NLD IN CENTRAL BURMA: TREADING WATER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000946 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM ECON PREL BM NLD SUBJECT: NLD IN CENTRAL BURMA: TREADING WATER REF: RANGOON 287 Classified By: P/E: Mark B. Taylor; for Reasons 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Facing repressive measures by regional authorities, the NLD struggles to maintain minimal activities in the key central divisions of Mandalay and Magwe. Elder party leaders shrugged off the effects of the SPDC's public campaign to coerce NLD resignations, but hope for "outside help" to rekindle Burma's dispirited opposition. The GOB closely watches NLD youth and students and prevents them from organizing or communicating and coordinating with the NLD's leadership. NLD leaders in central Burma highlighted growing involvement of USDA in intimidation efforts. END SUMMARY. 2.(C) During a June 22-23 visit to Mandalay, Emboffs met with five members of the NLD's Mandalay Division Committee. The Mandalay Committee members voiced their intention to maintain limited party activities, but expressed concern over moves by the SPDC to tighten control through the state-made mass mobilization organization, Union Solidarity Development Association (USDA). Chairman Bo Zan recounted personal attacks on him and other NLD members by suspected USDA members on motorcycle. (reftel). 3.(C) The NLD members expressed keen interest in the UN Security Council resolution proposed by the USG. In particular, they asked how the resolution would fare with Chinese and Russian opposition. Emboff acknowledged that PRC and Russian resistance presents a challenge to the UNSC initiative and noted that discussions on the resolution were ongoing in New York and other countries. The NLD members noted the regime's alarm over the prospective resolution and expressed hope that the initiative would succeed. According to the NLD officials, Burmese people, too afraid to speak out themselves, put the burden of political dissent on the NLD, which sees "outside help" as essential to break the political stalemate. Chairman U Bo Zan cited many examples in history when Burmese rulers sought outside assistance in the fight for self-determination. 4.(C). The NLD elders then discussed the government's public campaign touting the resignations of key NLD members in Mandalay Division. Chairman U Bo Zan declared that most of the resigning NLD members were unknown to the party leaders in the Division. In a recent group of 40 resignations in the Mandalay area, only two of the "members" were known to be active, added Daw Win Mya Mya. "They are lying," concluded the NLD officials, who expressed confidence that this public campaign would not have a serious effect on the NLD. Later, however, the NLD leaders spoke about the deleterious effects of the government's efforts, often through the USDA, to lure NLD members away from the party by offering bribes and perks, such as permission to engage in illegal businesses. The regime promises "hundreds of lakhs" of kyat (equivalent to thousands of dollars) to some NLD officials, they complained. The elder politicians also inquired about the future of the former U.S. Consulate in Mandalay, which they hoped would be reopened to represent America and indirectly help the NLD. 5.(C) The five elder officials noted that they continue to hold monthly party meetings in private residences and issue statements to the international media and external supporters. The NLD office in Mandalay remains closed, although its sign remains. Party Secretary U Kan Htun described how party members repainted the fading and paint-chipped sign over the office at night without taking the sign down. Removal and replacement of the sign, claimed the Secretary, would have broken a regulation against erecting new political party signs. TAKING THE DEBAYIN ATTACK TO THE HAGUE? -------------- 6.(C) Daw Win Mya Mya revisited the violent USDA attack on Daw Aung Sang Suu Kyi and her entourage in Debayin on May 30, 2003, showing Emboff the scars remaining from wounds she suffered in that attack. Not only has the SPDC failed to investigate the attack, noted the Party's Mandalay Secretary, but its security personnel arrested her and others who survived the attack, releasing them with a warning that "you have not been interviewed." NLD members infer from this warning that it could be used by authorities a pretext to re-arrest and "investigate" them at any time. Win Mya Mya then revealed a proposal developed by the Mandalay Committee, to bring the Debayin incident before the International Court of Justice in The Hague. She noted that the drivers of the vehicles ferrying USDA members to the site, who she intimated are sympathetic to the NLD, are available as eye witnesses to the violence and killings. 7.