Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06RANGOON1609
2006-10-30 08:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rangoon
Cable title:
TRYING TO GET A POLITICAL DIALOGUE GOING IN BURMA
VZCZCXRO3612 PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH DE RUEHGO #1609 3030842 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 300842Z OCT 06 FM AMEMBASSY RANGOON TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5347 INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 9977 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 3580 RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 7076 RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2907 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0564 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
C O N F I D E N T I A L RANGOON 001609
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2016
TAGS: PGOV BM UN
SUBJECT: TRYING TO GET A POLITICAL DIALOGUE GOING IN BURMA
Classified By: CDA Shari Villarosa for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L RANGOON 001609
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2016
TAGS: PGOV BM UN
SUBJECT: TRYING TO GET A POLITICAL DIALOGUE GOING IN BURMA
Classified By: CDA Shari Villarosa for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) confidants have proposed a
means to resume a political dialogue, which UN U/SYG Gambari
might suggest to Than Shwe when they next meet in Burma.
Apparently ASSK wrote a letter to Than Shwe in 2004 proposing
a way forward whereby she would step back from the NLD party
and offer her services to unify Burmese behind some broadly
acceptable political arrangements. At the time, Than Shwe
reportedly rejected ASSK's letter as insufficiently
respectful. Her retort, according to her doctor (Dr. Tin Myo
Win aka Douglas),was how respectful does she need to be to
someone who has never kept his promises. Nevertheless,
fearing a lost opportunity should Gambari fail to address
political issues when he visits, Leon de Riedmattan believes
he has persuaded UN Resrep Charles Petrie that this letter
might offer a way to begin a political dialogue.
2. (C) De Riedmattan served for many years as a liaison
between ASSK and the military, primarily Khin Nyunt. In that
capacity he gained the confidence of ASSK, but once Khin
Nyunt was deposed in 2004, his utility to the other generals
became less welcome. Earlier this year, his visa to continue
living in Rangoon was denied, although he has been permitted
to return for regular "social visits" every few months. He
has spent the past two weeks in Rangoon speaking with as many
people as he could, including ASSK's doctor, NLD activists,
and various diplomatic and UN contacts. While some Burmese
exiles claim that ASSK would never negotiate with the
military, both de Riedmattan and Douglas, asserted to Charge
recently that she has long indicated her willingness to do
so. Douglas cited her frequent discussions with senior
military officers during the Khin Nyunt era and various NLD
statements through the years, including its offer earlier
this year to recognize the military as the de facto
government.
3. (C) Both Douglas and de Riedmattan want to forestall
international pressure to endorse the National Convention as
the only political option at this time, effectively
abandoning the pro-democracy activists. De Riedmattan
acknowledged waning interest among Europeans in demanding
political change as "too hard." Instead, they would prefer
to focus on humanitarian assistance and just hope that
political change would come in time. De Riedmattan said
various people in New York had gotten to Gambari with this
message. He claimed to have persuaded Charles Petrie that it
would be a terrible mistake for Gambari to ignore political
issues when he visits Rangoon. He said that Petrie would try
to arrange a meeting between Gambari and de Riedmattan in
Bangkok before he travels to Rangoon. De Riedmattan also
said, contrary to conventional wisdom, that Than Shwe had no
particular unwillingness in speaking with ASSK, but suspected
Khin Nyunt of conspiring with her to advance his own
interests. De Riedmattan also plans to travel to the
UK-hosted Wilton Park meeting November 2-4 to insure
political issues get discussed there as well, even though
they do not now appear on the meeting agenda.
4. (C) Comment: Until ASSK is free to say directly what she
thinks, other well-intentioned, but not necessarily
authoritative, individuals will claim to speak for her. Many
Burmese believe there is significant willingness among senior
military officers to consider other political options, but no
one will risk the wrath of Than Shwe. So we need to keep
pushing for Than Shwe and ASSK to talk together and figure
out a way forward. Gambari appears to be the only one who is
likely to speak directly with both individuals anytime soon,
and it would be a terrible mistake for him to ignore the very
difficult political issues that have brought Burma to its
current deteriorated state. However, all the pressure should
not be on ASSK, rather Gambari should pressure Than Shwe to
accommodate her as well, otherwise Than Shwe will go down in
history as the man responsible for Burma's tragic decline.
