REGIME TIGHTENS THE NOOSE ON U.N. ACTIVITIES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000079 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MLS, P, IO; NEW DELHI FOR U/S BURNS; PACOM FOR FPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL EAID BM SUBJECT: REGIME TIGHTENS THE NOOSE ON U.N. ACTIVITIES REF: A. RANGOON 56 ¶B. 04 RANGOON 1216 RANGOON 00000079 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: CDA Shari Villarosa for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The Burmese regime appears poised to curtail the residency of a UN-sponsored mediator and confidant of Aung San Suu Kyi and impose new restrictions on UN agencies and international NGOs. The UN agencies and INGOs have devised creative measures to adapt to restrictions, but the regime continues to create new obstacles to the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The SPDC's treatment of the UN, and its representatives, reveals the generals' disregard for the international community and for efforts to seek genuine national reconciliation. The latest news on restrictions is not good, but may prompt other countries in the region to join an international consensus on Burma in favor of political reform. We recommend citing these recent examples with counterparts in Washington and throughout the region. End Summary. ASSK CONFIDANT FACES EXPULSION ¶2. (C) On January 17, Leon de Riedmatten, director of the Swiss NGO "Humanitarian Dialogue," called on the Charge. De Riedmatten has for over a decade been closely tied to international efforts to achieve a political dialogue in Burma. A close confidant of Aung San Suu Kyi, he served for several years as former UN Special Envoy Razali's local liaison to both the regime and the democratic opposition. The ILO had also asked de Riedmatten to serve as its coordinator on a forced labor program, shelved after the May 2003 assault on ASSK. De Riedmatten spearheaded the ICRC's successful efforts in the 1990s to gain access to regime prisons, now under assault (ref A). ¶3. (C) According to De Riedmatten, GOB authorities have informed him that they will not renew his residency permit, which expires on February 22. He has appealed, with no success thus far, and requested an official explanation. The GOB has not responded, although contacts have told him that unnamed senior authorities accuse him of acting as a "politician," and not as an international mediator. De Riedmatten noted that Razali's recent resignation may have given the GOB an opportunity to "get rid of me, too" but offered that it is unclear if the primary target is him, his NGO, or both. He said the only certainty is that "this decision goes much higher" than the relevant Ministries. ¶4. (C) De Riedmatten expressed uncertainty over what has spurred the GOB to end his residency and seek his removal from Burma. He acknowledged that virtually every activity in which he has been involved over the years is currently under siege, including the ICRC, ASSK, a political dialogue with the opposition, the ILO, and the UNSYG's engagement via a special envoy. In mid-2005, following the International Labor Conference in Geneva, the GOB launched a massive anti-ILO campaign which resulted in death threats directed at the ILO liaison officer and also de Riedmatten (ref B). ¶5. (C) De Riedmatten welcomed an offer from the Charge to assist him, and suggested that raising his case with neighboring countries and with the GOB could help demonstrate U.S. and international community interest in his situation. De Riedmatten said that the ILO had raised his case with the Burmese Ambassador in Geneva, who expressed understanding, but probably has no influence with regime authorities. GRIM PROSPECTS FOR UN AGENCIES AND NGOS ¶6. (C) UNDP resident representative and UN resident coordinator Charles Petrie also called on the Charge on RANGOON 00000079 002.2 OF 002 January 17 to discuss his upcoming trip to New York to brief the UNDP Executive Board. Petrie, like de Riedmatten and ICRC officials (ref A),also reported troubling developments regarding restrictions on UN agencies and NGOs in Burma. ¶7. (C) Petrie said that the Minister of Health, UNDP's primary point of contact within the GOB, had informed him that the Minister of National Planning and Economic Development would soon take the leading role in oversight of all UN and NGO activities in Burma. UN agencies and NGOs currently coordinate their activities directly with "line Ministries" that have relevant technical capacity and expertise. According to Petrie, the Minister of Planning (Soe Tha, a cabinet veteran close to senior regime generals) would likely impose new restrictions on the humanitarian organizations, including tighter control over site visits outside of Rangoon, restrictions on residency permits, and new demands on local staff hiring. ¶8. (C) Petrie said that the Ministry of Planning's "Foreign Economic Relations Department" (FERD) will soon become the GOB's specific oversight entity and will issue a directive governing the activities of all UN agencies and NGOs. "For example," said Petrie, "the GOB will require all expatriate TDYers to obtain FERD clearance for their travel and activities inside Burma." Petrie said this development did not bode well for the humanitarian organizations and noted that the regime's relocation of the capital to remote Pyinmana is already creating many obstacles for UN activities. ¶9. (C) The Charge observed that Petrie's report shows the GOB is still moving in the opposite direction. Nonetheless, she surmised, this might also be an opportunity to encourage other countries to join the international consensus on Burma and put more pressure on the regime. Petrie agreed, noting that the move to Pyinmana had antagonized "even Burma's friends." He said that given the recent Burma discussion at the UN Security Council, he planned to raise the country's humanitarian needs, and the potential threat they pose to the region, when he made the rounds in New York and Washington. The Charge encouraged him to discuss the successful efforts of UN agencies to operate at the community level, when unencumbered by regime restrictions. COMMENT: CUTTING OFF THEIR NOSE DESPITE THEIR FACE ¶10. (C) The Global Fund terminated its programs in Burma in 2005 because of GOB intervention in the delivery of resources and restrictions on access to target populations. Illogically, as always, the regime is now compounding the problem by broadening its restrictions. UN agencies and NGOs, as always, may devise creative measures to adapt to the new restrictions, but the regime continues to demand more international assistance while making the delivery of existing aid a taxing endeavor. ¶11. (C) Leon de Riedmatten's mediation role has diminished considerably with the prolonged detention of ASSK, the ouster of Khin Nyunt, and the regime's refusal to have any dialogue with UN envoys. He is a valuable resource, however, and would be a key player should any opening for political dialogue emerge. The regime's treatment of him reveals the generals' disregard for both the international community and for efforts to seek genuine national reconciliation. ¶12. (C) We recommend that the Department and Embassies in the region consider citing these examples of disregard for the UN and its activities when talking with counterparts about Burma policy. We should be sending a consistent message that the regime needs to increase access for the international community, not restrict it further. End Comment. VILLAROSA