BURMA TIGHTENS THE NOOSE ON ICRC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001622 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL BM SUBJECT: BURMA TIGHTENS THE NOOSE ON ICRC REF: RANGOON 1232 RANGOON 00001622 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Poloff Dean Tidwell for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Shortly after the arrival of a new head of delegation for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),the GOB informed the INGO that it could no longer work to support detainees in Burma directly, warned ICRC to stay away from border areas, and ordered two ICRC field offices to close. Officials also instructed ICRC to work only through the government-controlled Myanmar Red Cross Society and not directly with ministry officials. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) The new Head of Delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Pierre-Andre Conod, received a letter two weeks ago summoning him to attend a meeting at the capital on October 23. The letter stressed that he "must come for a meeting," and added, "don't fail to come." The meeting in Nay Pyi Taw was chaired by the Minister of Home Affairs (MHA),and also attended by the Minister of Health (MOH) and the President of the Myanmar Red Cross Society (MRCS),who was subsequently replaced. ¶3. (C) The Minister of Home Affairs, Major General Maung Oo, did most of the talking at the meeting. He confirmed that the MHA would once again be ICRC's reference ministry, which responded to ICRC's request (reftel). The regime had placed ICRC under MOH liaison approximately one year ago. ICRC considers its work with prisoners more law enforcement related than health related and preferred to work with the MHA. NOW THE BAD NEWS ¶4. (C) Maung Oo told Conod that ICRC could no longer conduct its activities to support families of detainees in Burma, and that this component of ICRC's work "was over." The GOB has not allowed ICRC to make any unaccompanied prison visits since November 2005. Since then, ICRC continued to facilitate communication with the families of political and other prisoners and assisted them in traveling to the (often remote) locations where their family members were imprisoned. ¶5. (C) Maung Oo added that the regime was very uncomfortable with ICRC's activities in border areas. He told Conod that ICRC must administer all its border activities from Rangoon. He concluded by stating that the MRCS will be the sole contact point between ICRC and the GOB in the future, and that ICRC must collaborate with MRCS on all its activities, including development of an action plan. ¶6. (C) Conod's deputy, Thierry Ribaux, told us that ICRC plans to challenge the instruction to work through the MRCS, which is a government organized NGO closely linked to the regime generals. As an international organization, the ICRC is insisting it has the right to deal directly with the government, and not through intermediaries such as the MRCS. After the meeting in Nay Pyi Taw, the ICRC told its expatriate staff to stop traveling to the field to avoid provocation and lower its profile, but it has not informed the regime about this decision. ¶7. (C) Ribaux said ICRC continues to receive mixed signals from the GOB. While officials in Nay Pyi Taw seem uncomfortable with ICRC expatriates making any field visits, regional military commanders continue to show ICRC the green light. One regional commander extended an invitation to ICRC to visit his area on November 1, well after the Nay Pyi Taw meeting. RANGOON 00001622 002.2 OF 002 TIGHTENING THE NOOSE ¶8. (C) On November 1, police ordered the ICRC offices in Mawlamyine (Mon State) and Kengtung (Shan State) to close. They offered no reason, carried no written orders, and issued no deadline. The police, who answer to the Minister of Home Affairs, told local ICRC staff they had "received instructions" to inform the ICRC field offices to close. ¶9. (C) Police have not yet visited other ICRC field offices in Mandalay, Taunggyi (Shan State),or Hpa-an (Karen State). ICRC is not sure whether the regime only wants to close its offices in Mawlamyine and Kengtung, or police chiefs in the other towns had simply not yet delivered the same message. ICRC will not hurry to close down its offices. Ribaux said ICRC opened its field offices after obtaining written permission and therefore only plans close them down on receipt of written instructions. ¶10. (C) So far ICRC has only told a few of its key staff and selected diplomatic missions about the closure order. ICRC does not want the issue to become publicized in the media for the time being, as they still hope for a reversal of policy. While ICRC wanted to keep us informed, Ribaux stressed that ICRC does not want us to make any statements or intercede on their behalf. He hinted that ICRC might ask one or two other diplomatic missions with greater entree to the GOB to act on its behalf. ICRC AND THE MRCS ¶11. (C) ICRC has cooperated with the MRCS in the past to establish family links with prisoners, primarily as a means of delivering letters. Now that ICRC no longer has any access to prisoners, this activity has ceased. ICRC also gave some low level training to MRCS staff in disaster preparedness and international humanitarian law (IHL). When the regime ordered the MRCS to train the military on IHL, ICRC assisted the MRCS develop a program since the MRCS had no knowledge of the field. ¶12. (C) The order to ICRC to only work through MRCS comes at the same time as a regime-led shake up of the MRCS. At a recent farewell party for the departing ICRC head, several MRCS members became drunk and engaged in a fistfight amongst themselves. ICRC staff had to intervene to separate the two MRCS factions. Subsequently, the regime dismissed all ten members of the MRCS executive committee and appointed ten new members, naming one new member as president. The new officers have not yet taken up office. ¶13. (C) COMMENT: The ICRC has consistently stuck to its international policy of unaccompanied visits to allow confidential access to prisoners in Burma. As a result, it SIPDIS has been unable to visit any prisons since the regime imposed new rules in November 2005 requiring USDA or MRCS officials to accompany all prison visits. The new restrictions, cutting off ICRC direct access to prisoners' families, border areas, and government officials, will make it even harder for ICRC to do its work in Burma, but remaining ICRC staff are committed to continue their efforts and are prepared to ride out the latest storm. While ICRC is not part of the UN umbrella and has asked us to avoid making these latest setbacks public for the time being, it is important that those who follow Burma -- and U/SYG Gambari in particular -- be made aware of the latest regime efforts to throw obstacles in the path of international humanitarian assistance and further isolate their country's thousand-plus political prisoners from any outside contact. END COMMENT. STOLTZ