GAMBARI FINDS LITTLE GIVE IN BURMESE GENERALS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 001678 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP AND IO; PACOM FOR FPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL BM SUBJECT: GAMBARI FINDS LITTLE GIVE IN BURMESE GENERALS REF: A. RANGOON 1670-CHARGES FILED AGAINST OPPOSITION LEADERS ¶B. RANGOON 1609-TRYING TO GET A POLITICAL DIALOGUE GOING ¶C. RANGOON 1538-RESTRICTIONS ON HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE CONTINUE ¶D. RANGOON 1269-ASSK IN GOOD HEALTH BUT NOT FREE ¶E. RANGOON 679--MAY GAMBARI VISIT Classified By: CDA Shari Villarosa for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: UN Under Secretary General Ibrahim Gambari made a second visit to Burma November 9-12 to try to get a political dialogue going and increase the space for humanitarian assistance. It does not appear at this time that he made much, if any, progress. He met with Burma's senior military leadership and Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK). Although the UN had hoped to arrange a more varied set of meetings away from government-controlled (and bugged) premises, Gambari only succeeded in having a few meetings outside of government premises. Gambari recognized, and informed the generals, that he needed to take back concrete results. He appears to be returning empty-handed. End Summary. Generals On a Train -------------- ¶2. (C) Gambari met with Rangoon-based Chiefs of Mission on November 11 to offer a less detailed briefing about his meetings than after his first visit last May (ref E). He clarified that he came as an emissary of the Secretary General under the good offices mandate of the UN General Assembly, separate from the UN Security Council process that has also gotten underway since last May. He will brief both the Secretary General and the Security Council on his return. His objectives for this visit: "build on the trust between military leaders and him" to continue the process of dialogue and engagement; promote tangible results in making the regime's "roadmap" more credible and inclusive; seek the release of political prisoners; ensure greater access for humanitarian assistance; and stop hostilities in Kayin (Karen) State. The final point did not appear to get much attention since he only reported that he understood a ceasefire may be in the works. He said he would not "have been invited back if there was no desire to continue discussion" in response to a question whether he still saw opportunities. He expressed the hope that some results would follow after his departure, but did not expect them immediately. He said he told the generals that even the members against Security Council action wanted to see results. ¶3. (C) Burma's political future appeared to be the primary focus of this visit. This time the military leaders pushed back: challenging the number of political prisoners and announcing that the National Convention was the only way forward. Gambari described the discussions as "real give and take," but in the end he seemed to accept that the military's way "was the only game in town" leaving it to the international community to decide how to deal with this fact. Gambari said that he emphasized the need for a fair, all inclusive process and advised the generals that "a constitution must reflect diverse views so that it lasts." If relevant parties are excluded the chances of peace would diminish, according to Gambari, without peace, there would be no sustainable development, and without democracy and human rights, there would be no peace or development. He did not offer any information on the military leaders' response. ¶4. (C) Gambari clearly received the message that the generals were in a hurry to finish, adding that the "train may have left the station, so the opposition must decide." The NLD senior leaders, with whom he met at UN offices, did not have a "coherent response," but Gambari acknowledged that they favor dialogue and compromise. He later added that the "NLD can wait or become irrelevant because the military is determined to move the train." Gambari also met with representatives of the 17 ethnic groups participating in the RANGOON 00001678 002 OF 003 National Convention (on the NC premises) and said they all favored humanitarian assistance. He did not offer any insights as to their views of the NC process. Pro-Democracy Supporters Left Behind -------------- ¶5. (C) Richard Horsey of the ILO provided Charge and the French Ambassador a readout of Gambari-ASSK meeting since Gambari met with UN reps after his meeting with her. It did not take place at her residence as Gambari requested, but at the state guest house, and lasted over an hour. Gambari found her well, but press reports said she requested to see her doctor more regularly (a request she also made in May--see ref E; her doctor has not been permitted to see her since August 24--ref D). Gambari told the diplomats that that he had messages from the military leaders for ASSK, but did not offer any specifics. ASSK, according to Horsey repeated her conditions and said that she would not abandon her party. We interpret this as Gambari's attempt to follow up on a letter ASSK wrote to Than Shwe in 2004, as recommended by Leon de Riedmattan in ref B. ¶6. (C) Gambari also met with representatives of the National Union Party (set up as the military party to contest the 1990 elections in which they garnered less than 20 % of the votes) and the Myanmar Womens Federation (a government organized NGO) on UN premises. He requested a meeting with representatives of the students, but did not get to see them, although he said he hoped to obtain written suggestions from them. Gambari said that he specifically requested the release of the five Generation 88 students (ref A),and received the impression that a debate is already going on inside the regime with regard to these particular prisoners. ¶7. (C) Most of the follow-up questions referred to the train metaphor. Could anyone get on? Gambari said he suggested that the train be stopped and views invited. Otherwise, he suggested "to get ready for the next station" of a referendum or elections. He acknowledged that whether these would be free and fair would be another issue, saying he volunteered UN assistance, if requested by the GOB, to assist with elections and/or monitoring. To highlight the sense of urgency on the part of the military, he said they were already taking action at local levels to put in place civilian leaders. Who Says We Have Problems? -------------- ¶8. (C) Gambari left it to UN Resident Coordinator to describe the discussions on humanitarian assistance, after saying that he repeatedly expressed his full confidence in Petrie as "humanitarian coordinator" in all his meetings. Petrie said that after detailed discussions with the Foreign and Labor Ministers it became clear that GOB perceptions of the Burma's current situation varied greatly from those of the UN and INGOs. So an agreement was reached for Secretary One Lt. Gen. Thein Sein (number 4 in the hierarchy) to chair an inter-ministerial meeting with UN representatives to review the situation. However, Petrie did not get the high-level liaison he sought (ref C). Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Nothing indicates that Gambari found the generals in a listening mood. Instead they set their conditions, which Gambari accepted and then turned around and tried to pressure the weaker party. Gambari does not appear to recognize the fact that ASSK cannot even meet with her own supporters to consult on how they should move forward, and that he was used to present her with essentially a "take it or leave it" offer. Gambari did not have any follow-up meetings planned with the Senior Generals, so we doubt they even expected her to take their offer. We're no experts on "good offices," but would expect a UN envoy to be more of an intermediary, carrying messages back and forth rather than one way. The RANGOON 00001678 003 OF 003 UN's willingness to accept a sham constitutional process does not offer the Burmese people any greater say in their future than they have now and could actually bind them more tightly into an even more rigid framework. Most of the Ambassadors briefed concluded that Gambari had failed to achieve any of his objectives. ¶10. (C) We learned that one of the reasons Gambari came back this time, was to strengthen his pitch to be designated the next UN Special Envoy for Burma based on his good rapport with the generals. No doubt they find him easy to manipulate since Gambari failed to even stay where he wanted and had to attend the National Convention, which he also sought to avoid. It is his ready willingness to dismiss the desires of the majority of the Burmese people for a more open and democratic government, however, that disqualifies him in our eyes. VILLAROSA