ILO SPECIAL ADVISOR DEPARTS BURMA EMPTY HANDED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001588

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA; GENEVA FOR LABOR
ATTACHE:JCHAMBERLAIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2016
TAGS: ELAB ECON PGOV PHUM BM
SUBJECT: ILO SPECIAL ADVISOR DEPARTS BURMA EMPTY HANDED

REF: RANGOON 1518

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Classified By: Poloff Dean Tidwell for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: ILO Special Advisor Francis Maupain briefed
us on his unsuccessful negotiations with GOB officials on
October 20-21 to try to establish a credible mechanism for
ILO investigations of forced labor complaints. After
reaching tentative agreement with the GOB permitting the ILO
unfettered access to forced labor complainants, the Burmese
scuttled the agreement by refusing to budge on minor issues.
The ILO told the Minister of Labor that, absent agreement,
the ILO might refer the case of Burma to the UN or the ICJ.
The Labor Minister claimed that he lacked orders to show more
flexibility in negotiating with the ILO. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) ILO Special Advisor Francis Maupain briefed us on his
October 20-21 meetings with the Minister of Labor. He came
to Rangoon only after the Minister of Labor gave clear
signals to ILO's Rangoon Liaison Officer Richard Horsey that
the GOB was ready to finalize an agreement on a credible
mechanism for the ILO to investigate forced labor complaints
(reftel).


3. (C) The ILO sought recognition from the GOB that the ILO
liaison officer would have private, confidential access to
forced labor complainants and that the GOB would not
persecute complainants, even if their complaints turned out
to be baseless. The ILO also wanted assurances from the GOB
that the ILO liaison officer could travel freely in Burma in
a timely manner, that the liaison officer could attend forced
labor trials, that the GOB would report back regularly to the
ILO on its follow up investigations, and that the ILO liaison
office in Rangoon could increase staff to meet a possible
increased workload in the future.


4. (C) At the initial meeting on October 20, the Minister of
Labor raised objections to the ILO proposal on the grounds
that it was incompatible with Burmese laws for a foreign
official to have investigative power. However, he appeared
ready to be more interactive than during previous meetings,
according to Maupain. After further discussion, he referred
Maupain and Horsey to his labor working group to discuss
details of an agreement.


5. (C) The meeting with the working group began positively.
The GOB objected initially to the ILO's position on access to
complainants, insisting that any assessment by the liaison
officer be a "joint assessment" with GOB representatives
present. When the ILO said this was unacceptable, the
working group pushed for a GOB representative to be allowed
to interview all complainants immediately after they met with
ILO officials. When Horsey and Maupain rejected this, too,
the GOB agreed that the ILO could make its own assessment
visits and Burmese officials would conduct their own
assessments after the ILO reported its conclusions to the GOB.


6. (C) When the ILO team met with the working group the next
day, the GOB had hardened its position. The Burmese
negotiators balked at the provision in the draft agreement to
allow the ILO to increase its presence in Burma should
conditions require it, and asked the ILO to delete this
clause from the agreement. ILO refused, but tried to soften
its demand by stressing that additional staff would not be
required immediately, only as workload increased. The
working group refused to accept ILO's assurances, but
indicated that the GOB would issue new visas "if necessary."


7. (C) Another sticking point was the length of the letter's
"probationary period." The ILO recommended an 18-month

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period to review progress, but the Burmese negotiators
insisted it should last no more than six months. The ILO
tried to get the working group to be flexible by suggesting
"no less than six months and no more than 18 months." The
talks concluded without agreement on this issue.


8. (C) The ILO team surmised that the Burmese negotiators may
have felt they gave away too much on ILO access on October
20, and raised the stakes on other issues to scuttle the
talks. When it became clear that the ILO team would not
compromise, the working group tried to retract its earlier
agreement to allow ILO to make independent assessments,
returning to their old negotiating points. The Deputy
Minister of Labor concluded the meeting by referring to the
GOB's initial negotiating position, while stressing that
negotiations could not continue until he reported to his
government.


9. (C) The ILO team met again with the Minister of Labor on
October 21, who said he understood the consequences if Burma
did not comply with the ILO's offer. The minister told
Maupain that the GOB was ready to face any charges that ILO
workers' groups might lodge with the International Court of
Justice, and was already preparing its own defense. The
minister concluded the meeting by confirming that he had been
instructed to hold his current position, but agreed that he
would try to obtain "different instructions." Maupain
departed Rangoon on October 24, after the Minister of Labor
sent a message stating that he had not received any new
instructions.


10. (C) COMMENT: Permitting ILO unfettered access to
complainants would have been a welcome step forward and
created a positive mood for the upcoming planned visit by UN
U/SYG Gambari. By refusing to agree to increased ILO
staffing, the GOB likely thought they could effectively
restrict access since the lone ILO representative here now
would become quickly overwhelmed based on the continuing
forced labor reports we receive. Once again, the regime's
desire to control trumps any desire to show willingness to
cooperate with the international community. We congratulate
the ILO on insisting they have real access rather than
settling for paper access. END COMMENT.
VILLAROSA