Petrobras Seeking Alternatives to Bolivian Gas

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 RIO DE JANEIRO 000234 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR WHA/BSC AND WHA/AND NSC FOR CRONIN DOE FOR SLADISLAW, GWARD STATE PASS OPIC FOR RGREENBURG, DMORONESE STATE PASS EXIM FOR NATALIE WEISS, COCONNER USDOC FOR 3134/USFCS/OIO/WH/SHUPKA USDOC FOR 4332/ITA/MAC/WH/OLAC/MWARD AID/W FOR LAC/AA E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EPET ENRG ECON PGOV PREL BR SUBJECT: Petrobras Seeking Alternatives to Bolivian Gas REFS: A) LA PAZ 1316 and previous B) BRASILIA 888 and previous C) SAO PAULO 512 (U) This cable is Sensitive But Unclassified; please protect accordingly. -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) In a recent conversation with Consul General, Petrobras officials indicated that they did not anticipate that the Bolivia-Brazil crisis will lead to any short or medium term disruption in gas supply to Brazil. Petrobras, however, will accelerate the development of gas reserves in the Santos Basin and may turn to fuel oil as a substitute for natural gas imports. Our interlocutors noted that although Petrobras expected Morales to nationalize Bolivia's natural gas industry, the unfriendly way it was conducted, with troops occupying the company's facilities, was a big surprise. Meanwhile, the price of gas imports from Bolivia remains to be negotiated. Our Petrobras contacts further stated that the Bolivian nationalization, which was spurring the Brazilian government to develop its domestic gas supplies with the goal of gas self-sufficiency, had undermined Venezuelan President Chavez's planned gas mega-pipeline to Brazil and Argentina. End Summary. ¶2. (U) On May 15, Consul General, Political Officer and Pol/Econ Specialist met with Petrobras officials, Edimilson Antonio Dato Sant'Anna, Director of Operations and Logistics, and Heitor Miranda Madeira da Silva, Executive Manager, to discuss the Petrobras-Bolivia gas situation. In accordance with the nationalization decree, Bolivian President Evo Morales sent military troops on May 1 to occupy foreign oil and gas fields and installations, and gave foreign companies six months to agree to new contracts or leave Bolivia (ref A). Petrobras representatives indicated that while the company was fully aware of Morales' campaign promise to nationalize the oil and gas industry, it had been expecting a transition period with negotiations, not the occupation of their facilities by the Bolivian military. -------------- The Flow of Gas from Bolivia -------------- ¶3. (U) Petrobras is the largest foreign investor in Bolivia with USD 1.5 billion invested there. According to the two Petrobras officials, the company's activities in Bolivia generate yearly revenues of USD 1.2 billion, equivalent to about 15% of Bolivia's GDP. Prior to the nationalization decree, USD 600 million of this total had been destined for Bolivian government coffers, although now the decree would raise the government's take to USD 850 million. ¶4. (U) Sant'Anna and da Silva stated that Brazil's daily production of natural gas is 10 million cubic meters and daily imports from Bolivia are 26 million cubic meters. This total daily consumption of 36 million cubic meters is divided as follows: 25.2 for the distributors, 6.3 for the thermoelectric plants, and 4.5 for the refineries. (Note: official GoB statistics from the National Petroleum Agency paint a somewhat different picture, with Bolivian gas RIO DE JAN 00000234 002 OF 003 accounting for between 43% and 47% of Brazil's daily consumption.) According to the Rio de Janeiro State Secretary for Energy, the state is partially protected from SIPDIS any shortfall in the supply of natural gas from Bolivia. Only 20 percent of the natural gas consumed in the state of Rio comes from Bolivia, while 80 percent comes from the Campos basin, north of Rio de Janeiro. -------------- Alternatives for Brazil -------------- ¶5. (U) Although our interlocutors declared that "there is a general consensus" that Brazil will not suffer any disruptions in its gas supply, they also observed that Petrobras was already studying alternatives to substitute natural gas imports -- from conversion of industrial facilities (steel, glass and ceramics in particular) to fuel oil from gas, acceleration of the production of natural gas from the Santos basin, and development of alternative sources of energy (biodiesel, ethanol). ¶6. (SBU) Sant'Anna stated that Petrobras' strategic plan already