GOI LEADERS SAY ITALY WILL REMAIN STAUNCH ALLY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ROME 001450 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM IAEA IT IZ IR SR SUBJECT: GOI LEADERS SAY ITALY WILL REMAIN STAUNCH ALLY REF: ROME 1399 ROME 00001450 001.2 OF 005 Classified By: Classified by Anna Borg, Deputy Chief of Mission, for re asons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. PDAS Kurt Volker met May 8-9 with a cross-section of political and MFA representatives and stressed to elected GOI leaders the importance of continued cooperation on Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, the Balkans and other global issues. He said that Italy would remain an important ally but there should be careful coordination and no surprises - particularly on Iraq, Iran and the Israeli - Palestinian conflict. Romano Prodi, leader of the winning coalition and the next likely PM of Italy, welcomed the message and said his government looked forward to working closely with the USG (reftel). Margherita party members echoed that sentiment and added that the new center-left governing coalition would not end Italy's engagement in Iraq, but transition its presence toward reconstruction and training for Iraqi security forces. Additionally, they added that the new government would be more critical of Russia, Cuba and Venezuela than Berlusconi had been. MFA Political Director Terzi told Volker that the while the new government would refocus its attention on being a more engaged EU player, this focus would not come at the expense of Italy's relationship with the U.S. Terzi added that, historically, the GOI had maintained a consistent foreign policy and despite domestic political changes. Volker's visit was an excellent chance for both sides to underscore strong interest in maintaining excellent ties during the next government. End summary. Volker: USG wants to work with you -------------- ¶2. (C) Volker met with Romano Prodi and two advisors for a breakfast meeting on May 9, the second and most crucial day of voting for the Italian president. He had lunch with Margherita Party members Gianni Vernetti and Antonio Polito and met separately with DS party members Luciano Vecchi and Federica Mogherini. Volker also met MFA Director General for Political Affairs (Terzi),DG for the Americas (Bisogniero),Special Coordinator for Iraq (De Martino), Deputy DG for European Integration (Oliva),senior advisor in the office of Middle Eastern affairs (Scarantino),and director of the Balkans office (De Cardona). Volker had separate meetings with Francesco Talo and Marco Carnelos, diplomatic advisors to the Prime Minister, and Carlo Baldocci, diplomatic advisor to Finance Minister Tremonti. Volker's public diplomacy program included a lunch with foreign affairs editors of newspaper and television media outlets, a dinner with think tank leaders, and a press briefing for foreign affairs journalists. ¶3. (C) In his meetings with newly elected leaders and with MFA officials Volker stated that the USG valued Italy's international engagement and expected that the excellent relations between the two countries would continue. He noted that the USG expected a new government to make some adjustments to Italy's foreign policy but asked that the GOI work with the USG and other allies before making any major changes to Italy's commitments abroad. On Iran, Volker said the USG welcomed Italian efforts to expand the dialogue but only if the message remained consistent. The EU3 mechanism was a configuration chosen by the EU, not the U.S. Changing the channels of communication could allow the Iranians to focus on the messengers, not the message. Nevertheless, the U.S. supported finding a way to add Italy to the mix, possibly through the G8 consultation. On Iraq, Volker noted that Italy had been an important ally in working to bring stability to the region and any changes in Italy's posture should be done in consultation with other coalition partners and the Iraqi Government. Volker noted the need to find mechanisms to provide humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people while not giving legitimacy to Hamas as long as they refused to recognize Israel, renounce violence, and abide by previous agreements. On Venezuela, Volker encouraged Italy to avoid giving legitimacy to Hugo Chavez by meeting him and to speak out against his undemocratic behavior at home. So far, Chavez had characterized criticism of his behavior as one-sided, coming only from the U.S. It would be helpful for Italy and other European nations to speak out as well. ROME 00001450 002.2 OF 005 Prodi, Coalition Partners Stress Continuity -------------- ¶4. (C) Prodi told Volker and the Ambassador that Italy's close relationship with the U.S. would continue (reftel). MFA officials and diplomatic advisors Baldocci and Talo told Volker that Prodi was eager to get off to a good start in his relationship with the U.S. and would be very careful to ensure that Italy's closer relations with the EU did not come at the expense of its relations with the U.S. Margherita party leaders Vernetti and Polito told Volker that the new PM and his coalition were glad to hear that the USG was committed to maintaining excellent relations. Many of the Center-Left politicians had feared that the relationship depended heavily on the personal relationship between Bush and Berlusconi. Baldocci added that Prodi would seek to gain tangible recognition from the USG of the importance of Italian participation on key international decisions. Terzi urged the U.S. to take note of Italy's consistent and reliable partnership with the U.S. throughout the turbulent times that have stressed USG relations with other EU and NATO partners and insisted that the excellent relationship between the U.S. and Italy would continue. Party Leaders: No Zapatero Move in Iraq -------------- ¶5. (C) Margherita and DS party leaders, as