Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06RANGOON372
2006-03-20 10:00:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Rangoon
Cable title:  

BURMA AI OUTBREAK UPDATE - MARCH 20

Tags:  EAGR EAID AMED PGOV PREL CASC TBIO KFLU BM 
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000372 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA; UDSA FOR FAS/PECAD,
FAS/CNMP, FAS/AAD, APHIS; BANGKOK FOR USAID (JOHN
MACARTHUR),APHIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAGR EAID AMED PGOV PREL CASC TBIO KFLU BM
SUBJECT: BURMA AI OUTBREAK UPDATE - MARCH 20

REF: A. SECSTATE 43425


B. RANGOON 364

C. RANGOON 345

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000372

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA; UDSA FOR FAS/PECAD,
FAS/CNMP, FAS/AAD, APHIS; BANGKOK FOR USAID (JOHN
MACARTHUR),APHIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAGR EAID AMED PGOV PREL CASC TBIO KFLU BM
SUBJECT: BURMA AI OUTBREAK UPDATE - MARCH 20

REF: A. SECSTATE 43425


B. RANGOON 364

C. RANGOON 345


1. (U) SUMMARY. No human cases of AI have been reported in
Burma to date. A joint FAO/WHO assessment team, accompanied
by USAID Bangkok Infectious Diseases Advisor and Embassy's
FSN agricultural specialist, visited hospitals and poultry
farms in Mandalay and Sagaing Divisions on March 17-18 to
gather further information on AI cases among birds in Burma.
Burmese authorities have culled poultry and banned the sale
and transport of poultry and eggs from affected areas,
although FAO and WHO remain concerned about the possibility
of spreading the infections by the methods used. Embassy has
polled foreign donor missions, but none seem ready to help
meet the most urgent needs relayed by the FAO and WHO to help
the GOB contain the spread of AI in Burma. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) A joint FAO/WHO assessment team returned to Rangoon
from Mandalay on March 19 to brief FAO, WHO, and Livestock
Breeding and Veterinary Department (LBVD) officials. USAID
Bangkok's Infectious Diseases Advisor, Dr. John MacArthur,
who participated in the Mandalay assessment team visit,
briefed the Charge before returning to Bangkok on March 19
and will separately report his findings to Washington. Both
he and FSN reported receiving complete access to the various
sites, including a last-minute request to see the hospital
set up to the handle human cases. USAID advisor also
received more up-to-date documents than Ministry of Health
(MOH) officials in Rangoon had.


3. (SBU) Key findings of the FAO/WHO assessment team include:

-- Although Burma first reported possible AI on March 12
after poultry die-offs in Mandalay District, earlier
suspected outbreaks occurred in Khin Oo, Zeegon, and Shwebo
townships (in Sagaing Division, northwest of Mandalay) in

early February 2006.

-- 1,500 chickens died in Shwebo township (8 percent of the
total flock of 18,100 birds at 60 chicken farms, including 26
commercial layer farms, there).

-- The die-offs began in the first week of February but
officials did not notice for two weeks because the rapid test
used cannot identify H5N1.

-- As chickens there did not respond to medicine and began to
die in large numbers, some poultry farmers in Shwebo sold
their remaining birds to a chicken wholesaler in Mandalay.
Unconfirmed rumors suggest that about 1,500 chickens were
also smuggled by train from Shwebo to Myitkyina (Kachin
State) and most were dead or dying when discovered by GOB
officials; LBVD is now testing samples for AI.

-- LBVD officials have begun culling all poultry in a
3-kilometer radius of the Kywesekan site in Mandalay where
authorities first confirmed the H5N1 virus. 18 chicken and
quail farms are affected. Authorities have also established
an additional 7-kilometer control zone and banned all
movement of livestock, poultry, and equipment from poultry
farms within the area.

-- FAO and USAID visitors at the culling sites expressed some
concern that the methods used (improper disposal of used
PPEs, failure of visitors to disinfect their shoes, stray
dogs allowed to roam freely near the piles of dead chickens)
could spread the virus to other poultry farms that the same
LBVD staff visit. Local officials agreed to modify culling
procedures based on advice from the survey teams.

