POST-ABQAIQ MINISTER OF INTERIOR FORMALLY REQUESTS

S E C R E T RIYADH 001542 SIPDIS SIPDIS DOE FOR OFFICE OF POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, JHART AND GPERSON, STATE FOR NEA/ARPI, PM/RSAT, S/CT, DS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2016 TAGS: PTER MASS MARR ASEC PREL EPET ETRD SA SUBJECT: POST-ABQAIQ MINISTER OF INTERIOR FORMALLY REQUESTS HELICOPTER SUPPORT AND SECURITY CONSULTATION FOR OIL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION REF: (A) RIYADH 1255 (B) RIYADH 1091 (C) AMBASSADOR OBERWETTER'S 2/25 LETTER TO THE SECRETARY Classified By: AMBASSADOR JAMES C. OBERWETTER FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (U) This is an action request. ¶2. (S) Summary and Action Request: Post requests Department's prompt review and guidance in responding to the Saudi government's formal request for helicopter support and security consultations, for the security of oil facilities in the Kingdom. Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal and Assistant Minister of Interior Mohammad bin Nayif March 11 formally requested to lease 20 Blackhawk and 10 Chinook helicopters, and the services of U.S. training personnel, to train Saudi pilots until new helicopters could be made available. The Saudi leaders indicated that the SAG had placed a tender and had been in touch with various helicopter-producing firms, and also suggested that U.S. firms would have an advantage in the procurement bidding process if the U.S. could now make leased helicopters available. The Foreign Minister and Prince Mohammad also asked for consultations for Aramco on oil facilities protection, commenting that the SAG "needed to train our people to protect oil facilities." End Summary and Action Request. -------------- Helicopters -------------- ¶3. (S) Ambassador Oberwetter met March 11 with Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal at the latter's request. Assistant Minister of Interior Mohammad bin Nayif and Deputy Political Counselor (notetaker) also attended the meeting. The Foreign Minister began by stating that the subject of the meeting would be the SAG's request for helicopters and that Prince Mohammad would be briefing on the request. The Ambassador noted that in response to the SAG's request a week ago, the Embassy's Defense Attache and Political-Military officers had reviewed all available options for providing the requested helicopters as quickly as possible. They had determined that refurbishing out-of-commission helicopters would take only six months, while the process for ordering and receiving delivery of new helicopters would take 18 months. The Ambassador explained that the latter process was longer because all helicopters currently in the production pipeline are earmarked for end use already. ¶4. (S) Prince Mohammad began his presentation by noting that he was briefing the Foreign Minister and Ambassador together because "we are all on one team." He then indicated that the Ministry of Interior (MOI) was seeking to lease 20 Blackhawks (medium-weight) and 10 Chinook (heavy-weight) with which to train pilots until new helicopters arrive. Prince Mohammed stressed that the MOI was seeking operational U.S. helicopters and training personnel to come to Saudi Arabia to train while the MOI waited for the new helicopters. He indicated that the SAG had already placed a tender and had been in touch with various helicopter manufacturers, including Boeing, which he said had an operator in Oregon with KV-47s and CH-47s available. Prince Mohammad told the Ambassador that if the U.S. could provide the requested leased helicopters and trainers, American defense firms would have the upper hand in the procurement bidding process, since the Saudi pilots would be familiar with the U.S. products. ¶5. (S) The Foreign Minister asked the Ambassador if the MOI plan was feasible. The Ambassador replied that, while there may be scattered helicopters here and there, he could not say whether they were available in the numbers requested by the SAG. In fact, he said, given current U.S. military commitments, he could not even say whether any Blackhawks or Chinooks could be spared. The Ambassador added that in addition to crews and qualified trainers, such a plan would require qualified maintenance personnel and dedicated storage facilities. The Foreign Minister pointed out that the requested helicopters were intended to guard oil facilities which, if they were lost to attacks, would affect both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. He added that the SAG was asking if helicopters already planned for the military could be redirected. Prince Mohammad also added that he knew the U.S. military had plenty of Blackhawks and that, even though they were requesting 30 helicopters overall, the MOI would be happy to start with less than that. He again noted that the U.S. would have the upper hand in the procurement bidding process if helicopters are provided immediately for training. The Ambassador told the Saudi leaders that the USG would review the request, adding that he was aware that the attack on Abqaiq had been much closer to succeeding than generally acknowledged. -------------- Security Consultations -------------- ¶6. (S) Continuing in the same vein, Prince Mohammad asked if the U.S. could provide a "real professional person" to help the MOI advise Aramco on oil facilities protection. The Ambassador noted that an American team visited the Kingdom roughly two years ago and made suggestions on security improvements to oil facilities, specifically Abqaiq. Some of those suggestions had been followed, while others were not. The Ambassador commented that it appeared that except for a few bombings in Riyadh, all other terrorist attacks in the Kingdom -- including the attack on Consulate General Jeddah in 2004 -- involved the attackers breaching the gate of a facility. He said the Abqaiq attack followed the same pattern. The Ambassador concluded by noted that the USG could send an ATA team to conduct a vital installation security course. Prince Mohammad responded by stating that the SAG "needed to train our people to protect oil facilities." He said the SAG needed both human and mechanical protection systems to overcome the risks involved with terrorist attacks. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶7. (S) Although they apparently accepted Post's cautions about the lead time involved in new helicopter procurement, SAG leaders clearly believe that the U.S. can provide aircraft for a short-term fix until new aircraft become available. The SAG also appears to have rejected Post's recommendation of a fast track maintenance program to bring more of its helicopters on line. The rejection is probably due to an MOI preference for its own helicopter fleet, a lack of well-trained pilots in any of the military and security services, and a reluctance by Ministry of Defense and Aviation services to compromise what operational capability they have by lending their resources to the MOI. RSAF Commander General al-Faisal recently told with visiting CENTAF Commander General North that he needed more helicopter pilot training, commenting that because the Saudi Arabia National Guard (SANG) and the MOI were developing helicopter assets, "everyone is asking me for pilots." ¶8. (S) Comment continued: The Ambassador will offer the same security training courses to Saudi Aramco via Petroleum Minister al Naimi at a meeting the Ambassador has requested. Prince Mohammad's comments concerning the protective forces in place were far less than complimentary, confirming previous post reporting about the lackadaisical performance of Saudi guard forces during the Abqaiq attack. In discounting the reliability and performance of Saudi Arabia's armed guards, he seems to be searching for a silver bullet to take their place. End Comment. OBERWETTER