GAMBARI FINDS LITTLE GIVE IN BURMESE GENERALS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 001678

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP AND IO; PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL BM
SUBJECT: GAMBARI FINDS LITTLE GIVE IN BURMESE GENERALS

REF: A. RANGOON 1670-CHARGES FILED AGAINST OPPOSITION

LEADERS

B. RANGOON 1609-TRYING TO GET A POLITICAL DIALOGUE
GOING

C. RANGOON 1538-RESTRICTIONS ON HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE CONTINUE

D. RANGOON 1269-ASSK IN GOOD HEALTH BUT NOT FREE

E. RANGOON 679--MAY GAMBARI VISIT

Classified By: CDA Shari Villarosa for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: UN Under Secretary General Ibrahim Gambari
made a second visit to Burma November 9-12 to try to get a
political dialogue going and increase the space for
humanitarian assistance. It does not appear at this time
that he made much, if any, progress. He met with Burma's
senior military leadership and Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK).
Although the UN had hoped to arrange a more varied set of
meetings away from government-controlled (and bugged)
premises, Gambari only succeeded in having a few meetings
outside of government premises. Gambari recognized, and
informed the generals, that he needed to take back concrete
results. He appears to be returning empty-handed. End
Summary.

Generals On a Train
--------------


2. (C) Gambari met with Rangoon-based Chiefs of Mission on
November 11 to offer a less detailed briefing about his
meetings than after his first visit last May (ref E). He
clarified that he came as an emissary of the Secretary
General under the good offices mandate of the UN General
Assembly, separate from the UN Security Council process that
has also gotten underway since last May. He will brief both
the Secretary General and the Security Council on his return.
His objectives for this visit: "build on the trust between
military leaders and him" to continue the process of dialogue
and engagement; promote tangible results in making the
regime's "roadmap" more credible and inclusive; seek the
release of political prisoners; ensure greater access for
humanitarian assistance; and stop hostilities in Kayin
(Karen) State. The final point did not appear to get much
attention since he only reported that he understood a
ceasefire may be in the works. He said he would not "have
been invited back if there was no desire to continue
discussion" in response to a question whether he still saw
opportunities. He expressed the hope that some results would
follow after his departure, but did not expect them
immediately. He said he told the generals that even the
members against Security Council action wanted to see results.


3. (C) Burma's political future appeared to be the primary
focus of this visit. This time the military leaders pushed
back: challenging the number of political prisoners and
announcing that the National Convention was the only way
forward. Gambari described the discussions as "real give and
take," but in the end he seemed to accept that the military's
way "was the only game in town" leaving it to the
international community to decide how to deal with this fact.
Gambari said that he emphasized the need for a fair, all
inclusive process and advised the generals that "a
constitution must reflect diverse views so that it lasts."
If relevant parties are excluded the chances of peace would
diminish, according to Gambari, without peace, there would be
no sustainable development, and without democracy and human
rights, there would be no peace or development. He did not
offer any information on the military leaders' response.


4. (C) Gambari clearly received the message that the
generals were in a hurry to finish, adding that the "train
may have left the station, so the opposition must decide."
The NLD senior leaders, with whom he met at UN offices, did
not have a "coherent response," but Gambari acknowledged that
they favor dialogue and compromise. He later added that the
"NLD can wait or become irrelevant because the military is
determined to move the train." Gambari also met with
representatives of the 17 ethnic groups participating in the

RANGOON 00001678 002 OF 003


National Convention (on the NC premises) and said they all
favored humanitarian assistance. He did not offer any
insights as to their views of the NC process.

Pro-Democracy Supporters Left Behind
--------------


5. (C) Richard Horsey of the ILO provided Charge and the
French Ambassador a readout of Gambari-ASSK meeting since
Gambari met with UN reps after his meeting with her. It did
not take place at her residence as Gambari requested, but at
the state guest house, and lasted over an hour. Gambari
found her well, but press reports said she requested to see
her doctor more regularly (a request she also made in
May--see ref E; her doctor has not been permitted to see her
since August 24--ref D). Gambari told the diplomats that
that he had messages from the military leaders for ASSK, but
did not offer any specifics. ASSK, according to Horsey
repeated her conditions and said that she would not abandon
her party. We interpret this as Gambari's attempt to follow
up on a letter ASSK wrote to Than Shwe in 2004, as
recommended by Leon de Riedmattan in ref B.


6. (C) Gambari also met with representatives of the National
Union Party (set up as the military party to contest the 1990
elections in which they garnered less than 20 % of the votes)
and the Myanmar Womens Federation (a government organized
NGO) on UN premises. He requested a meeting with
representatives of the students, but did not get to see them,
although he said he hoped to obtain written suggestions from
them. Gambari said that he specifically requested the
release of the five Generation 88 students (ref A),and
received the impression that a debate is already going on
inside the regime with regard to these particular prisoners.


7. (C) Most of the follow-up questions referred to the train
metaphor. Could anyone get on? Gambari said he suggested
that the train be stopped and views invited. Otherwise, he
suggested "to get ready for the next station" of a referendum
or elections. He acknowledged that whether these would be
free and fair would be another issue, saying he volunteered
UN assistance, if requested by the GOB, to assist with
elections and/or monitoring. To highlight the sense of
urgency on the part of the military, he said they were
already taking action at local levels to put in place
civilian leaders.

Who Says We Have Problems?
--------------


8. (C) Gambari left it to UN Resident Coordinator to
describe the discussions on humanitarian assistance, after
saying that he repeatedly expressed his full confidence in
Petrie as "humanitarian coordinator" in all his meetings.
Petrie said that after detailed discussions with the Foreign
and Labor Ministers it became clear that GOB perceptions of
the Burma's current situation varied greatly from those of
the UN and INGOs. So an agreement was reached for Secretary
One Lt. Gen. Thein Sein (number 4 in the hierarchy) to chair
an inter-ministerial meeting with UN representatives to
review the situation. However, Petrie did not get the
high-level liaison he sought (ref C).

Comment
--------------


9. (C) Nothing indicates that Gambari found the generals in
a listening mood. Instead they set their conditions, which
Gambari accepted and then turned around and tried to pressure
the weaker party. Gambari does not appear to recognize the
fact that ASSK cannot even meet with her own supporters to
consult on how they should move forward, and that he was used
to present her with essentially a "take it or leave it"
offer. Gambari did not have any follow-up meetings planned
with the Senior Generals, so we doubt they even expected her
to take their offer. We're no experts on "good offices," but
would expect a UN envoy to be more of an intermediary,
carrying messages back and forth rather than one way. The

RANGOON 00001678 003 OF 003


UN's willingness to accept a sham constitutional process does
not offer the Burmese people any greater say in their future
than they have now and could actually bind them more tightly
into an even more rigid framework. Most of the Ambassadors
briefed concluded that Gambari had failed to achieve any of
his objectives.


10. (C) We learned that one of the reasons Gambari came back
this time, was to strengthen his pitch to be designated the
next UN Special Envoy for Burma based on his good rapport
with the generals. No doubt they find him easy to manipulate
since Gambari failed to even stay where he wanted and had to
attend the National Convention, which he also sought to
avoid. It is his ready willingness to dismiss the desires of
the majority of the Burmese people for a more open and
democratic government, however, that disqualifies him in our
eyes.

VILLAROSA