Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06RANGOON1512
2006-10-13 04:17:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rangoon
Cable title:  

KACHINS BET ON THE NATIONAL CONVENTION PROCESS

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL BM 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001512 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL BM
SUBJECT: KACHINS BET ON THE NATIONAL CONVENTION PROCESS

REF: RANGOON 1475

RANGOON 00001512 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: PolOff Dean Tidwell for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001512

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL BM
SUBJECT: KACHINS BET ON THE NATIONAL CONVENTION PROCESS

REF: RANGOON 1475

RANGOON 00001512 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: PolOff Dean Tidwell for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Kachin Independence Organization's (KIO)
delegate to the National Convention believes the ethnics must
try to strike the best possible deal with the regime via the
National Convention and try to amend the constitution later,
following a period of confidence building. He thinks violent
opposition to the regime would again be brutally crushed and
that current pro-democracy forces lack adequate experience to
lead the country. By betting on the regime's scripted
constitution process, the KIO leadership is gambling that the
people it represents will accept its less than courageous
stance. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Prior to the opening of the GOB's latest session of
the National Convention (NC),KIO vice chairman Dr. Tu Jar
described to Embassy staff the organization's rationale for
participating in the regime's tightly choreographed process
to draft a new constitution. Dr. Tu Jar said the KIO
Executive Committee had decided in 1992 that key national
issues could only be solved through dialogue, not on the
battlefield. Having made this decision, the KIO signed a
cease-fire agreement with the SPDC in 1994 and agreed to
participate in the NC after the SPDC announced its "seven
step road map" to democracy in 2003. He explained that the
KIO had expected the process to be more transparent and open
to international scrutiny.


3. (C) Dr. Tu Jar said that through its participation in the
NC, the KIO has discovered what is most important to the
various interest groups attending the Convention. For the
ethnic minorities, he said, some form of autonomy under
federalism remains the key objective. The SPDC is primarily
concerned about maintaining a military dominated power
sharing system. The political parties engaged in the NC
place achievement of democracy atop their agenda. Tu Jar
admitted that ethnic representatives' proposals at the NC
were not adopted, nor even discussed, but consoled himself
that at least the regime registered their concerns. He also

said that it remains unclear whether any legislative power
will exist at the state level, as states under the current
script are only allowed to have state councils with very
limited autonomy.

REALISM VS. IDEALISM


4. (C) According to Tu Jar, the KIO participates in the NC
because it feels it is more important to be realistic than
idealistic. KIO leaders assume the regime will push through
its road map regardless of obstacles. While the KIO does not
want to condone long-term military government rule, it
believes it is important to support any plan that allows at
least a small amount of power sharing as preferable to the
status quo. The KIO also hopes to be able to amend the
constitution in the future to allow for greater democracy.
Tu Jar believes that the military will only demand 25 percent
of the seats in a future parliament, leaving 75 percent for
civilians. He also surmised that military parliamentarians
would only seek to control the Ministries of Defense, Home
Affairs, and Border Affairs and National Races, while
civilians would run the other ministries.


5. (C) Despite going along with the regime in the NC process,
the KIO refused the SPDC's request to issue a statement
condemning the United States for placing Burma on the UNSC
agenda (reftel). Dr. Tu Jar admitted that the Kachin may
have to suffer the consequences, but the KIO showed it is
willing take a stand against the regime on selected issues.


RANGOON 00001512 002.2 OF 002


A TIME FOR CONFIDENCE BUILDING


6. (C) Dr. Tu Jar admitted that a lack of trust remains a
basic obstacle to bringing democracy to Burma. The ethnic
Burman majority still feels that ethnic minorities only want
to tear the union apart. At the same time, the minorities
feel that Burmans look down on them and do not want them to
share power on an equitable basis. Additionally, the
military fears that a civilian government will seek reprisals
for decades of military abuse and misrule. Tu Jar said that,
after a period under a new constitution, different groups
might begin to develop greater confidence in one another and
help move toward greater democracy. He cited Thailand and
Indonesia as countries where the transition from military
rule to civilian rule has been gradual. He ruled out
returning to the battlefield, or relying on a public uprising
to fight for democracy because the military would again
brutally crush any resistance. Tu Jar also told us that he
believes the opposition has no experienced leaders who could
lead the country.


7. (C) COMMENT: The KIO optimistically joined the NC process
only to discover the only scriptwriter is the regime. Since
the KIO signed a cease-fire with the SPDC, the regime has
exerted increasing control over Kachin State's rich natural
resources and gem trade, and replaced Kachins with ethnic
Burmans in most key government and administrative positions
in the state. If the KIO fails to gain any significant
autonomy through its NC participation, and the signals are
not promising, its frustrated constituency may lose faith in
current leadership and end the cease-fire agreement that has
given them few tangible benefits so far. Kachin youth face
severe unemployment and many are already tempted by drugs or
better prospects across the border in China. While senior
leaders (who have been compensated by the military) are
unwilling to fight for their rights, young people have little
to lose. END COMMENT.
VILLAROSA