Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06ROME1625
2006-05-31 14:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rome
Cable title:  

ITALY: PM PRODI ON CIVILIAN COMMITMENT TO IRAQ,

Tags:  PREL NATO MOPS EUN IZ AF IT 
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FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4931
INFO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 1440
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 7162
RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 1508
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 001625 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT. FOR EUR/WE, NEA, SA;
OSD FOR DASD FATA AND DASD CAGAN
STATE PLEASE PASS TO SENATOR ALLEN'S OFFICE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2016
TAGS: PREL NATO MOPS EUN IZ AF IT
SUBJECT: ITALY: PM PRODI ON CIVILIAN COMMITMENT TO IRAQ,
INTEREST IN IRAN TALKS, CONCERN OVER AFGHANISTAN AND
DETERMINATION TO CONTRIBUTE TO STRONG ALLIANCE


ROME 00001625 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD SPOGLI. REASONS 1.4 B AND D.

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Summary
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 001625 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT. FOR EUR/WE, NEA, SA; OSD FOR DASD FATA AND DASD CAGAN STATE PLEASE PASS TO SENATOR ALLEN'S OFFICE E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2016 TAGS: PREL NATO MOPS EUN IZ AF IT SUBJECT: ITALY: PM PRODI ON CIVILIAN COMMITMENT TO IRAQ, INTEREST IN IRAN TALKS, CONCERN OVER AFGHANISTAN AND DETERMINATION TO CONTRIBUTE TO STRONG ALLIANCE ROME 00001625 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: AMBASSADOR RONALD SPOGLI. REASONS 1.4 B AND D. -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) In a wide-ranging meeting with Senator Allen and the Ambassador on May 30, Italian PM Prodi said Italy was firmly committed to Iraq's future, but had to figure out how to end its military engagement while continuing to contribute to reconstruction and political development. He said he was more worried about Afghanistan than Iraq, because he could not see a political vision for the future there. Prodi asserted that, as Iran's top European trading partner since the 1950s, Italy should not be excluded from the EU-3 or the P-5 plus-1 talks on Iran. He also argued for giving Italy a larger share of responsibility in the Middle East, and added that in many cases it would benefit the U.S. to allow Europe and key European countries a more active role in international problem solving. Prodi said that given Italy's size, its overseas engagements were enormous. He intended to sustain them, and "to do our duty as part of a strong alliance." End Summary. ¶2. (C) On May 30, Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi met visiting U.S. Senator and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee on Europe George Allan and the Ambassador. They discussed Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Mediterranean security, the Middle East, China, the Balkans and European integration. -------------- Iraq -------------- ¶3. (C) Sen. Allen thanked Podi for Italy's support and steadfastness in protecting freedom and noted the importance of remaining closely linked in our efforts in Iraq, where Italy's involvement was critical. Prodi replied that given Italy's size, its overseas engagements were "huge," and that Italy had decided to remain engaged in the Balkans, Afghanistan and elsewhere. "We want to do our duty as part of a strong alliance," he said. In Iraq, Italy had made a clear political commitment to end its military operations and an equally clear commitment to continue its cooperation on civilian and political recon
struction in Iraq. Prodi said Italy would have no political problem renewing its commitment, asserting "our decision to be in Iraq with a different mission will be kept." He said he hoped that Foreign Minister D'Alema would visit Iraq before his June 12 meeting with Secretary Rice (DefMin Parisi was in Iraq when the meeting took place. We have heard that D'Alema plans to go on June 8.) ¶4. (C) The Ambassador reiterated that Italy's presence in Iraq was critical and had a value that transcended mere numbers. It was an important symbol of unity among Allies and a demonstration of support to the Government of Iraq. He urged the PM not to minimize the importance to the Iraqis or to the U.S. of Italy's presence on the ground and the vital role Italy plays there. Prodi answered that Italy's problem now was to find a way politically to divide the civilian work from the military engagement so that the latter could end. He was certain that Italy would find a way to do so and concluded that he had always maintained a commitment to the future of Iraq. ¶5. (C) Comment: While PM Prodi went out of his way to try to reassure us, our soundings with various GOI contacts make clear that Italy has not yet decided what it will do in Iraq. The GOI is looking at options ranging from proceeding with the plan of the previous government to convert to a PRT of 60 or so civilians protected by 600 to 800 Italian troops, to withdrawing all Italians from Nassiriyah and running an economic assistance program long-distance. FM D'Alema's meeting with Secretary Rice on June 12 will be critical to give Italy a clear sense of what we believe the costs and ROME 00001625 002.2 OF 003 benefits are of the options they are considering. The Italian decision will be made by Parliament based on recommendations from the Council of Ministers at the end of June/early July. -------------- Afghanistan -------------- ¶6. (C) Prodi turned to Afghanistan, saying that while there was some form of end in sight for Iraq, in Afghanistan, he could not discern any political vision for the future, disparate regional forces were gaining in strength and more than half the GNP was based on the drug trade. "How can you have a country like this?" he asked, adding, "in the end, we will be embarrassed." He said he was much more worried about Afghanistan's future than about Iraq's. -------------- Iran -------------- ¶7. (C) In response to Sen. Allen stressing the importance of U.S.