BURMA: DEMOCRACY AWAITS ANOTHER DAY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 RANGOON 000732

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ECON PREL BM
SUBJECT: BURMA: DEMOCRACY AWAITS ANOTHER DAY

REF: A. 05 RANGOON 901

B. 03 RANGOON 1552

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Classified By: P/E Chief W. Patrick Murphy for Reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Embassy Rangoon's Pol/Econ Chief departs post this
week, ending a three-year tour and having spent six of the
past eight years on Burma-related assignments. We asked him
to share a few unvarnished views on the current situation.
He observes that the prospect for meaningful improvement in
the near future remains extremely low. U.S. Burma policy, he
nonetheless concludes, is morally sound and appropriately
uncompromising. We must, however, accept that we are laying
the groundwork for a future Burma, likely governed by
heretofore unknown leaders, not an imminent transition
involving the current players on the field, or even those in
the dugout.

PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE


2. (C) Meaningful change will not come while Burma remains
under the yoke of the members of the current military regime.
The senior generals firmly believe that their authoritarian
rule is righteous and necessary. Although the generals have
obtained personal wealth and comfort, greed is not their
primary motivation. It is power, control, and the
unyielding, misguided notion that the military is the only
institution capable of governing and protecting Burma and
keeping the country from imploding.


3. (C) Although they are skilled military strategists, the
generals are unschooled in public policy and international
relations. "Compromise," "negotiation," "development," and
"interdependency" are not in their lexicon. They refuse to
accept that Burma faces either a political or economic crisis
and view any effort to alter the status quo as a mortal
threat to their own well-being. In the myopic world of the
SPDC, therefore, the democratic opposition, and most members
of the international community, are enemies. The generals
thus conclude that there is no meaningful role in Burma's
future for those who advocate change or reform.


4. (C) Caveat: The generals are notoriously unpredictable
and illogical. Furthermore, their rule -- built on fear and
financed by the proceeds of massive consumption of natural
resources -- is not infinitely sustainable. We should
therefore continue to press for dialogue and national
reconciliation. We don't rule out death-bed conversions or
internal dynamics that could undermine the unity and
patronage that bind the members of the regime and underpin
the blind loyalty of the vast military apparatus. There are
absolutely no signs, however, that the senior generals intend
to seek or to accept political change of their own free will.
That said, it is international pressure that keeps Aung San
Suu Kyi alive, allows the National League for Democracy to
maintain legal status, and occasionally leads to a release of
political prisoners. If we retreat from applying pressure in
the absence of meaningful change, the generals would surely
respond with greater abuse and repression of their own
population.

U.S. POLICY


5. (C) We are right on target. International critics of
sanctions and isolation of the regime grossly underestimate
local realities. There is broad support among the Burmese
people for U.S. efforts to deny the generals outside
resources to perpetuate their rule, as well as for our
support of the democratic opposition, dialogue, and reform.

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There is deep contempt for the generals who rule the country
and the cronies who support them; even illiterate villagers
don't buy the SPDC's charade. There is a profound
understanding of, and desire to obtain, democracy and basic
human rights. And there is ample evidence that engagement
with the generals does not produce results.


6. (C) Embassy officers travel widely throughout the country
(P/E Chief has been to 13 of the country's 14 states and
divisions) and make regular use of Burmese language skills,
ensuring a broader view than most diplomatic missions
receive. There is no question that the Burmese people view
the United States as their staunchest ally. As we are
inspired by their courage and compelling cause, they in turn
gather strength from our steadfast support. They will
remember this support when change comes. Such sentiments in
a future Burma will help protect and advance U.S. interests
in the region.


7. (C) Our effort over the past year to place a greater
emphasis on seeking shared objectives with members of the
international community has been more effective in achieving
consensus than previous attempts to increase international
pressure. Many countries quietly support our sanctions.
Numerous diplomats begrudgingly admit that the United States
has been right all these years to mistrust the generals and
to advocate on behalf of the Burmese people. These
countries, however, are unwilling or incapable of applying
their own sanctions or genuine pressure. Pressing these
countries to do so risks undermining the unity we can achieve
by capitalizing on their growing frustration with the regime.



8. (C) Even the countries that have been most inclined to
engage the regime have been appalled by the SPDC's
misbehavior over the past year, including the absurd
relocation of the capital to remote Pyinmana; the continuing
detention of ASSK and other advocates of non-violent change;
the GOB's failure to mitigate the export of refugees, drugs,
and disease; and the regime's general disdain for the
international community, in particular the United Nations.
The opportunity is ripe to achieve a shared platform of
common objectives. We should make every effort to ensure
that the generals hear the same, consistent message wherever
they venture: free ASSK and the political prisoners;
establish an inclusive, meaningful dialogue; and cooperate
more openly with the U.N. and international community.

MECHANISMS FOR DIALOGUE


9. (C) The generals have evolved from what was essentially an
oligarchy in 1988, to a triumvirate in the 1990s (Generals
Than Shwe, Maung Aye, and Khin Nyunt),to what is arguably
now a one-man dictatorship (Senior General Than Shwe). This
reality, a sad and frequent occurrence throughout Burmese
history, leads to an increasingly diminished number of
authority figures. The ability, therefore, of any single
country, international organization, or NGO to penetrate the
regime and press for dialogue is extremely limited. The
SPDC's growing, self-imposed isolation only complicates the
task.


10. (C) Realistically, only Burma's immediate neighbors
(China, India, Thailand and, to a lesser extent, ASEAN as a
collective) and the United Nations stand any chance of
bending Than Shwe's ear, or even the ears of those who might
succeed him. We should be relentless in our dialogue with
the immediate neighbors, and encourage them to develop a
greater understanding of the unsustainability of SPDC-rule

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and the inevitability that the Burmese people desire and
deserve something much better than repressive, unenlightened
rule. In is in the interests of Burma's neighbors that such
an inevitable transition be peaceful and stable.


