmosphere of timidity within the MFA, and it remains to be seen whether D'Alema will step up in defense of democracy in Russia, Belarus and the other former Soviet republics. SPOGLI

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