GOING IT ALONE IN SOUTHERN BURMA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000707 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINS PREL ECON EAID SOCI BM TH SUBJECT: GOING IT ALONE IN SOUTHERN BURMA REF: RANGOON 668 RANGOON 00000707 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: A/DCM W. Patrick Murphy for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The Burmese government, having gained an upper hand over insurgents and perceiving no local political threats, generally neglects the southern Burmese seaport of Dawei. The coastal border region, however, blessed with a robust fishing industry and productive agricultural sector, manages to do quite well on its own, creating a standard of living relatively high for Burma. Migrant workers from this area, primarily in Thailand, contribute remittances, provide another major boost to the local economy. The migrants, however, also contribute infectious diseases, which pose a growing health threat to the Dawei population. End Summary. ¶2. (U) On May 17-18 P/E Chief and visiting Bangkok Poloff visited the southern seaport of Dawei, located in Tanintharyi Division, Burma's southernmost province. The city of roughly 70,000 inhabitants is the commercial and administrative hub for a district comprised of four townships with a total population of over 650,000. GETTING INTO THE ZONE ¶3. (U) The Burmese regime has only recently allowed foreigners to visit and work in Dawei. Burmese Army campaigns in the 1990s against the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and the Mon National Liberation Front (MNLF),in neighboring Karen and Mon States, pushed some insurgents south to the Dawei region, leading to increased banditry and insecurity. As a result, the GOB previously designated most of the area as an off-limits "black zone." Insurgent activity has diminished considerably over the past two years. Only several small, limited-access "brown zones" remain, most located contiguous to the Thai border. ¶4. (C) Despite the official opening of Dawei, coupled with improved air access and potential beach tourism, the GOB does not actively encourage foreign visitors. Road links north to Mon State or east to Thailand are in poor condition, inaccessible to most commercial traffic. Local officials in Dawei, per standard regime practice, monitored our activities closely and questioned our FSN assistant about our schedule and meeting participants. Although several international NGO representatives agreed to meet with us, Save the Children staff declined, intimating fear of unwanted follow-on scrutiny by local officials. SOLO EFFORT ¶5. (SBU) In the absence of many centrally-provided services, Dawei must make do on its own. Remarkably, and in contrast to other isolated parts of Burma, Dawei provides for itself quite well. A private company distributes most electricity, a rare exception elsewhere, as electric power is dominated by the inefficient state-owned Myanmar Electric Power Enterprise (MEPE). Road construction falls to local townships, which have built a local network that is in better shape than most Burmese cities of a comparable size. A local monastery runs the city's only, privately-funded orphanage, housing over 50 children, many of whom are victims of conflict in Karen and Kayah States. The population of Dawei, however, is predominantly ethnic Burman. ¶6. (U) Decent local roads, regular electricity, solid residential home construction, and a vibrant retail sector all suggest a relatively high standard of living in Dawei. According to NGOs and local residents, the region thrives on an active and lucrative fishing sector; cultivation of rubber, cashew, and other agricultural products; and RANGOON 00000707 002.2 OF 003 remittances from migrant workers in Thailand. Local markets provide a varied and ample food supply. We saw no signs, however, that Dawei receives any social or economic benefit from the natural gas pipeline that bisects Burma less than 50 miles to the north (reftel). THE THAI CONNECTION ¶7. (U) Unlike many of Burma's border areas, informal trade is not a significant source of local income in Dawei. Despite the proximity of Thailand, poor roads and a mountainous border preclude direct trade apart from seafood. A staff member at the NGO World Vision, which works on health and education programs in 28 villages throughout the district, said that Dawei's primary commercial route is through southern Tanintharyi Division and on to neighboring countries. Most traders use a local "speed boat" ferry to reach the southern border town of Kawthaung, just across from the Thai port of Ranong. ¶8. (C) The ASEAN Ambassadors based in Burma traveled 100 miles further south in April, to the port of Myeik. They also found a prosperous town, plenty of electricity, and cell phone coverage that extended beyond Burma. Fishing is also the primary income generator there. One fishing trawler owner told the Singaporean Ambassador that it only costs him USD 300,000 to acquire a trawler and he can earn USD 1-2 million a year. Even with increasing fuel prices, he can make a handsome profit and pay off the cost of the trawler in two years. He sells his catch in Ranong and keeps the proceeds in Thai banks, only repatriating funds as needed for local expenses. BRINGING HOME MORE THAN BACON ¶9. (SBU) Access to Thailand for migrant workers has proven a mixed blessing for Dawei. Remittances provide a significant boost to the local economy; however, migrants, primarily fishermen, also return home with infectious diseases. Dawei, according to NGO workers, has at least five overt brothels, significantly more than usual in Burma. HIV and STI infection rates in Dawei, according to a MSF-Switzerland physician, have skyrocketed over the past five years. MSF provides medical treatment and counseling for over 400 regular HIV/AIDS patients, the majority of whom are men. Among the newest HIV/AIDs patients, however, are many widows who lost their husbands to the disease. MSF also sponsors a dozen health clinics, including a mobile unit, that treat hundreds of patients a day throughout the district. The most common ailments, said local MSF workers, are tuberculosis and malaria. PRIORITIES ¶10. (C) According to a variety of Embassy sources, the Burmese Army has gained an upper hand over insurgents in the Dawei district and the GOB has forced the democratic opposition fully underground. Prior to our trip, senior leaders of the National League for Democracy (NLD) in Rangoon, fearful of negative repercussions, requested that we not seek to meet with local party representatives in Dawei, a rarity for the normally bold pro-democracy movement. Local interest in politics appeared to be minimal. We observed patrons at a local restaurant, watching a CNN satellite feed, switch channels during a Burma news story on recent conflict between the BA and the KNU. The patrons, it appeared, were far more interested in a live broadcast of the weekly Thai lottery, the last numbers of which are the source of a cottage gambling industry in Burma. OUT OF SIGHT, OUT OF MIND RANGOON 00000707 003.2 OF 003 ¶11. (C) Comment: The Dawei region falls under the authority of the Coastal Military Command, headquartered in Myeik. The military commander there, as we understand it, mirrors the GOB's neglect of Dawei, a hallmark of the regime's approach to development in the majority of Burma's ethnic hinterlands. The regime's minimal presence in Dawei most likely reflects a perception that the region poses no serious threat; therefore, scarce military and government resources can focus elsewhere. Dawei's ample resources have enabled it to fend quite well on its own, a benefit not permitted in most other areas of the country with valuable resources, but more active insurgencies. It is this kind of rare exception that offers a glimpse into how Burma could be without heavy-handed central government involvement. End Comment. VILLAROSA