Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ROME1680
2006-06-06 09:53:00
SECRET
Embassy Rome
Cable title:
IRAQ: ITALY CONSIDERING THREE OPTIONS: FULL PRT
how-toVZCZCXRO9053 OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK DE RUEHRO #1680 1570953 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 060953Z JUN 06 FM AMEMBASSY ROME TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4984 INFO RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE 0286 RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0225 RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 1449 RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 7189 RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 1517 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
S E C R E T ROME 001680
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT. FOR EUR/WE AND NEA/I;
OSD PASS TO DASD FATA
JAKARTA PLEASE PASS TO SECDEF CONTROLOFF
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2016
TAGS: PREL NATO MOPS IZ IT
SUBJECT: IRAQ: ITALY CONSIDERING THREE OPTIONS: FULL PRT
W/600-800 TROOPS, SCALED-DOWN PRT, OR COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL
W/BAGHDAD-BASED AID PROGRAM
Classified By: DCM ANNA BORG. REASONS 1.4 B AND D.
S E C R E T ROME 001680
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT. FOR EUR/WE AND NEA/I;
OSD PASS TO DASD FATA
JAKARTA PLEASE PASS TO SECDEF CONTROLOFF
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2016
TAGS: PREL NATO MOPS IZ IT
SUBJECT: IRAQ: ITALY CONSIDERING THREE OPTIONS: FULL PRT
W/600-800 TROOPS, SCALED-DOWN PRT, OR COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL
W/BAGHDAD-BASED AID PROGRAM
Classified By: DCM ANNA BORG. REASONS 1.4 B AND D.
1. (S) PolMilCouns met June 5 with Italian Defense Minister's
Diplomatic Advisor Achille Amerio. Amerio said DefMin Parisi
was at a two-day meeting of all Italy's ministers where Iraq
was being discussed, and it was unclear what would come out
of those discussions. That said, according to Amerio, prior
to the ministers' conclave Italy was considering "two or
three options" in Iraq, and much depended on what Allies told
senior Italians in the coming days. The negative impact on
Allies and Iraqis would be factored into Italy's decision.
The options under consideration in rough outline were: 1) a
full PRT with 600-800 troops for force protection (staunchly
opposed by the GOI's far-left parties who agreed to be part
of PM Prodi's governing coalition based on promises of full
and immediate withdrawal); 2) some scaled-down version of a
PRT with some smaller unspecified force protection element;
or 3) a complete troop withdrawal from Dhi Qar province and a
civilian assistance program run out of the Italian Embassy in
Baghdad.
2. (S) PolMilCouns stressed the USG's expectation that Italy
would fulfill its commitment to standing up a PRT with
adequate force protection, and continue providing training,
mentoring, logistics and commo support to Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF) in Dhi Qar. Amerio replied that the Italians
were well aware that if force protection levels fell below
600 they would be hard-pressed to keep the PRT. He agreed
completely with the importance of assisting the ISF but was
unable to give assurances that Italy would continue to do so
unless the centrists in Italy's governing coalition could
prevail on the far left to accept some level of Italian troop
presence.
3. (S) Amerio noted that the new Italian government was
committed to showing that its policy in Iraq was different
from that of its predecessor, and that the centrists
(including the PM, DefMin and FM) had to decide whether to go
forward with the PRT and accept that the far-left would make
a lot of unhappy noise, and possibly rupture Italy's
governing coalition, or agree to the far left's demands for
complete troop withdrawal for the sake of keeping the
government together. There might be a middle way, but if so,
it was not yet clear what that would entail. He said he
hoped DefMin Parisi would come back from the ministers'
conclave with a sense of how much latitude the GOI would have
in making its Iraq decision. We urged Amerio to have the
DefMin share with SecDef in detail whatever options were
still under consideration by Italy when the two meet at the
NATO Defense Ministerial June 7-8.
SPOGLI
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT. FOR EUR/WE AND NEA/I;
OSD PASS TO DASD FATA
JAKARTA PLEASE PASS TO SECDEF CONTROLOFF
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2016
TAGS: PREL NATO MOPS IZ IT
SUBJECT: IRAQ: ITALY CONSIDERING THREE OPTIONS: FULL PRT
W/600-800 TROOPS, SCALED-DOWN PRT, OR COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL
W/BAGHDAD-BASED AID PROGRAM
Classified By: DCM ANNA BORG. REASONS 1.4 B AND D.
1. (S) PolMilCouns met June 5 with Italian Defense Minister's
Diplomatic Advisor Achille Amerio. Amerio said DefMin Parisi
was at a two-day meeting of all Italy's ministers where Iraq
was being discussed, and it was unclear what would come out
of those discussions. That said, according to Amerio, prior
to the ministers' conclave Italy was considering "two or
three options" in Iraq, and much depended on what Allies told
senior Italians in the coming days. The negative impact on
Allies and Iraqis would be factored into Italy's decision.
The options under consideration in rough outline were: 1) a
full PRT with 600-800 troops for force protection (staunchly
opposed by the GOI's far-left parties who agreed to be part
of PM Prodi's governing coalition based on promises of full
and immediate withdrawal); 2) some scaled-down version of a
PRT with some smaller unspecified force protection element;
or 3) a complete troop withdrawal from Dhi Qar province and a
civilian assistance program run out of the Italian Embassy in
Baghdad.
2. (S) PolMilCouns stressed the USG's expectation that Italy
would fulfill its commitment to standing up a PRT with
adequate force protection, and continue providing training,
mentoring, logistics and commo support to Iraqi Security
Forces (ISF) in Dhi Qar. Amerio replied that the Italians
were well aware that if force protection levels fell below
600 they would be hard-pressed to keep the PRT. He agreed
completely with the importance of assisting the ISF but was
unable to give assurances that Italy would continue to do so
unless the centrists in Italy's governing coalition could
prevail on the far left to accept some level of Italian troop
presence.
3. (S) Amerio noted that the new Italian government was
committed to showing that its policy in Iraq was different
from that of its predecessor, and that the centrists
(including the PM, DefMin and FM) had to decide whether to go
forward with the PRT and accept that the far-left would make
a lot of unhappy noise, and possibly rupture Italy's
governing coalition, or agree to the far left's demands for
complete troop withdrawal for the sake of keeping the
government together. There might be a middle way, but if so,
it was not yet clear what that would entail. He said he
hoped DefMin Parisi would come back from the ministers'
conclave with a sense of how much latitude the GOI would have
in making its Iraq decision. We urged Amerio to have the
DefMin share with SecDef in detail whatever options were
still under consideration by Italy when the two meet at the
NATO Defense Ministerial June 7-8.
SPOGLI