-- The Mandalay District Commander has banned all sales of
eggs and chicken at town markets, Army officers have
instructed soldiers and their families to avoid consuming
chicken and eggs. A list of infected sites we received from
LBVD officials revealed numerous military-owned poultry and
quail farms in the vicinity of the Mandalay site.

-- The government is not offering compensation to poultry
owners or commercial farmers, but LBVD officials have assured
those whose flocks they cull that they will be eligible to
receive new stock and feed free of charge at a later date.
FAO has advised LBVD officials that the 21-day disease-free
minimum may be too short of a time period and recommended
LBVD waits longer before restocking any culled flocks.
-- The FAO/WHO visitors also recommended that LBVD officials
work more closely with the MOH and arrange joint team visits
to suspected sites so one can focus on quarantining and
culling birds while the other screens humans for potential
cases.

-- No human AI cases have been detected in Burma to date.

-- According to NGO contacts, the two individuals
hospitalized in Mandalay for observation after contact with
AI-infected poultry (ref C) both tested positive for malaria,
not influenza.

-- The GOB is continuing its aggressive public awareness
campaign, with daily television broadcasts and newspaper
articles encouraging people to report dead birds, prepare and
cook meat safely, and practice proper hygiene.


3. (SBU) WHO Burma's AI coordinator, Kanokporn Coninx, told
emboffs on March 18 of additional concerns. WHO believes
some Mandalay poultry farm owners may have attempted to send
their stock to distant markets ahead of visits by AI
investigation teams. WHO staff have also heard reports of a
disease outbreak among poultry in Mon State in southern
Burma, near the Thailand border. The Deputy Minister of
Health and GOB technicians traveled to the affected area on
March 20 to investigate further.


4. (SBU) Charge met on March 17 with the Canadian and EU
Ambassadors to Burma, both based in Bangkok. They said that
neither Canada nor the EU plans immediate AI assistance to
Burma. Canadian Amb. Comeau said Canada did not plan any
direct AI assistance, but would likely support FAO and WHO in
their regional efforts. EU Ambassador Hamburger deferred to
Brussels. Neither government has a plan to respond to
Burma's most urgent needs for PPEs, laboratory testing
equipment, or outside medical/veterinary expertise.


5. (SBU) Other missions in Burma had similar reactions. All
are aware of recent AI developments in country, but none have
plans to offer immediate assistance, either directly to the
GOB or via FAO/WHO. The Koreans will offer flu shots to
KOICA volunteers in Burma (especially those in the Mandalay
region) and are reviewing long-term aid options. Australia
and the U.K. have no plans to provide immediate assistance.
Prior to the recent outbreak, the German Embassy recommended
to Berlin that they fund a request from WHO/FAO Rangoon for
donor support but has not yet received a response. Tokyo had
decided prior to the outbreak to give $10 million to FAO
Burma and $2 million to UNICEF Burma for AI public awareness
activities, and the GOB Ministry of Health and Ministry of
Livestock and Fisheries have both approached the Japanese
Embassy for further assistance in response to the outbreak.
Japan is reviewing these requests.


6. (SBU) COMMENT: As they cope with a significant AI outbreak
in central Burma, GOB officials have shown remarkable
openness in sharing information and allowing access for
foreign officials, including our USAID advisor, to sites
under investigation. They clearly recognize the need for
public awareness and fast action to contain the spread of AI
and the threat it poses to both human and animal populations.
Unfortunately, the international donor community does not
appear prepared to respond rapidly to the spreading
infection. LBVD and MOH officials continue to appeal for
technical expertise to ensure their quarantining, culling,
monitoring, and treatment efforts are effective. They have
proven responsive to USAID advisor's recommendations.
Technical experts would not only help make Burma's response
to this AI crisis more effective at an early stage, they
would also provide up-close opportunities to observe GOB
surveillance and end-use accountability, and transit this
information to the outside world. The window has been opened
to us; now we must find ways to keep it open. END COMMENT.
VILLAROSA