-European unity on Iran and preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, Prodi pointed out that Italy had been Iran's top European trading partner since the 1950s, and as such, should not be excluded from fora such as the EU-3 or the P-5 plus-1. He said that Iran was much more important than Iraq, that not only did we need to keep nuclear weapons out of Iranian hands, we also needed to keep Iran from becoming "wild and out of control." Prodi suggested that we must see whether Ahmedinejad was really empowered, noting that his rhetoric was even more aggressive than that of the clerics, and added we all need to try to better understand what is going on inside Iran. -------------- Mediterranean/Middle East -------------- ¶8. (C) Prodi claimed that Italy had a responsibility to organize a Mediterranean policy that establishes links between Europe and the countries on the southern shores, and that one of his first acts would be an initiative to establish common Mediterranean institutions (universities, banks, etc.). He hoped that Morocco, Israel, Egypt and others would be receptive, and that Italy could work with Spain, France, Greece and Cyprus on this. He said the Islamic world is the most difficult audience for receiving the democratic message, but that his initiative to build common institutions could help. ¶9. (C) When Sen. Allen asked what the U.S. could do better in advancing our shared values, Prodi answered that the U.S. must share more responsibility, and cited as an example the marginal role played by Europe in the Middle East peace process. Prodi said that was not helpful to either our common interests or relations between us, but conceded that the Europeans were partly at fault because they were so divided. He repeated that the more responsibility could be shared with Europe in the Middle East, the better, adding, "we know the area well. We live in it." Sen. Allen said it would be helpful if the EU would list Hezbollah as a terrorist organization and help cut off its financing. Prodi replied that while we all must be against Hezbollah, we must take care not to cause explosions in Palestinian society. A rising death rate would have an undesirable effect. A humanitarian channel was needed. The Palestinian Authority needed to recover and perhaps win back power in the next elections. Prodi praised the Israeli initiative to allow in medical products and hospital supplies. The Ambassador said Hamas was trying to frame a false choice. The choice was not between Palestinian suffering or western support, but between Palestinian suffering and Hamas renouncing terror and recognizing Israel. -------------- ROME 00001625 003.2 OF 003 Balkans/Europe -------------- ¶10. (C) Prodi said he was convinced that EU membership must be offered as a clear political target to the countries of the Balkans or foreign troops would never be able to get out. He asked if we could imagine what today's Europe would be like if the EU had not enlarged, especially with a more assertive Russia. He hoped that the EU would take in Croatia and Macedonia soon, and in the mid-term would also bring in Albania and Bosnia. Italian troops, he said, may be there for another 20 years, but EU prospects would help hasten stability. He acknowledged that after the failure of the vote on the constitution there was more prudence among EU members towards further enlargement, and that he was taking it upon himself to try to keep Romania and Bulgaria moving toward membership (pointing out that, 10 years ago, if you had said Romania would soon be in the EU, they'd put you in an asylum). On the question of Turkish membership, he said progress had slowed, but because of lack of continued European "digestive capacity" rather than anything the Turks had or had not done. Turkish membership, he said, would be a longer and harder issue than membership for the Balkan states, who have small populations and together have one percent of the EU's GNP. Prodi said he hoped it would be possible to re-start the European process after next year's French elections. He asserted that France cannot move on EU questions until after those elections, and this would stop motion by the EU as a whole. Prodi identified two other challenges facing the EU: simplifying the constitution to focus on basic principles; and grappling with a common currency in the absence of a common fiscal policy. -------------- China -------------- ¶11. (C) Prodi asked Sen. Allen about U.S. views of China. Sen. Allen said China does not share our values, and that while it was not an enemy, it was more than just a competitor. In some ways it was an opponent. The question, he said, was whether China would liberalize and permit freedom. Chinese behavior was not, he underscored, constrained by public opinion. Prodi said he believed the Chinese leaders would have to allow liberalization when average income levels reached a certain point. ¶12. (U)Senator Allen did not have an opportunity to clear this message. SPOGLI

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