YUDHOYONO VISIT TO BURMA: LIGHT AND FLUFFY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000325

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV BM ID
SUBJECT: YUDHOYONO VISIT TO BURMA: LIGHT AND FLUFFY

REF: A. 05 RANGOON 973


B. SECSTATE 29380

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Classified By: P/E Chief W. Patrick Murphy for Reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: Indonesian President Yudhoyono's March 1-2
visit to Burma appears to have been purely protocol and
devoid of any substantive political message to regime
leaders. SPDC Chairman Than Shwe gave the Indonesian
President a standard recitation of regime achievements and
its road map to a democracy "that fits Burma," claiming that
international pressure is slowing the process. We are told
that Than Shwe declined Yudhoyono's request for a one-on-one
meeting, offering that the top generals are a team and have
nothing to hide from one another.


2. (C) The Burmese regime pursued this visit aggressively,
using it not only for the perceived legitimacy that a state
visit bestows, but also to water down the unprecedented
unified stance on Burma that ASEAN leaders adopted at their
December Summit. In doing so, the generals applied the same
"divide and rule" tactics to ASEAN leaders that they use to
break down unity among domestic opposition and ethnic groups.
End Summary.


3. (U) The Burmese official media gave top billing to
Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's March 1-2
visit to Rangoon. Per usual practice, however, the regime
did not reveal any details on the substance of the two-day
state visit, instead devoting official coverage to
Yudhoyono's visits to Rangoon's Shwedagon Pagoda and the
regime's National Museum. The GOB media mentioned only
Yudhoyono's wife, Kristiani Herrawati, and Indonesian Foreign
Minister Hassan Wirajuda as participants in the large
Indonesian delegation. The regime did not accord Yudhoyono
the same pomp and circumstance that it has this week for the
visit of Indian President Kalam.

A COURTESY CALL AND NO MORE
--------------


4. (C) On March 3, Indonesian Ambassador Wyoso Prodjowarsito
briefed members of the diplomatic corps on Yudhoyono's
30-hour visit. Wyoso described the visit, Yudhoyono's first
to Burma, as "just a courtesy call" to get acquainted with
regime leaders. The Indonesian President did not press the
SPDC on political reform issues, such as democracy or the
release of Aung San Suu Kyi, although Wyoso admitted when
questioned that UNSYG Kofi Annan and UN human rights envoy
Pinheiro had requested Yudhoyono raise these topics.


5. (C) Wyoso said that the visit focused on increasing
bilateral cooperation. Accordingly, Indonesian FM Wirajuda
and Burmese FM Nyan Win signed an MOU establishing a joint
commission for bilateral cooperation and agreed on future
plans to conclude separate agreements in areas such as
culture and trade. The first joint commission meeting will
take place in April or May in Jakarta. Wyoso said that
Indonesia hopes to have some agreements ready by then, but
admitted that nothing much has come of past agreements with
Burma. He added that Yudhoyono had designated former Home
Affairs Minister Hari Sabarno as his special advisor to
follow up on the bilateral agreements.

DEMOCRACY THAT FITS BURMA
--------------


6. (C) Wyoso said that Yudhoyono had two brief discussions
with SPDC Chairman Senior General Than Shwe. The first
meeting was a 45-minute session that included SPDC Deputy
Chairman Vice Senior General Maung Aye, MOD Chief of General
Staff General Thura Shwe Man, PM Lt Gen Soe Win, Secretary-1

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Lt Gen Thein Sein, FM Nyan Win, and the Burmese Ambassador to
Indonesia. Joining Yudhoyono were Wirajuda, Sabarno,
Economic Coordinating Minister Boediono, former FM Ali
Alatas, and Amb. Wyoso. Yudhoyono, who requested a private
meeting with Than Shwe, met the SPDC Chairman in a brief
follow-on meeting that also included the other four SPDC
generals from the first meeting. Amb. Wyoso did not
participate in the "private" meeting and had nothing to offer
on what was discussed.


7. (C) At the first session, according to Wyoso, Than Shwe
described regime plans to move to a democracy "that fits
Burma," claiming that international pressure had slowed
progress. Than Shwe also claimed to be interested in the
"happiness" of the Burmese people, but added that democracy
should not jeopardize the people's welfare. The Senior
General used to rest of the meeting to recite, as usual,
progress the regime claims to have achieved through
construction of roads and dams. When diplomats asked if
Yudhoyono would make a report about his meetings in Burma to
ASEAN, Wyoso replied that Malaysian Foreign Minister Hamid is
supposed to brief ASEAN Foreign Ministers on Burma in Bali
April 19-20.


8. (C) A/CDA and P/E Chief met on March 8 with Leon de
Riedmatten, local liaison for the UNSYG's Special Envoy to
Burma. De Riedmatten traveled to Jakarta in February with
then-Special Envoy Razali to encourage the GOI to raise
political reform issues with the regime. They met with
Alatas, Wirajuda, and foreign policy advisor Dino Patti
Djalal, among others, but all rejected any expectation that
Yudhoyono would press for reform. They only agreed that the
President might relate Indonesia's experience in
transitioning from military to elected civilian rule if Than
Shwe was willing to listen.


9. (C) According to de Riedmatten, Than Shwe was not willing
to listen. When Yudhoyono spontaneously requested a
one-on-one with the SPDC Chairman at the end of the bilateral
session, Than Shwe refused and said the generals were a team
and had nothing to hide from one another. Yudhoyono's
"private" meeting with the top five generals followed and,
according to de Riedmatten, Than Shwe unceremoniously ended
it after less than ten minutes of pleasantries.

POWERS STUCK IN THE 70s
--------------


10. (C) Adik Wibowo, the World Health Organization (WHO)
representative in Burma, attended a private lunch that
Yudhoyono joined with the local Indonesian community. She
said Yudhoyono told the participants that Burma appeared to
be stuck in the 1970s, while Indonesia moved forward and
changed. The Indonesian President offered his opinion that
the Burmese military looked like it would stay in power for
another four to seven years. He also commented that it was
"very strange" that the generals had relocated the capital to
remote Pyinmana when there are so many other urgent needs in
the country.

COMMENT: DIVIDE AND RULE
--------------


11. (C) Senior Indonesian officials have suggested in foreign
press reports that Yudhoyono raised political issues with the
SPDC, including the need for national reconciliation and a
more inclusive "road map to democracy." By all accounts,
however, the visit was little more than an introductory
"courtesy call" devoid of any substantive political message
to regime leaders.


12. (C) Several well-connected local observers have told us

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that the GOB aggressively pursued the Yudhoyono visit
immediately following the December ASEAN Summit. The GOB
also pushed India to move up the date of President Kalam's
state visit from late 2006 to this month. Not only do such
ceremonial visits bestow a perception of legitimacy on the
regime, they also help the SPDC stall other visitors with
more sensitive agendas, like Malaysian FM Hamid. In doing
so, the generals are applying the same tactics of "divide and
rule" and "ignore offers to mediate" to ASEAN leaders that
they use to break unity among domestic opposition parties and
ethnic groups. End Comment.
STOLTZ