C O N F I D E N T I A L REYKJAVIK 000098

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

OSLO FOR DATT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/21/2016
TAGS: MARR PREL MASS IC
SUBJECT: ICELAND: JUSTICE MINISTER FRUSTRATED -- AND
LOOKING FOR HELP ON SAR CAPABILITY

Classified By: AMBASSADOR CAROL VAN VOORST, REASONS 1.4 (B & D).


1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador met with the Icelandic
Justice Minister 3/22 as part of post's roll-out of the U.S.
decision to remove fighter aircraft and CSAR helicopters from
Naval Air Station Keflavik (NASKEF). The Minister expressed
deep disappointment at the "unilateral" decision and listed
other Allied countries he calculated might fill U.S. shoes.
He did not, however, rule out continued defense cooperation
with the U.S. and urged that the U.S. team bring detailed
offers to the negotiating table. As the minister responsible
for the Coast Guard, he was especially focused on the need to
avoid any drop in SAR capabilities when the U.S. helicopters
leave. End summary.


2. (C) The Ambassador, with poloff as notetaker, called on
Icelandic Minister of Justice and Ecclesiastical Affairs
Bjorn Bjarnason March 22 to discuss the U.S. announcement
March 15 that we would remove by the end of the fiscal year
the four F-15 jets and the five combat search-and-rescue
(CSAR) helicopters now stationed there.

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Shock and Thaw
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3. (C) The Ambassador asked Bjarnason his views on necessary
next steps to continue cooperation in the security and safety
areas that fall under his responsibilities. Bjarnason
questioned U.S. dependability as a guarantor of Iceland's
security and expressed deep disappointment with the U.S.
decision.


4. (C) The Ambassador reviewed the several years of U.S.
efforts to prepare the Icelanders for the departure of the
aircraft and summarized "feverish" preparations now underway
in Washington to come to Reykjavik in a few days with clear
proposals on how we can provide Iceland with a visible and
credible defense. In response, Bjarnason pulled out a 2004
memorandum that his ministry had prepared regarding
"co-operation, exchange of information and mutual assistance
between Iceland and USA" and conceded that he was still
interested in working together with us in all these areas,
viz., civil defense, WMD issues, border control and organized
crime, training of the Icelandic Special Police (SWAT) Force,
and search and rescue. The last was his greatest concern, he
said, and replacing the U.S. CSAR helicopters would be his
highest priority over the next several weeks. The Icelandic
government had been planning and budgeting to take over the
SAR function in FY08; the advanced timetable left it with a
looming critical gap in capabilities.


5. (C) Bjarnason emphasized that Iceland has "more cards to
play than the bilateral one." He noted Foreign Minister Geir
Haarde's recent contacts with the Norwegians, British, and
French, as well as Danish interest in possibly formalizing
North Atlantic SAR cooperation. He said, however, he had
already been approached by Sikorsky, which expressed interest
in selling helicopters to Iceland, and expected to hear from
other vendors as well. Queried by the Ambassador, he
confirmed Iceland was also looking into the option of
contracting with a private firm for temporary SAR services.


6. (C) Comment: Bjarnason's father was Foreign Minister when
Iceland signed the 1951 Defense Agreement, and Bjarnason has
been a decades-long supporter and defender of bilateral
defense cooperation. The key take-away message from this
meeting is that Iceland is eager to see what we can put on
the table at the upcoming bilateral discussion and that, as
Haarde told U/S Burns, the search and rescue issue is of
critical and immediate concern to the Icelandic government.
End comment.
van Voorst