AL-HASA SHI'A WELCOME U.S. INTERVENTION IN IRAQ,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 000042 SIPDIS SIPDIS DHAHRAN SENDS PARIS FOR ZEYA, LONDON FOR TSOU E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PTER KISL SA KIFR SUBJECT: AL-HASA SHI'A WELCOME U.S. INTERVENTION IN IRAQ, SEEK IMPROVEMENTS AT HOME Classified by Acting Consul General Ramin Asgard for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Members of the Shi'a community in Al-Hasa welcomed U.S. intervention in Iraq, saying an almost unqualified "thank you" during lunch with Acting CG and PolOff. Although noting some progress in the SAG's campaign against home-grown terrorism, they said that the government's campaign for tolerance had yet to change the negative feelings many Saudi Sunnis had toward Shi'a. The Shi'a religious figures present at lunch exhibited a diversity of ties to Shi'a clerics and institutions in Iraq and Iran but stressed that these ties were religious, not political, in nature. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) Hussein Ali Al-Ali, a prominent Hasawi businessman and chairman of the Hussein Al-Ali Establishment conglomerate, invited Acting CG and PolOff to his house in Hufuf for lunch on December 28 to meet members of Al-Hasa's Shi'a community. Al-Hasa is one of the two largest centers of the Saudi Shi'a population in the Eastern Province (EP), the other being Qatif. Al-Hasa's 800,000 residents, slightly less than half of whom are Shi'a, live in small cities, towns, and villages scattered throughout Al-Hasa, Saudi Arabia's largest oasis. Lunch guests included businessmen, the vice president and secretary general of Al-Hasa's municipal council, and local Shi'a religious figures and activists. The Shi'a clerics were accorded places of honor by the other attendees during the lunch. -------------- Iraq: "Thank You" -------------- ¶3. (C) At least three guests said "we thank you" to acting CG and PolOff in reference to U.S. intervention in Iraq. Sheikh Hashem Al-Sayyid Mohammad Al-Salman, head of Al-Hasa's "hawza", the only Shi'ite religious school permitted in Saudi Arabia; Sheikh Adel Bu Khamsin; and Sadek Al-Jubran, a lawyer and activist who was (and may still be) an associate of Hassan Al-Saffar, all noted that the opening up of Iraq, the introduction of democracy, and the freedom now enjoyed by the Iraqi Shi'a represented very positive developments. While many of our Qatifi Shi'a contacts have qualified their support for U.S. intervention in Iraq with reference to the ;ongoing violence, the only qualification in this group came from Bu Khamsin: "What is preventing the U.S. from making the same demands of Saudi Arabia? Is it your interest in oil?" -------------- Challenges at Home -------------- ¶4. (C) As Bu Khamsin's question indicates, our interlocutors were unhappy with the degree of freedom and acceptance accorded to the Saudi Shi'a. Noting that extremist ideology was still endemic in schools, books, and ministries such as the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Al-Jubran said that an intensive "national project" was needed to rid Saudi Arabia of this ideology. While acknowledging that the SAG was making progress on the security front in killing or capturing terrorists, Al-Jubran argued that its ideological campaign against extremism was falling short. Efforts like the National Dialogue, he said, "reach only the cream of society." While accepting that programs like "Experiments in the Name of Jihad," a series shown on Saudi TV that features interviews with returned "jihadis" and discussion intended to show how misguided and deceived the jihadis were, were well intentioned, Al-Jubran commented, "But who watches Saudi TV? Maybe the government produced it to convince you, the Americans, how committed it is to fighting terrorism." Al-Salman made reference to the struggle faced by the Saudi Shi'a to gain equal treatment by the SAG less directly, recounting his long, frustrating, but ultimately successful efforts in petitioning the government to allow the hawza, which has 350 students (including 100 female students),to move from cramped quarters in a mosque to a new building. He welcomed a visit by ConOffs to the hawza as long as we received permission from the proper authorities. ¶5. (C) Several lunch guests had chosen to take active roles in two new institutions to begin to address important grievances, though not necessarily grievances specific to the Shi'a community. Abdul Aziz Al-Bahrani, an elected member of the Al-Hasa municipal council recently selected by its members as the council's vice-president, discussed the need for greater development of the Al-Hasa area (to be reported septel),while Mohammad Al-Jubran, brother of Sadeq Al-Jubran, spoke of his appointment to the EP branch of the National Human Rights Association. The branch will open formally in several weeks, Al-Jubran explained, but will accept petitions and complaints for investigation and/or referral to the Association's headquarters in Riyadh even before its formal opening. PolOff noted that other contacts had expressed skepticism that the association, given its affiliation with the SAG, would actually be able to accomplish anything. "It is important to advance awareness of human rights and bring abuses to the government's attention," Al-Jubran replied, indicating that he intended to see if the association could be one vehicle to achieve these goals. (Note: Another member of the EP branch is Jafar Al-Shayeb, a Shi'ite activist from Qatif. End note.) -------------- A Network of Religious Ties Abroad -------------- ¶6. (C) Each person we asked confirmed that the majority of the Shi'a of Al-Hasa, like the Shi'a of Qatif, follow Ayatollah Sistani as their "marja'", or religious authority, with the rest following a variety of other figures, mainly in Iraq or Iran. Bu Khamsin noted that the institution of the marja' was based on doctrine and teachings, not the geographic location of the marja'. All of the religious figures present at lunch had studied abroad, in Najaf (especially the older ones),Qom, Karbala (less frequently), or some combination of the three. In response to PolOffs's question about the nature of the ties between Saudi Shi'a and Iran, Al-Salman stressed that the ties were "religious in nature, not political." He said that he did not see evidence of Iran trying to influence the Saudi Shi'a as it had in the early 1980s when it attempted to export its revolutionary doctrine. "They have to take charge of their own affairs right now," he continued, "and that is enough to keep them busy." He concluded by saying that the Saudi Shi'a were seeking their full rights and equal treatment as Saudi citizens, nothing more. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) This trip was our first large-scale foray into the Shi'a community in Al-Hasa. The Hasawi Shi'a have a reputation for being less activist than their counterparts in Qatif, but they clearly have organizational networks, particularly religious ones, and share many of the same perspectives and grievances as the Qatifi Shi'a. In addition, some community leaders have chosen, as they have in Qatif, to use new Saudi institutions, such as the municipal councils and the National Human Rights Association, to promote their agendas. We will follow closely the experience of the Shi'a, both Hasawi and Qatifi, with these institutions as a measure both of how much power and autonomy the SAG is willing to grant the institutions and how satisfied our Shi'a interlocutors are with these avenues of participation. End comment. (APPROVED: ASGARD) OBERWETTER