KAREN STATE: JUST ANOTHER DRY SEASON OFFENSIVE?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000848 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL PINS BM SUBJECT: KAREN STATE: JUST ANOTHER DRY SEASON OFFENSIVE? REF: A. RANGOON 799 ¶B. RANGOON 698 ¶C. RANGOON 624 ¶D. RANGOON 591 ¶E. USDAO IIR 6 812 0127 06 ¶F. CHIANG MAI 65 RANGOON 00000848 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Poloff Dean Tidwell for Reasons 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During a GOB-organized trip for diplomats to Karen State June 8-10, a former Burmese Army battlefield commander recalled the Burmese Army's 1983-84 dry season offensive against the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and the KNLA's major miscalculation that enabled the Burmese Army eventually to overrun several major KNLA bases along the Thai border. The Burmese Army may be trying to repeat history with its current operations in northern Karen State. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) During a GOB-organized tour for diplomats to visit Karen State on June 8-10 (ref A),U Ye Htut, a Deputy Director General in the Ministry of Information, candidly discussed his past military career with emboff. U Ye Htut served in the Burmese Army from the 1980s until a year ago, when the GOB assigned him to the Ministry of Information. ¶3. (C) U Ye Htut was attached to the 22nd Light Infantry Division and, as a field commander, engaged in many battles with the KNLA. He commanded the battle group that eventually overran the KNLA's Maw Pho Gay base and fought in the battle to capture Karen National Union (KNU) headquarters at Manerplaw. He claimed the KNLA mistakenly assumed the Burmese Army's 1983-84 dry season offensive would be modest, as in like past years, when the Burmese Army usually attacked KNLA bases during the dry season, then retreated across the Dawna mountain range before the rains cut supply lines. The KNLA therefore put up only light resistance when Burmese Army units crossed a 5,000-foot pass in the Dawna Range in late 1983 with sufficient supplies to remain throughout the rainy season, and thereby missed the opportunity to stop the Burmese Army at the narrow pass. ¶4. (C) According to KNU sources, the KNLA's 6th Brigade continues to control a few small isolated pockets of territory along Burma's land border with Thailand south of Mae Sot. The KNLA's 7th Brigade holds a few small enclaves north of Mae Sot along the Thaungyin (Moei) River, while the 2nd Brigade operates in northern Karen State, particularly in the mountainous region around Hpapun along the Salween River. This is the largest area over which the KNU still has some influence and still receives support from local villagers. U Ye Htut said that the area where military operations recently occurred has many deep ravines where Burmese soldiers must walk single file and are more vulnerable to ambushes. ¶5. (C) Sources, including local Karen contacts (ref B),media reports, and accounts by NGOs working along the Burma-Thai border, reported that the latest Burmese military activity in northern Karen State began in late 2005. The armed clashes between the Burmese Army and the KNLA's 2nd Brigade in northern Karen State and adjoining areas reportedly began after the Burmese Army moved supplies to forward areas adjacent to traditional KNU territory (ref B). Emboff observed military convoys on June 4 and 6 of this year in Bago Division moving in the direction of northern Karen State. Each truck carried 20-40 Burmese Army troops from divisions around Burma (ref E). During the GOB-organized diplomatic visit to southern Karen State, Minister of Information Kyaw Hsan acknowledged the ongoing military operations in northern Karen State (ref A). RANGOON 00000848 002.2 OF 002 ¶6. (C) COMMENT: Although the rugged terrain of northern Karen State is well-suited for guerrilla warfare, Karen forces are vastly outnumbered by the Burmese Army. We do not have evidence that the current Burmese push into northern Karen territory is a "major offensive," but U Ye Htut's comments and the amount of supplies and troops en route indicate that the GOB is paying close attention to past lessons. Gaining control of more KNU territory would provide a safety buffer for expansion of transportation routes to and from the new capital at Pyinmana, and would give the SPDC valuable leverage in any cease-fire negotiations with the beleaguered Karen. END COMMENT. STOLTZ