UN RANGOON PROBES FOR OPENING IN BURMESE LEADERSHIP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000887

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM EAID PREL BM
SUBJECT: UN RANGOON PROBES FOR OPENING IN BURMESE LEADERSHIP


RANGOON 00000887 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: CDA: SVIllarosa for Reasons 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) Summary: Onder Yucer, the temporary UN Resident
Coordinator in Rangoon met with Charge on June 27 to discuss
his efforts to persuade the GOB to loosen restrictive
guidelines on humanitarian organizations, as well as the UN's
role in negotiating some sort of political transition. He
met June 26 with the Minster of Planning, and expressed hope
that he convinced the Minster to loosen the restrictive
guidelines issued in February. Yucer also complained about
recent NLD letters to keep the Secretary General involved in
political discussions, and expressed surprise at the lack of
GOB interest in engaging with the international financial
institutions. While he came across as nave, we encouraged
his efforts to push for greater humanitarian access. End
summary.


2. (C) On June 27, Onder Yucer, the UN's temporary Resident
Coordinator briefed Charge on his recent efforts to engage
the GOB to loosen restrictive guidelines for humanitarian
assistance and to negotiate some sort of political
transition. Yucer indicated eagerness to follow up on U/SYG
Gambari's May 18-20 visit to probe for more positive
engagement by the GOB. The UN Resident Coordinator had sent
a letter to Planning Minister Soe Tha urging the GOB to
loosen restrictions on humanitarian organizations. A second
letter to Prime Minster Soe Win, approved by Gambari, was
"more upbeat," according to Yucer, and listed large
humanitarian programs, such as the $6 million collected for a
polio vaccine campaign, the new "Three Diseases Fund", and
UNICEF programs that could proceed if the GOB provided
greater access. Both letters urged the two sides to talk
"face-to-face," which led to the Planning Minister's
invitation to meet.

Increasing Humanitarian Access
--------------

3. (C) Yucer met with Planning Minster Soe Tha June 26. He
recommended to the Minister that the guidelines for
humanitarian assistance providers should not contain layers
of restrictions to address the one or two exceptional cases
when the GOB experienced some problems, but rather, should
embrace the principles of humanitarian assistance and
international development cooperation adopted by the UN. The
Minister, after first defending the new regulations,
ultimately acknowledged that the guidelines were not etched
in stone and could be looked at again. Yucer expressed hope
that the GOB would inform donors at their next meeting, set
for the end of July, of revised regulations. He planned to
follow up with the Minister, who told him, "Please call me
any time." Charge encouraged him to proceed, saying that
opening space for humanitarian assistance would reverse the
steady narrowing of space for those organizations to operate
noted over the past few years.


4. (C) Yucer expressed surprise that the Planning Minister
did not seem aware of how the GOB could benefit from
development assistance from the World Bank, Asian Development
Bank, or International Monetary Fund. He found the Minister
uninformed about upcoming IMF Article IV consultations, and
how they could pave the way for hundreds of millions of
dollars in assistance (which did attract the Minister's
interest). Charge explained that Burma had been cut off from
IFI programs for two decades, and that it would not be able
to regain access without significant economic and political
reforms. Yucer suggested that academics and technical
specialists might meet to discuss and recommend a plan of
action for Burma to regain access to IFI programs.


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UN as a Political Negotiator
--------------

5. (C) Yucer described his meeting with the Planning Minister
as a sign of "the door opening a crack," for GOB engagement
with the UN as well on the political process. He detected
"some softening" in the GOB posture, citing Gambari's visit
and pressure at the recent ILO meeting. We are at a
crossroads, he said, and wanted to explore the potential UN
role if there were to be change in the GOB's political
position. "Should the Secretary General become more
involved?" he wondered aloud. Charge answered that many
Burmese strongly welcome the involvement of the Secretary
General and his representatives. He also repeatedly
described the UN role as a "negotiator," to which the Charge
replied that representatives of all the Burmese people must
negotiate to reach any durable resolution. The role for the
international community would be to facilitate those
negotiations. Yucer inquired about the USG response to
movement by the GOB. The Charge replied that the USG would
respond to sincere reform efforts, meaning concrete action,
not just words.


6. (C) Yucer said, "someone should advise the NLD" not to
write letters to the Secretary General, because UN diplomacy
is fragile, and needs to stay "discreet and cool." He added
that UN resrep Petrie was "deeply hurt" by the letters.
Charge explained that NLD leaders understood Gambari and
Petrie as urging NLD to join the National Convention without
conditions. Yucer replied that Gambari made it clear that
concessions would be required of both sides to find "common
ground." He told Senior General Than Shwe that they must
allow political parties to freely operate, free political
prisoners, and include Aung San Suu Kyi in any political
dialogue. He also claimed that Gambari had "full access"
during his visit, which Charge challenged noting that Gambari
had been blocked from visiting UN offices in Rangoon. Yucer
acknowledged that "fistfights almost broke out" over that
issue and clarified that Gambari had extensive meetings with
the senior generals and Aung San Suu Kyi.


7. (C) Charge suggested that the various political entities
might need help in basic negotiating concepts, such as
compromise, to establish a foundation for successful
negotiations. Yucer asked whether a Special Negotiator
should be appointed, adding (contrary to information received
elsewhere) that it had never been decided that UNDP Rangoon
would be the "negotiator." Charge recommended someone, who
could bring all sides together to start talking, would be
most helpful. She added that active engagement by UN
Headquarters would keep the pressure on the military leaders
to deliver action, which Gambari had noted would be required.



8. (C) Comment: Yucer came across as nave, which is
understandable given his arrival just a month ago. He is a
retired UN civil servant (a UN WAE),who worked most recently
in China and North Korea. He also mentioned working in
Sierra Leone and Yemen in the past. He was brought in to act
as the UN resrep during the three month sabbatical of Charles
Petrie. In order to capitalize on the Gambari visit, we
welcome Yucer's eagerness to push for greater access to
humanitarian organizations. However, he does not appear at
this point to possess sufficient information on Burma's
history to make an effective political negotiator and bring
the diverse political entities together. End comment.
VILLAROSA