GAMBARI'S MEETINGS IN BURMA - UNCENSORED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 001701

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP AND IO; PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL BM
SUBJECT: GAMBARI'S MEETINGS IN BURMA - UNCENSORED

REF: A. RANGOON 1678


B. RANGOON 1609

Classified By: P/E Chief Leslie Hayden for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: UN U/SYG Gambari delivered a strong message
to Burma's senior generals that the regime must choose
between taking concrete steps toward democracy or face
further action in the UNSC, according to UN Resrep Charles
Petrie. General Than Shwe angrily denied that there was a
humanitarian crisis in Burma or that the regime held any
political prisoners. The regime manipulated Gambari's
schedule from beginning to end, staging his visit to the
National Convention for maximum propaganda value. Gambari
delivered an offer from Than Shwe to ASSK, offering to
release her from house arrest if she would agree to endorse
the National Convention and to "abide by the laws of the
country." ASSK rejected the offer, but said she is willing
to enter a dialogue with the regime. According to the UN,
ASSK was happy to see Gambari and welcomed his future visits.
End Summary.


2. (C) Charge met with UN Resident Coordinator Charles
Petrie on November 15 for a private, frank readout of U/SYG
Gambari's meetings during his November 9-12 visit to Burma.
Petrie told the Charge that Gambari was dismayed that the
regime refused him access to a broader range of humanitarian
and civil society groups. Petrie said he advised Gambari to
postpone his visit as the regime had not agreed to the UN's
three key conditions: allowing Gambari to stay at a hotel
rather than the government guest house; granting broader
access to members of political and civil society
organizations; and permission to hold his meetings on UN
premises. Despite Petrie's recommendation, Gambari pushed
forward with the visit, hoping that some UN requests would be
granted after he arrived. Unfortunately, none were.

"WE WERE USED"
--------------


3. (C) Petrie told us that from the very beginning of the
visit, it was clear the agenda was under control of the
"hardliners." One of Gambari's first meetings, with the
Minister of Planning, featured such a delusional presentation
of Burma's humanitarian situation by the Minister that the
meeting lacked any subsequent credibility. Gambari's visit
to the National Convention (NC) was stage-managed in such a
way that Petrie admitted the regime "manipulated the UN from
beginning to end." Instead of arriving at the convention
after the daily session had concluded, as had been agreed,
Gambari arrived to face a full-court media press, including
TV cameras. The authorities seated the UN entourage in the
center of the floor and filmed them while all of the NC
delegates marched past them. Additionally, while Gambari
waited to see Gen. Thein Sein, Secretary-I and Chairman of
the Convention, the regime had various members of the
convention say "good-bye" to Gambari with long speeches.


4. (C) Petrie noted that Gambari's meeting with the ethnic
cease-fire groups during the NC visit was closely monitored.
Even so, Petrie added, ethnic representatives told Gambari
that their people needed more access to humanitarian
assistance and expressed dismay that the NC was not
addressing some of the most important issues between the
regime and the cease-fire groups. Gambari mentioned the
first but not the later during his briefing to the diplomatic
community (ref A).

THAN SHWE LOSES IT
--------------


5. (C) Petrie said that Gambari met alone with Burma's top
two Generals, Than Shwe and Maung Aye. Gambari brought a
frank message to the regime, according to Petrie: Burma is
at a crossroads; it has a clear choice of engaging with the
international community and taking concrete steps toward
democracy or facing action in the UN Security Council.
Gambari told Than Shwe that in order to avoid UNSC action,

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Burma's leadership must take confidence-building actions
quickly in the following areas: 1) offering greater access
for INGOs implementing humanitarian assistance; 2)
identifying a high-level GOB liaison to facilitate dialogue
on humanitarian issues; 3) releasing political prisoners such
as Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) and the 88 Generation Student
(88GS) leaders; 4) concluding an agreement with the ILO on a
mechanism to address forced labor complaints; and 5) agreeing
to an independent mission to Kayin (Karen) State to assess
humanitarian needs.