He reportedly does care about his legacy, and is under the
illusion that he has united the country and built it up.
That illusion should be burst.
VILLAROSA
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2016
TAGS: PGOV BM UN
SUBJECT: TRYING TO GET A POLITICAL DIALOGUE GOING IN BURMA
Classified By: CDA Shari Villarosa for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) confidants have proposed a
means to resume a political dialogue, which UN U/SYG Gambari
might suggest to Than Shwe when they next meet in Burma.
Apparently ASSK wrote a letter to Than Shwe in 2004 proposing
a way forward whereby she would step back from the NLD party
and offer her services to unify Burmese behind some broadly
acceptable political arrangements. At the time, Than Shwe
reportedly rejected ASSK's letter as insufficiently
respectful. Her retort, according to her doctor (Dr. Tin Myo
Win aka Douglas),was how respectful does she need to be to
someone who has never kept his promises. Nevertheless,
fearing a lost opportunity should Gambari fail to address
political issues when he visits, Leon de Riedmattan believes
he has persuaded UN Resrep Charles Petrie that this letter
might offer a way to begin a political dialogue.
2. (C) De Riedmattan served for many years as a liaison
between ASSK and the military, primarily Khin Nyunt. In that
capacity he gained the confidence of ASSK, but once Khin
Nyunt was deposed in 2004, his utility to the other generals
became less welcome. Earlier this year, his visa to continue
living in Rangoon was denied, although he has been permitted
to return for regular "social visits" every few months. He
has spent the past two weeks in Rangoon speaking with as many
people as he could, including ASSK's doctor, NLD activists,
and various diplomatic and UN contacts. While some Burmese
exiles claim that ASSK would never negotiate with the
military, both de Riedmattan and Douglas, asserted to Charge
recently that she has long indicated her willingness to do
so. Douglas cited her frequent discussions with senior
military officers during the Khin Nyunt era and various NLD
statements through the years, including its offer earlier
this year to recognize the military as the de facto
government.
3. (C) Both Douglas and de Riedmattan want to forestall
international pressure to endorse the National Convention as
the only political option at this time, effectively
abandoning the pro-democracy activists. De Riedmattan
acknowledged waning interest among Europeans in demanding
political change as "too hard." Instead, they would prefer
to focus on humanitarian assistance and just hope that
political change would come in time. De Riedmattan said
various people in New York had gotten to Gambari with this
message. He claimed to have persuaded Charles Petrie that it
would be a terrible mistake for Gambari to ignore political
issues when he visits Rangoon. He said that Petrie would try
to arrange a meeting between Gambari and de Riedmattan in
Bangkok before he travels to Rangoon. De Riedmattan also
said, contrary to conventional wisdom, that Than Shwe had no
particular unwillingness in speaking with ASSK, but suspected
Khin Nyunt of conspiring with her to advance his own
interests. De Riedmattan also plans to travel to the
UK-hosted Wilton Park meeting November 2-4 to insure
political issues get discussed there as well, even though
they do not now appear on the meeting agenda.
4. (C) Comment: Until ASSK is free to say directly what she
thinks, other well-intentioned, but not necessarily
authoritative, individuals will claim to speak for her. Many
Burmese believe there is significant willingness among senior
military officers to consider other political options, but no
one will risk the wrath of Than Shwe. So we need to keep
pushing for Than Shwe and ASSK to talk together and figure
out a way forward. Gambari appears to be the only one who is
likely to speak directly with both individuals anytime soon,
and it would be a terrible mistake for him to ignore the very
difficult political issues that have brought Burma to its
current deteriorated state. However, all the pressure should
not be on ASSK, rather Gambari should pressure Than Shwe to
accommodate her as well, otherwise Than Shwe will go down in
history as the man responsible for Burma's tragic decline.
He reportedly does care about his legacy, and is under the
illusion that he has united the country and built it up.
That illusion should be burst.
VILLAROSA