well as MFA officials, assured Volker that Italy would remain committed to helping maintain international peace and security. Margherita party leader Vernetti grudgingly admitted that Berlusconi and Fini had made irreversible gains in Italian foreign policy that the new government would continue to build on. Terzi added that NATO would be a cornerstone of foreign policy and Italy would support enlargement of both NATO and the EU. Vecchi (DS) said the main difference on foreign policy between the Berlusconi and Prodi governments would be a new enthusiasm for the process of EU integration and revitalization. He assured Volker that despite rhetoric from the far left, military missions abroad will continue to have important symbolic value for Italy and the majority of the center left would continue to support them. Italy, he said, would work to strengthen European security and defense policy as part of a unified effort of cooperation with the U.S. and NATO. ¶6. (C) On the issue of Iraq, a key point of disagreement between Prodi and Berlusconi during the election, party leaders and MFA officials stated that despite campaign rhetoric, there would not be a Spanish-style withdrawal of Italian troops from Iraq. Instead, Italy would transition its presence to reconstruction and training roles, as planned by the Berlusconi government. MFA officials noted that the transition to a PRT presence would necessitate the deployment of troops for force protection and the details and configuration of troops would have to be worked out in coordination with the coalition and Iraqi leadership. Margherita party leader Polito told Volker that the Center Left would seek to characterize its involvement in Iraq as a humanitarian mission and support for the new Iraqi government and would not derail plans for an Italian PRT. Vecchi said Italy would take care not to create additional security problems for the Iraqi government as it transitions to its new structure in Iraq. Iran: next challenge for the international community -------------- ¶7. (C) On Iran, party leaders and MFA officials stated that a Prodi-led government will want to be among the key nations that work to resolve the problem. Italy was Iran's biggest EU trading partner. It was open to expanding the EU3 or holding a discussion on Iran within the G8. Despite Italy's disappointment about the EU3, Italy agreed in substance on the message being delivered to Iran. MFA officials and party leaders insisted that should Italy join the discussion on Iran, it would not allow Iran to create a distraction from the issue by focusing on the channel of communications rather than on the message. They noted that for diplomatic pressure to be most effective, Italy should be included. Talo noted that the Iranian issue had to be carefully coordinated ROME 00001450 003.2 OF 005 between the U.S. and EU, particularly in order to gain Russian cooperation. Carnelos wondered aloud whether the recent fatal attack against Italian troops in Iraq was a signal to Italy from Iran. The explosive device had been extremely sophisticated and it was suspected by some that expertise may have been supplied by the Iran. Improved Relations with Israel Must Continue -------------- ¶8. (C) Margherita party members told Volker that Prodi had erred in accepting a congratulatory phone call from the Hamas after his election. The new government, however, was committed to maintaining the good relations that had developed between the Berlusconi government and Israel. Party leaders and MFA officials agreed that the conditions placed on Hamas by the international community must be enforced before direct assistance to the Palestinian Authority could be offered. The key challenge would be to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe and to help the Palestinian people to understand that the financial problems facing the PA were the result of Hamas actions, not the international community. Carnelos warned that France was prepared to make major concessions on the policy of not legitimizing Hamas in order to prevent a public outcry resulting from Palestinian suffering. He urged the U.S. to lobby the GOF and other EU members not to soften the stance against Hamas. Internationally supervised distribution of assistance in PA-controlled areas could offer a solution to this problem. ¶9. (C) MFA Middle East Specialist Scarantino said that an important key to defusing many of the conflicts in the Middle East was finding a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. So far, Israel seemed to be moving in the direction of a unilateral solution - a direction that would not offer lasting peace. Margherita party member Vernetti suggested that closer NATO cooperation, or even membership in NATO could offer Israel the type of security guarantees that Israel needed in order to make major concessions. Volker responded that NATO does have a relationship with Israel, raising this issue formally now would be divisive. Ready for Renewed Efforts on Democratization -------------- ¶10. (C) In the context of the discussion of the Middle East, MFA officials and party leaders noted that Italy was prepared to work bilaterally and through the EU and NATO to advance the cause of democracy in the Middle East. Prodi was particularly interested in the EuroMed dialogue. Scarantino, however, observed that the push for democracy was seeing a greater influence of Islamist parties in Egypt, Palestine, and other places. Margherita party reps were more optimistic, noting that the party was committed to expanding contacts with NGOs, civil society, businesses and moderate party leaders in the Middle East. Vernetti noted that he recently met with the wife of imprisoned Egyptian opposition leader Ayman Nour. Volker told the MFA and Margherita party leaders that structures such as the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue and the Forum for the Future could