BURMA: DEMOCRACY AWAITS ANOTHER DAY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 RANGOON 000732 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM ECON PREL BM SUBJECT: BURMA: DEMOCRACY AWAITS ANOTHER DAY REF: A. 05 RANGOON 901 ¶B. 03 RANGOON 1552 RANGOON 00000732 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: P/E Chief W. Patrick Murphy for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Embassy Rangoon's Pol/Econ Chief departs post this week, ending a three-year tour and having spent six of the past eight years on Burma-related assignments. We asked him to share a few unvarnished views on the current situation. He observes that the prospect for meaningful improvement in the near future remains extremely low. U.S. Burma policy, he nonetheless concludes, is morally sound and appropriately uncompromising. We must, however, accept that we are laying the groundwork for a future Burma, likely governed by heretofore unknown leaders, not an imminent transition involving the current players on the field, or even those in the dugout. PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE ¶2. (C) Meaningful change will not come while Burma remains under the yoke of the members of the current military regime. The senior generals firmly believe that their authoritarian rule is righteous and necessary. Although the generals have obtained personal wealth and comfort, greed is not their primary motivation. It is power, control, and the unyielding, misguided notion that the military is the only institution capable of governing and protecting Burma and keeping the country from imploding. ¶3. (C) Although they are skilled military strategists, the generals are unschooled in public policy and international relations. "Compromise," "negotiation," "development," and "interdependency" are not in their lexicon. They refuse to accept that Burma faces either a political or economic crisis and view any effort to alter the status quo as a mortal threat to their own well-being. In the myopic world of the SPDC, therefore, the democratic opposition, and most members of the international community, are enemies. The generals thus conclude that there is no meaningful role in Burma's future for those who advocate change or reform. ¶4. (C) Caveat: The generals are notoriously unpredictable and illogical. Furthermore, their rule -- built on fear and financed by the proceeds of massive consumption of natural resources -- is not infinitely sustainable. We should therefore continue to press for dialogue and national reconciliation. We don't rule out death-bed conversions or internal dynamics that could undermine the unity and patronage that bind the members of the regime and underpin the blind loyalty of the vast military apparatus. There are absolutely no signs, however, that the senior generals intend to seek or to accept political change of their own free will. That said, it is international pressure that keeps Aung San Suu Kyi alive, allows the National League for Democracy to maintain legal status, and occasionally leads to a release of political prisoners. If we retreat from applying pressure in the absence of meaningful change, the generals would surely respond with greater abuse and repression of their own population. U.S. POLICY ¶5. (C) We are right on target. International critics of sanctions and isolation of the regime grossly underestimate local realities. There is broad support among the Burmese people for U.S. efforts to deny the generals outside resources to perpetuate their rule, as well as for our support of the democratic opposition, dialogue, and reform. RANGOON 00000732 002.2 OF 004 There is deep contempt for the generals who rule the country and the cronies who support them; even illiterate villagers don't buy the SPDC's charade. There is a profound understanding of, and desire to obtain, democracy and basic human rights. And there is ample evidence that engagement with the generals does not produce results. ¶6. (C) Embassy officers travel widely throughout the country (P/E Chief has been to 13 of the country's 14 states and divisions) and make regular use of Burmese language skills, ensuring a broader view than most diplomatic missions receive. There is no question that the Burmese people view the United States as their staunchest ally. As we are inspired by their courage and compelling cause, they in turn gather strength from our steadfast support. They will remember this support when change comes. Such sentiments in a future Burma will help protect and advance U.S. interests in the region. ¶7. (C) Our effort over the past year to place a greater emphasis on seeking shared objectives with members of the international community has been more effective in achieving consensus than previous attempts to increase international pressure. Many countries quietly support our sanctions. Numerous diplomats begrudgingly admit that the United States has been right all these years to mistrust the generals and to advocate on behalf of the Burmese people. These countries, however, are unwilling or incapable of applying their own sanctions or genuine pressure. Pressing these countries to do so risks undermining the unity we can achieve by capitalizing on their growing frustration with the regime. ¶8. (C) Even the countries that have been most inclined to engage the regime have been appalled by the SPDC's misbehavior over the past year, including the absurd relocation of the capital to remote Pyinmana; the continuing detention of ASSK and other advocates of non-violent change; the GOB's failure to mitigate the export of refugees, drugs, and disease; and the regime's general disdain for the international community, in particular the United Nations. The opportunity is ripe to achieve a shared platform of common objectives. We should make every effort to ensure that the generals hear the same, consistent message wherever they venture: free ASSK and the political prisoners; establish an inclusive, meaningful dialogue; and cooperate more openly with the U.N. and international community. MECHANISMS FOR DIALOGUE ¶9. (C) The generals have evolved from what was essentially an oligarchy in 1988, to a triumvirate in the 1990s (Generals Than Shwe, Maung Aye, and Khin Nyunt),to what is arguably now a one-man dictatorship (Senior General Than Shwe). This reality, a sad and frequent occurrence throughout Burmese history, leads to an increasingly diminished number of authority figures. The ability, therefore, of any single country, international organization, or NGO to penetrate the regime and press for dialogue is extremely limited. The SPDC's growing, self-imposed isolation only complicates the task. ¶10. (C) Realistically, only Burma's immediate neighbors (China, India, Thailand and, to a lesser extent, ASEAN as a collective) and the United Nations stand any chance of bending Than Shwe's ear, or even the ears of those who might succeed him. We should be relentless in our dialogue with the immediate neighbors, and