(C) If the international media revisits the Debayin massacre in the international media, and holds the SPDC accountable, the NLD Mandalay office hopes to rekindle a national uprising, Win Mya Mya disclosed. The Mandalay NLD office is in a "pre-assessment" phase, according to Win Mya May, and seeks guidance on how to present the case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) with the highest prospects of success. She acknowledged that the Mandalay Committee had not yet raised this proposal with the NLD's National Committee in Rangoon, but will do so soon. She also opined that the proposal, which would undoubtedly raise the SPDC's ire, might not yield the National Committee's approval since the "uncles" in Rangoon seek to encourage contacts with the regime. LIKE THIEVES THEY CHASE US -------------- ¶8. (C) Daw Win Mya Mya noted that the Mandalay Committee's members are watched more closely now. She predicted that there would be security personnel waiting for the five NLD officials after the meeting and she was proven correct. She described the recently increased monitoring of NLD officials' movements by security personnel, who she claimed are assisted by USDA members trained in surveillance, by saying "they act like thieves, chasing us everywhere." TIGHT CONTROL ON NLD IN MAGWE -------------- 9.(C) Magwe Division, one of the country's largest sources of agricultural output and recruits for the Army, is not known for tolerating political dissent. The Division capital was one of Burma's few cities that saw no significant public protests in the summer of 1988. Magwe NLD Committee officers, contacted in Rangoon during the commemoration of Aung San Suu Kyi's birthday, claimed to be "rebuilding" and focused on strengthening the Party's role in Magwe, but they asked that Emboffs not contact them while visiting Magwe, as such a visit would provoke additional suppression of the Party's activities in the state. Emboffs found that other local figures, such as a politically active monk with no direct ties to the NLD, were also reluctant to meet them during their visit. MAGWE NLD YOUTH DISPIRITED, REALISTIC -------------- 10.(C) On June 27 Emboffs met in Magwe town with five representatives of the NLD Youth in the residence of one of the "Youth" who had been imprisoned for several years following the 1988 uprising. Three are now in their late thirties or early forties; two were in their twenties. As a group, they disparaged the new generation of students, describing them as politically inert, "with eyes and ears shut." They admitted, however, that some younger students still "see the light" and get involved despite the greater risks. The older students credited international support for the opposition in Burma but stated that the onus for pushing the regime was on those inside the country. They expressed appreciation for meeting with a USG official, and stressed that they are under unprecedented control now. Parents are afraid that their children's' political behavior could result in a student being barred from matriculation exams or entering university. One of the younger students noted that parents now get nervous when students listen to RFA or DVB at home. 11.(C) They described a new, lower threshold of dissent that now provokes a harsh response from the regime. For example, the NLD youth cited a modest 2006 action by current Magwe University students. The students protested a hike in the cost of bus transport from the center of Magwe to the new campus on the far outskirts of town. Police broke up the protest and expelled ten students identified as leaders. 12.(C) Illustrating the bleak prospects for Burma's youth today, one student said that, of his two daughters in their twenties, one has graduated university but can only find work selling snacks from a roadside store. The other daughter for the past year attended one of the SPDC's "computer colleges" where all the computers are inoperable. She has never operated a functioning computer. "What future do my daughters face?" he asked in despair. 13.(C) The Magwe youth claimed the forced NLD resignation campaign has yet to hit Magwe Division, but they acknowledged significant official pressure, particularly on students, to join the Union Solidarity Development Association (USDA),the regime's mass member organization. Some high-performing students who refused to join the USDA, have found themselves inexplicably locked out of matriculation exams and unable to get into universities, claimed one of the youth. In addition, the USDA has developed a security function, claimed the youth. These USDA informers, who assist the regular and Special Branch police in keeping tabs on and suppressing potential political activities, are part of an informal organization known as the "people's militia" which receives some training in fighting, claimed the youth. 14.(C) Comment: Continued repression by the regime against NLD in the Burmese heartland will likely continue. Regime intimidation tactics in these areas get less international press coverage, giving local authorities more latitude. In a tightly closed society, the NLD can do little to put the spotlight on the ongoing repression, which is why they welcome visits by Embassy officers, even though they expect even greater harassment. The most troubling trend we see appearing nationwide is the increasing use of USDA cadres as another element of intimidation, in addition to the police and military. END COMMENT. VILLAROSA