Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06RANGOON1776
2006-12-07 02:10:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Rangoon
Cable title:  

BURMA AI UPDATE - DECEMBER 5

Tags:  EAGR EAID AMED PGOV PREL CASC TBIO KFLU BM 
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VZCZCXRO8507
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHGO #1776/01 3410210
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 070210Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY RANGOON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5491
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1261
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0061
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 4407
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 3651
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 7159
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 4748
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 0053
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA 0987
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 0991
RUDKIA/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 0755
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHDC
RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHPH/CDC ATLANTA GA
RUEHRC/USDA FAS WASHDC
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001776 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA; USDA FOR FAS/PECAD,
FAS/CNMP, FAS/AAD, APHIS; BANGKOK FOR USAID:JMACARTHUR,
APHIS:NCARDENAS, REO:JWALLER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAGR EAID AMED PGOV PREL CASC TBIO KFLU BM
SUBJECT: BURMA AI UPDATE - DECEMBER 5

REF: RANGOON 1679

RANGOON 00001776 001.2 OF 002


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001776 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA; USDA FOR FAS/PECAD, FAS/CNMP, FAS/AAD, APHIS; BANGKOK FOR USAID:JMACARTHUR, APHIS:NCARDENAS, REO:JWALLER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EAGR EAID AMED PGOV PREL CASC TBIO KFLU BM SUBJECT: BURMA AI UPDATE - DECEMBER 5 REF: RANGOON 1679 RANGOON 00001776 001.2 OF 002 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Burma has not reported any new cases of AI since it contained the March - April 2006 poultry outbreak through extensive culling. The GOB continues to work with donors to improve its surveillance, reporting, and response capabilities. David Castellan, a short-term advisor to FAO Rangoon, praised the GOB's progress in developing a vaccination strategy and improving its response plan. He identified political barriers, centralized command and control, and lack of interagency coordination as the primary remaining obstacles to effective action. FAO plans to increase its staff to better handle AI issues in Burma. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) David Castellan, a short-term Rangoon FAO consultant, briefed econoff on developments in the GOB's ability to identify and respond to another avian influenza outbreak. He discussed the GOB's vaccination strategy, the costs of the GOB's response to the March-April 2006 AI outbreak, World Bank funding, problems of centralized control, political barriers, poultry sector restructuring, and increases in FAO staffing. ¶3. (SBU) Vaccination Strategy: The GOB has decided that it will use vaccination to respond to AI only after all other methods, including moving, culling, or disposing of sick birds fail to work, and only if the outbreak moves out of control. At that point, officials would use ring vaccination for all poultry around an affected area. The Livestock Breeding and Veterinary Department (LBVD) will stockpile two million vaccines. A short-term consultant will evaluate the existing regulatory structure and advise on changes necessary to address any legal constraints on the proposed strategy. Castellan said he believed the GOB made the right choice not to vaccinate before an emergency, but noted that the ring vaccination strategy requires extremely tight surveillance. ¶4. (SBU) Culling Overkill: While the GOB was successful in quickly halting the March-April 2006 AI outbreak through extensive culling, Castellan said the toll in lost revenue was high, especially for mid-size farmers. GOB officials estimate that over 540 households were adversely affected
by the culling. Castellan said the "control area" of 10 kilometers from the site of the outbreak was too large, and should be decreased to 2 kms. This would reduce the farmers' financial losses and take into account the inability of breeders and butchers to cull so many birds in a safe and expeditious manner. ¶5. (SBU) Coordination Problems and World Bank Funding: Castellan noted the need for better coordination between GOB human and animal health departments and the central government, and between central authorities and lower level state/division and district officials. Although various meetings have been held, no true coordination or follow-through yet exists, he said. Castellan noted that the World Bank would be more likely to release its projected $2 million funding if government entities cooperate closely. He confirmed that the World Bank's initial plan was to give $1 million each to FAO and WHO to help develop infrastructure to handle the AI threat in Burma. Projects would focus on capacity-building for human and animal health officials to develop in-country expertise, especially in epidemiology, lab diagnostics, surveillance, disease control, partnership, and leadership skills. The WB proposal will also include funding for more research on the AI vaccination, further analysis of the structure of Burma's poultry industry, and the creation RANGOON 00001776 002.2 OF 002 of baseline data on Burma's extensive quail industry, about which little is now known. The GOB culled almost as many quail (317,000) as chickens (327,000) in the March and April outbreak. ¶6. (SBU) Surveillance, Labs and Political Barriers: According to Castellan, the top priorities in Burma are better surveillance and lab capabilities. Castellan noted that strict surveillance is required for the GOB's ring vaccination strategy to work, and that regional commanders must ensure human and animal health officials in their regions work together. He said that the quality of efforts around the country varies according to the quality of the regional commander, and the process of shifting responsibility from the national level to the state/division level had not really started. He said that Burma can eventually have effective surveillance teams at the district level, but the political process to push responsibility down must come from the top, through states and divisions, before reaching the districts. Faced with limited resources, Castellan said, Burma must choose the most efficient surveillance method. He recommended that the government focus on training poultry marketers, veterinarians, and large-scale producers to create a strong biosecurity system and early warning mechanisms. On lab capabilities, Castellan agreed that the National Lab can now confirm AI diagnoses in animals, and expected new efforts to focus on improvements at regional labs to enable them to perform initial diagnosis as well. He said the lab in Mandalay, Burma's second city, still lacks key basic infrastructure. ¶7. (SBU) Poultry Sector Restructuring: Castellan said GOB animal health officials plan a pilot project to set aside land for poultry farms outside villages (reftel). The project will begin with 98 acres in Sagaing and Mandalay Divisions, sites of the prior AI outbreak. FAO will work with LBVD to develop a comprehensive strategy that looks at the functional components of the overall AI strategy, including ministry restructuring, rather than one that focuses on the efforts of individual donors or implementers. ¶8. (SBU) FAO Staff Increases: FAO plans to hire a long-term technical advisor to supervise the efforts of its five new short-term researchers and six national consultants. The national consultants will focus on emergency planning, implementation and management, labs, epidemiology; communications, and biosecurity. The FAO staff plant to operate from the LBVD offices to facilitate coordination, Castellan said. ¶9. (SBU) Comment: The government is willing to cooperate with international donors and accept foreign advice on handling AI, unlike its attitude toward most other offers of international humanitarian assistance, since the pandemic also threatens them and their control over Burma. Technicians and government officials welcome new input on AI, but they are powerless to compel regional military commanders to support surveillance teams, enforce biosafety, distribute information to the public, or report suspected outbreaks in a timely manner. Effective AI monitoring will require significant attitude and policy changes. Until regime leaders push their all-powerful regional commanders to make AI a priority and cooperate fully with animal and human health officials, the GOB's capacity to prevent another AI outbreak will remain erratic and unpredictable. End comment. VILLAROSA

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