6. (C) According to Petrie, when Gambari reached his point
on humanitarian assistance, Than Shwe "lost it" and began to
dress down Gambari in English. He denied that there was any
humanitarian crisis in Burma, citing bogus GOB statistics to
prove his point, and accused Petrie of being biased and under
the influence of Burmese exile groups in Bangkok. Than Shwe
allowed Gambari to continue, but lost his temper again when
the U/SYG urged the regime to release political prisoners.
Than Shwe switched to English again and denied Burma had any
political prisoners. Gambari pushed hard on the ILO issue,
urging the regime to agree on a mechanism to address forced
labor claims before the ILO Governing Board meeting on
November 15. Than Shwe brushed aside Gambari's concern and
said that his Labor Minister assured him that Burma was close
to an agreement with the ILO. Petrie said Gambari observed
that during his interactions with the Than Shwe and Maung
Aye, there appeared to be no space between them as is often
reported in local rumor and the exile press. In addition,
Maung Aye took a much more active part in the talks than last
May.


7. (C) While Than Shwe rejected Gambari's appeal for a
high-level GOB liaison to work with the UN on humanitarian
assistance, Gambari did reach agreement during his meeting
with Secretary-I Gen. Thein Sein that an inter-ministerial
meeting with the UN Country Team would be convened to review
the humanitarian situation in Burma. Petrie will push to
convene the committee by the end of November. Petrie told us
that he felt the UN has now reached a moment of confrontation
with the regime over humanitarian assistance. They plan to
use the opportunity to confront the regime with a true
picture of Burma's humanitarian problems and see whether the
government is willing to work with the UN to address them.
Petrie will prepare a three-to-four page brief, outlining the
inaccuracy of the government's figures, to try to introduce
reality into their fantasies. The brief will state frankly
the UN's position on the humanitarian situation in Burma and
will be used by the UN as an update of their strategic
framework. Petrie also plans to present the paper to General
Thura Shwe Mann, the Chief of the General Staff (number 3 in
the hierarchy),with whom he indicated the Europeans plan to
engage as a "track two" approach to get through to senior
levels of regime.

AUNG SAN SUU KYI SUPPORTS DIALOGUE
--------------


8. (C) Petrie told us that during Gambari's meeting with
Than Shwe, Gambari suggested to Than Shwe that he resume a
dialogue with ASSK, based on the 2004 letter she wrote to
Than Shwe (ref B). According to Petrie, Than Shwe showed no
interest in this idea but instead authorized Gambari to
deliver a different offer. Than Shwe's proposal included an
offer to free ASSK if she agreed to endorse the National
Convention and to "abide by the laws of the country." Petrie
told us that, although ASSK refused Than Shwe's offer, she
told Gambari she was not opposed to entering into a dialogue
with the regime. However, she would not agree to leave the
NLD now as she had offered to do in her 2004 letter. The
Charge noted that ASSK needed to be free to speak and consult
with her political party if there was going to be any useful
dialogue. She should not be limited to visits only with her
doctor. Such a move would signal the regime's true interest
in moving forward with a dialogue.


9. (C) According to Petrie, ASSK was pleased to see Gambari
and encouraged him to visit Burma more often. ASSK said she

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needed to see her doctor more regularly and pointed out that
she had seen even less of her doctor than usual since
Gambari's last visit. Gambari replied that he had also
noticed the lessening access, but that he felt he must
continue to push the regime on this issue.


10. (C) Petrie and other UN officials told us that Gambari
considered the whole visit a "total disaster" until his
meeting with ASSK. After this meeting, Petrie said, the
"whole mission turned around." The UN was especially pleased
that the photographs they took of ASSK with Gambari were
circulated widely. Petrie reiterated that Gambari was
especially disappointed with the way the regime manipulated
his visit to the National Convention and expressed relief
that pictures of Gambari with ASSK were circulating, rather
than pictures of him at the NC. During a meeting with the
Minister of Labor on the last day of his visit, Gambari
emphasized that that NC process was incomplete and asked how
the regime planned to fix it. The Labor Minister, reportedly
close to Than Shwe and increasingly influential in
formulating foreign policy, had no answer to Gambari's
question.


11. (C) Comment: Rangoon's diQatic and UN community view
Gambari's visit as a failure. Expecting more this time, they
see Gambari as going away with Qss than he got during his
May visit. So Petrie may be trying to put out a positive
spin. To judge whether it is more than spin, let's see if
Gambari begins criticizing the regime's recalcitrance rather
than dismissing the NLD as irrelevant. Clearly Than Shwe
feels he is negotiating from a position of strength and has
adopted a much harder line towards the UN. Some see this as
a Machiavellian ploy by number two Maung Aye to cause UN
action that can be used to justify Than Shwe's removal.
However, we doubt that he would be any more amenable to
democratic openness and respect for human rights. End
Comment.
VILLAROSA