SHI'A TRADITIONALIST LAMENTS SHIRAZI ASCENDANCY IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 005513 SIPDIS SIPDIS DHAHRAN SENDS PARIS FOR ZEYA, LONDON FOR TSOU E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/11/2016 TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL SA SUBJECT: SHI'A TRADITIONALIST LAMENTS SHIRAZI ASCENDANCY IN QATIF REF: A. RIYADH 3312 ¶B. 2005 RIYADH 9396 Classified by Consul General John Kincannon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- A Latent Conflict Seethes -------------- ¶1. (C) Kamal Al-Khatti, a Riyadh-based social researcher formerly employed by Prince Abdulaziz bin Fahd and son of Qatif's late and revered Judge Abdulhamid Al-Khatti, told the CG and ConOffs that the Shirazis (ref A) now dominated Qatif and the Saudi Shi'a community politically, but that a latent conflict seethed below the surface between the Shirazis and Qatif's traditional families. Al-Khatti described the Shirazis, led by Hassan Al-Saffar and including Jafar Al-Shayeb and several others of Qatif's elected municipal council members, as well-organized activists whose power bases, developed through charitable societies and other means, extended well beyond the traditional central area of Qatif (known as the Qala', or fortress) and into neighboring towns and villages. The expansion of the Shirazis' power, Al-Khatti continued, came at the expense of the powerful traditional families of the Qala', e.g. the Khunaizis, Jishis, Awamis, Seifs, Ghanems, and others. "You can't see it from the outside," he said, "but these families resent the Shirazis and are just waiting for an opportunity to regain their power." Al-Khatti noted that the traditional families currently lacked strong leadership, saying that his uncle Abdullah Al-Khunaizi, Shi'a judge from 2002 to 2005, was "too short-tempered to be an effective leader" and that Sayyid Mounir Al-Khabbaz, a well-regarded cleric, was "an excellent scholar but with no political ambitions and not good in public affairs." ¶2. (C) In addition to Shirazi dominance at the municipal council ballot box, Al-Khatti named several other ways the Shirazis were pushing the traditionalists out. He said that Ghalib Al-Hammad, whom the SAG appointed to replace Abdullah Al-Khunaizi as Qatif's Shi'a judge (ref B),was not a Shirazi himself, but he received the support of the Shirazis partly because he was from Tarut, and not from a traditional Qala' family. Citing Hassan Al-Hamza's two volume book on the Saudi Shi'a (not translated into English),he also claimed that the Shirazis were attempting to rewrite Qatif's history �00A;to downplay the leadership role of the traditional families and exaggerate the importance of groups from the outlying towns and villages. Al-Khatti said that he was hoping to write a modern history of the Shi'a that would take issue with Al-Hamza's portrayal. ¶3. (C) Al-Khatti described the Shirazis as a "political party" but said that their main goal was to lead the Shi'a community rather than to implement any particular platform. "Even if some of them would want to partition Saudi Arabia (thus creating an oil-rich state the Shi'a could dominate)," he volunteered, "they know it cannot be done and that it's not realistic. What they want is to be the recognized leaders of the Shi'a in Qatif and Al-Ahsa." Al-Khatti, who admitted that he was against the Shirazis "only because I am from a traditional family," gave Hassan Al-Saffar credit for his role in making the Shirazis a political force in the Shi'a community in Saudi Arabia and beyond. "Once (Mohammad ibn Mahdi Al-Hussaini Al-) Shirazi died (in 2001),the religious leadership went to his brother (Sadiq Al-Shirazi) and nephew (Mohammad Taghi Al-Mudarrasi),but it is Hassan Al-Saffar and Hadi Al-Mudarrasi (another nephew) who are the real political activists. Look at Hadi Al-Mudarrasi's work with the Shi'a in Bahrain. Anywhere the Shirazis are strong, it is because of one of these two." -------------- The Shirazis, Iran, and Saudi Hezbollah -------------- ¶4. (C) Asked by the CG about the Shirazis' feelings toward Iran, Al-Khatti said that their interests had diverged. "They used to agree with Iran on two things," he noted. "They both opposed the Saudi government and (Ayatollah Abu Al-Qasim) Al-Khoei, whom the Shirazis disliked because he didn't recognize Al-Shirazi as a marja'. But then Al-Khoei died (in 1992) and the Shirazis and the Saudi government came to an understanding (in 1993)." Al-Khatti said there was plenty of latent sympathy for Iran among the Saudi Shi'a community, giving an example from some years ago of a popular RIYADH 00005513 002 OF 002 cleric from Seihat with an Arab nationalist bent who found himself shunned by the community after warning that Iran would use the Saudi Shi'a for its own national interests. Al-Khatti characterized Saudi Hezbollah as "inactive and idle" but identified a Saudi Shi'a named Hassan Al-Mustafa, jailed by the SAG for 18 months after the Khobar Towers bombingin 1996 but then released, as one of its younger intellectual leaders. Al-Mustafa, he said, followed in the political tradition of former president Khatami of Iran and his Minister of Culture: "They make themselves out to be reformers and are open to talking about women's rights, but at the end of the day they believe in wilayet al-faqih." Asked by the CG if Iran was active in the EP, Al-Khatti said he did not know of any current activities but claimed that "Iran could revive its network at any time it wants." -------------- Comment -------------- ¶5. (C) Al-Khatti is the first Shi'a to speak so openly to us about the rivalry between the Shirazis and the traditional families of Qatif, although we have certainly sensed it from his uncle, among others. Individuals who fit the Saudi Shi'a "Shirazi" profile - i.e., former followers of Mohammad Al-Shirazi who spent a significant portion of the period 1980 to 1993 outside Saudi Arabia - seem to be in most leadership positions in the Saudi Shi'a community and to be the most active politically. They seem united in their current agenda of pushing for greater rights and recognition for the Shi'a within the Saudi system (ref A). We plan to explore further over the coming year the extent to which and the mechanisms by which leading Shirazis coordinate their actions, as well as possible differences among them. End comment. (APPROVED: KINCANNON) OBERWETTER