use increased Italian attention. Balkans: Bipartisan support for Italian role -------------- ¶11. (C) Balkans Office Director De Cardona told Volker that Italy's role in the Balkans was secure. Both Center Right and Center Left politicians had recently spoken out in support of the current policy. He argued in favor of Contact Group unity and close coordination with Ahtisaari and cautioned against allowing Russia to split Contact Group unity over discussions on the timing and possible imposition of a solution. Italy recognized that Kosovo was headed in the direction of some sort of phased or supervised independence, but the recent suspension of Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) talks with Serbia and Montenegro coupled with the death of Milosevic was producing a nationalist backlash in Serbia. According to Oliva, many Serbian politicians recognized that EU membership was a long-term goal but he worried that some believed the EU had reached its "absorption capacity" and EU membership might never be achieved. This removed a significant incentive for ROME 00001450 004 OF 005 the Serbs to cooperate in the status talks. Terzi added that if the Contact Group was leaning toward an imposed solution, the status should be imposed in ways that would be palatable to the Serbian public - there should be no discussion about NATO-interoperability with Kosovar security forces, for example. The issue of representation in international organizations should also be carefully considered in the short term. De Cardona questioned whether the Contact Group might reconsider the Mladic issue in light of all of this. De Cardona also noted that the failure of Bosnian constitutional reform presented a strong challenge to the CG's efforts in Bosnia. Terzi and De Cardona recommended that this issue be raised on the margins of the G8. ¶12. (C) Volker agreed that the Kosovo issue would be difficult for the Serbian population and argued that the Mladic issue was symbolic of the failure of the Serbian public to make the psychological changes to disassociate itself from its nationalist past, but this condition was non-negotiable. The international community should make clear what the incentives and consequences for Serbia's behavior were and that the door for Serbia to enter the EU would remain open. He agreed that Russian comparisons between Kosovo and Abkhazia had no legal basis and the U.S. would continue to argue this. Backsliding: Russia, Cuba, Venezuela and others -------------- --- ¶13. (C) Margherita party leaders noted that one legacy of the Berlusconi government that would not carry over would be the lack of criticism of undemocratic behavior. Vernetti told Volker that the Margherita's roots as a Christian Democratic and Social Democratic Party compelled it to be more forceful in its criticisms of Russia, Belarus and Cuba (which he referred to as "an island prison"). Vernetti said that his party was glad that Prodi was not meeting with Hugo Chavez during his visit to Rome. Vernetti worried that Chavez, Castro, and Morales of Bolivia were ushering in a period of failed policies in Latin America. Vernetti said he would like to use his party contacts to encourage other left-leaning governments in the region to speak out against Chavez. He noted that he would like to see Italy become more involved in Latin America. ¶14. (C) Terzi and Talo cautioned that Italy's dependence on Russian oil and Russia's role in the Iran crisis would dictate a non-confrontational approach to Russia. Terzi suggested that the U.S. consider ways to avoid having the Adapted CFE Treaty lose momentum since it remains important to Italy. Volker told both Talo and Terzi that the U.S. did not see a contradiction in working with Russia on various issues and criticizing the GORF when necessary. The U.S. was hoping to use the G8 and OSCE to reenergize efforts to solve the frozen conflicts on Russia's periphery. The U.S. was trying to break Russia's strategically outmoded mindset with regards to its neighbors. Having unstable governments on its periphery would only create problems for Russia. After several years of defending OSCE and ODIHR from Russian attempts to water down their role, the USG would make proposals to strengthen the role of the organizations. On CFE, Volker told Terzi that the U.S. opposed Russian efforts to avoid complying with their Istanbul commitments and rejected any notion of letting Russia have veto power over foreign troops stationed in Georgia and Moldova. UN Reform: No Tears over Stalled UNSC Expansion, Dissatisfied with HRC -------------- -------------- ¶15. (C) Terzi and Talo said Italy was glad that efforts to expand the UN Security Council were not progressing. Terzi asked the U.S. to hold the line at no expansion beyond 21. Italy understood that the U.S. was unlikely to pursue UNSC reform while HRC and administrative reform had either not progressed well or not progressed at all. Terzi said the HRC reform was a weak compromise that had roughly preserved the status quo, but that Italy would continue to participate in its work. Volker noted that Italy had put itself up for candidacy in 2007, and while the U.S. could not endorse candidates prior to voting, Italy met the criteria for countries that the U.S. would support. ROME 00001450 005.2 OF 005 ¶16. (C) Comment. All of our interlocutors stressed that Prodi wanted to make sure that U.S.- Italian relations did not suffer from the transition and portrayed him as a man who would be extremely careful not to send the wrong messages to the U.S. as he takes the reins of power. The willingness of party and GOI officials to make time for these meetings during a particularly intense day of political activity reinforced that message. Post was grateful that PDAS Volker could visit at the very early stages of transition. ¶17. PDAS Volker did not have an opportunity to clear this message before departing. SPOGLI