had contemplated accelerating the development of natural gas from the Santos Basin. Initially, the timetable predicts daily production for 2008 in the range of 8 to 9 million cubic meters, after completion and installation of the Mexilhao platform. By the end of 2010, the company estimates daily production would reach 30 million cubic meters. On May 18, Brazil's National Energy Policy Council (CNPE),an advisory body to President Lula that includes the Ministers of Energy and Agriculture and Petrobras' President, approved the accelerated Santos Basin development plan. To reach the target production levels, Petrobras estimates investments on the order of USD 16 billion, with the majority of this investment occurring between 2007 and 2011, when the construction of the ten platforms necessary for the completion of the project, will take place. (Comment. In the past, a number of independent analysts have noted that the notion that Petrobras will be able to get any significant amount of gas from the Santos Basin prior to 2010 is extremely optimistic. End Comment.) ¶7. (U) A second alternative would be to substitute natural gas imports with fuel oil. Petrobras' total natural gas imports are equivalent (boe - barrels of oil equivalent) to 100 thousand barrels of oil per day. In an interview with the press, Petrobras President Jose Sergio Gabrielli said that the company has the capacity to substitute all the natural gas imported from Bolivia with domestically produced oil. Petrobras exported an average of 250 thousand barrels of oil during the first three months of 2006, and could easily re-direct part of this volume to domestic consumption. Separately, on May 18 Petrobras announced that in September 2005 it had begun a pilot project in which it converted a (relatively small scale) thermal power generation plant to burn any one of several fuels, including gas, fuel oil, Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) or ethanol. -------------- The Need for Compensation -------------- ¶8. (SBU) The Petrobras officials believed the company would be indemnified adequately for any losses in Bolivia, based on RIO DE JAN 00000234 003 OF 003 the agreements it had previously signed with the Bolivian government. Petrobras will fight for its rights, Sant'Anna said, noting that the company has maintained a tough public stance and will not make further investments in Bolivia due to the 82 percent tax. Brazil needs to give Bolivia a dose of reality, our interlocutors declared. -------------- Alternatives for Bolivia -------------- ¶9. (SBU) According to Petrobras officials, it would take a minimum of five years for Bolivia to build up alternatives to the gas exports to Brazil. Were Bolivia somehow to identify new export customers, it could construct a new gas pipeline or a plant to liquefy the gas (LNG) for export. Another option would be to construct a petrochemical plant. -------------- Venezuelan (and Brazilian) Pipedreams -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Sant'Anna also stated that major petroleum projects in South America are in danger now, especially the project to construct a ten thousand-kilometer gas pipeline connecting Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela. He then turned his fire on Lula's foreign policy, arguing that President Lula's dream of promoting greater South American integration, with Brazil as the continent's leader, was totally impracticable now in view of the situation in Bolivia. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Petrobras is mounting a multi-pronged effort to persuade the Bolivians that Brazil has alternatives to Bolivian gas in both the short and long term. Some of the recent press publicizing these options doubtless is more negotiating strategy than reality. Brazil's ethanol supplies, for example, already are strained meeting the domestic demand for automotive fuel, and would not serve as a serious alternative for thermal power generation. Development of the Santos basin, while promising, is likely to take longer to yield significant quantities of gas than Petrobras posits. Brazil does, however, have sufficient oil should industry need to convert from gas to another fuel. Most importantly, there is little doubt that the GoB and Petrobras have decided on a gas self-sufficiency strategy and will move consistently in that direction. This will have repercussions not only for Bolivia, but for any other prospective suppliers. ¶12. (U) This cable was coordinated with AmEmbassy Brasilia. ATKINS