encourage them to develop a greater understanding of the unsustainability of SPDC-rule RANGOON 00000732 003.2 OF 004 and the inevitability that the Burmese people desire and deserve something much better than repressive, unenlightened rule. In is in the interests of Burma's neighbors that such an inevitable transition be peaceful and stable. ¶11. (C) The U.N. offers our best hope as a potentially effective intermediary to help level the playing field in Burma. We must, however, remain closely involved in this process. U/SYG Gambari's hyperbole that his recent visit to Burma had achieved "broad progress" underscores that any U.N. process requires our quiet, but firm, input and vigilance. Left unchecked, the U.N. will either set the bar too low or draw incorrect conclusions about the generals' true motives and intentions. ASSK AND THE DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION ¶12. (C) We have said much over the years about ASSK and her NLD. The party is at the fore of the pro-democracy movement, proved itself in the 1990 election, and remains the opposition's only organization with national reach, albeit one that is harassed, intimidated, and increasingly forced to operate underground. There is no question that its members are courageous, and many have made unimaginable sacrifices in pursuit of basic rights and freedoms for all Burmese. They deserve our full support and encouragement. ¶13. (C) Many diplomats in Rangoon underestimate ASSK's broad popularity (even among the military rank and file),her influence, and her ability to mobilize millions of people. They also accept too easily her critics' views that she is inflexible, stubborn, and intolerant of dissent. This is perhaps not too surprising, given that few current diplomats have met her or seen her in action. Nonetheless, there is absolutely no individual in Burma today who is capable of playing the same role. Her drive, determination, charisma, personal sacrifice, and credentials (daughter of the country's most respected independence leader and martyr) are unmatched. ¶14. (C) There are of course other leaders, and potential leaders. We should not miss opportunities to support the cause of those who remain in the regime's prison gulag or to nurture those who have more room to maneuver. Burma's future, however, does not necessarily lie in the hands of the NLD leadership. Elderly party leaders do not fully embrace democratic practices, even within the party, nor do they place a priority on tapping Burma's ethnic, age, and gender diversity. They have not revealed a vision for the future of Burma nor have they demonstrated that they would be independently capable of the extremely complex task of governing a democratic Burma. ¶15. (C) The Burmese regime, and NLD leaders, share a common neglect and distrust of the country's youth and ethnic minorities. We should encourage the leaders of Burma's pro-democracy political parties, including the NLD, to create meaningful leadership roles for their youth and ethnic members. These groups are vastly under-represented in civil society. An entire generation has missed out on the education opportunities that their elders enjoyed. And yet, as they have done during times of great upheaval and change throughout Burma's history, the youth and ethnics will play key roles during a transition. They must be empowered now as leaders in order to avoid chaos and instability when change comes. THE ECONOMY AND THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION RANGOON 00000732 004.2 OF 004 ¶16. (C) As a Rangoon economic officer famously observed in late 2003 ("Burma's Cockroach Economy," ref B),the generals handily absorb external shocks and poor domestic indicators. They can do so because they control abundant natural resources, tolerate a thriving informal economy, trade freely with rich neighbors who overlook the regime's political transgressions, and care little about social and economic development. They also have very little to lose; corruption and mismanagement have driven away most investors and what remains is a rump, undisciplined economy. ¶17. (C) The Burmese people are poor, and lose more purchasing power each day. We should not, however, be under the illusion that the economy has bottomed out or that economic despair will spark a revolution. The regime's economic policies are not designed to achieve long-term efficiency and growth, but to maintain self-perpetuation and national stability. The survivability of the economy at subsistence levels is feasible for at least the short-term. ¶18. (C) The regime's economic mismanagement and poor distribution of wealth nonetheless create significant poverty and suffering, especially among ethnic minority populations. These populations require, and deserve, targeted international humanitarian assistance. The country does not, however, face an immediate, national humanitarian crisis. We should closely scrutinize and question the development organizations that conclude a humanitarian crisis already exists and that the country risks implosion as a result. If we overplay the country's humanitarian needs, we risk undermining our policy efforts at the UN and elsewhere. While we should address the very real humanitarian needs, we should insist at the same time that genuine political reform will provide the best long-term solution. ¶19. (C) There are, of course, obvious indications that social conditions are deteriorating and need urgent attention. There are opportunities, although limited, to reach populations directly without regime interference. UNHCR, the ILO, CARE, PSI, and World Vision come to mind as superb, well-managed international organizations and INGOs that fully understand the political environment and the inherent risks, and have proven the ability to identify and implement appropriate, effective programs. Many other aid agencies, however, require our watchful oversight. Too many are willing to give the generals the benefit of the doubt, ignore obvious abuses and manipulation, and inappropriately and incorrectly identify the United States and other Western countries as the source of Burma's humanitarian woes. PARTING SHOTS ¶20. (C) A tour in Rangoon is ever challenging, often frustrating, always compelling. One can not but feel angered that the callous generals have denied their own population basic freedoms, opportunities, and progress. There is, however, no questiQthat our presence here makes a difference. The imminent completion of a new Embassy speaks volumes about our commitment to an appreciative Burmese population. ¶21. (C) Each officer arrives in Rangoon cautiously hopeful that forward movement will come on his/her watch. I regret that democracy will come another day, as I deeply regret that I can not bid farewell to ASSK, U Tin Oo, U Hkun Htun Oo, Su Su Nway, and dozens others who have inspired me personally. The generals have not, however, silenced their voices or our ability to make those voices heard around the world. VILLAROSA