11. (C) The U.N. offers our best hope as a potentially
effective intermediary to help level the playing field in
Burma. We must, however, remain closely involved in this
process. U/SYG Gambari's hyperbole that his recent visit to
Burma had achieved "broad progress" underscores that any U.N.
process requires our quiet, but firm, input and vigilance.
Left unchecked, the U.N. will either set the bar too low or
draw incorrect conclusions about the generals' true motives
and intentions.

ASSK AND THE DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION


12. (C) We have said much over the years about ASSK and her
NLD. The party is at the fore of the pro-democracy movement,
proved itself in the 1990 election, and remains the
opposition's only organization with national reach, albeit
one that is harassed, intimidated, and increasingly forced to
operate underground. There is no question that its members
are courageous, and many have made unimaginable sacrifices in
pursuit of basic rights and freedoms for all Burmese. They
deserve our full support and encouragement.


13. (C) Many diplomats in Rangoon underestimate ASSK's broad
popularity (even among the military rank and file),her
influence, and her ability to mobilize millions of people.
They also accept too easily her critics' views that she is
inflexible, stubborn, and intolerant of dissent. This is
perhaps not too surprising, given that few current diplomats
have met her or seen her in action. Nonetheless, there is
absolutely no individual in Burma today who is capable of
playing the same role. Her drive, determination, charisma,
personal sacrifice, and credentials (daughter of the
country's most respected independence leader and martyr) are
unmatched.


14. (C) There are of course other leaders, and potential
leaders. We should not miss opportunities to support the
cause of those who remain in the regime's prison gulag or to
nurture those who have more room to maneuver. Burma's
future, however, does not necessarily lie in the hands of the
NLD leadership. Elderly party leaders do not fully embrace
democratic practices, even within the party, nor do they
place a priority on tapping Burma's ethnic, age, and gender
diversity. They have not revealed a vision for the future of
Burma nor have they demonstrated that they would be
independently capable of the extremely complex task of
governing a democratic Burma.


15. (C) The Burmese regime, and NLD leaders, share a common
neglect and distrust of the country's youth and ethnic
minorities. We should encourage the leaders of Burma's
pro-democracy political parties, including the NLD, to create
meaningful leadership roles for their youth and ethnic
members. These groups are vastly under-represented in civil
society. An entire generation has missed out on the
education opportunities that their elders enjoyed. And yet,
as they have done during times of great upheaval and change
throughout Burma's history, the youth and ethnics will play
key roles during a transition. They must be empowered now as
leaders in order to avoid chaos and instability when change
comes.

THE ECONOMY AND THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION


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16. (C) As a Rangoon economic officer famously observed in
late 2003 ("Burma's Cockroach Economy," ref B),the generals
handily absorb external shocks and poor domestic indicators.
They can do so because they control abundant natural
resources, tolerate a thriving informal economy, trade freely
with rich neighbors who overlook the regime's political
transgressions, and care little about social and economic
development. They also have very little to lose; corruption
and mismanagement have driven away most investors and what
remains is a rump, undisciplined economy.


17. (C) The Burmese people are poor, and lose more purchasing
power each day. We should not, however, be under the
illusion that the economy has bottomed out or that economic
despair will spark a revolution. The regime's economic
policies are not designed to achieve long-term efficiency and
growth, but to maintain self-perpetuation and national
stability. The survivability of the economy at subsistence
levels is feasible for at least the short-term.


18. (C) The regime's economic mismanagement and poor
distribution of wealth nonetheless create significant poverty
and suffering, especially among ethnic minority populations.
These populations require, and deserve, targeted
international humanitarian assistance. The country does not,
however, face an immediate, national humanitarian crisis. We
should closely scrutinize and question the development
organizations that conclude a humanitarian crisis already
exists and that the country risks implosion as a result. If
we overplay the country's humanitarian needs, we risk
undermining our policy efforts at the UN and elsewhere.
While we should address the very real humanitarian needs, we
should insist at the same time that genuine political reform
will provide the best long-term solution.


19. (C) There are, of course, obvious indications that social
conditions are deteriorating and need urgent attention.
There are opportunities, although limited, to reach
populations directly without regime interference. UNHCR, the
ILO, CARE, PSI, and World Vision come to mind as superb,
well-managed international organizations and INGOs that fully
understand the political environment and the inherent risks,
and have proven the ability to identify and implement
appropriate, effective programs. Many other aid agencies,
however, require our watchful oversight. Too many are
willing to give the generals the benefit of the doubt, ignore
obvious abuses and manipulation, and inappropriately and
incorrectly identify the United States and other Western
countries as the source of Burma's humanitarian woes.

PARTING SHOTS


20. (C) A tour in Rangoon is ever challenging, often
frustrating, always compelling. One can not but feel angered
that the callous generals have denied their own population
basic freedoms, opportunities, and progress. There is,
however, no questiQthat our presence here makes a
difference. The imminent completion of a new Embassy speaks
volumes about our commitment to an appreciative Burmese
population.


21. (C) Each officer arrives in Rangoon cautiously hopeful
that forward movement will come on his/her watch. I regret
that democracy will come another day, as I deeply regret that
I can not bid farewell to ASSK, U Tin Oo, U Hkun Htun Oo, Su
Su Nway, and dozens others who have inspired me personally.
The generals have not, however, silenced their voices or our
ability to make those voices heard around the world.
VILLAROSA