PREPARING GAMBARI FOR HIS NEXT VISIT TO BURMA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 001327

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP ASSISTANT SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER HILL, IO
ASSISTANT SECRETARY SILVERBERG, DRL ASSISTANT SECRETARY
LOWENKRON, EAP/MLS; USUN FOR AMBASSADOR SANDERS; PACOM FOR
FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ECON PREL BM
SUBJECT: PREPARING GAMBARI FOR HIS NEXT VISIT TO BURMA

REF: A. RANGOON 732 (DEMOCRACY AWAITS ANOTHER DAY)


B. RANGOON 700 (NLD REACTION TO GAMBARI VISIT)

C. RANGOON 1232 (ICRC ACCESS)

D. RANGOON 679 (GAMBARI BRIEFING)

E. RANGOON 530 (NLD OFFER TO THE REGIME)

F. RANGOON 155 (NATIONAL CONVENTION RECESSES)

G. RANGOON 79 (LEON DE RIEDMATTEN)

Classified By: CDA Shari Villarosa for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Post supports U/SYG Gambari's efforts to
foster dialogue in Burma, but another trip stage-managed by
the regime would be counterproductive. The regime's
extension of Aung San Suu Kyi's house arrest shortly after
Gambari's last visit was a slap in the face of the UN.
Gambari needs to deliver a strong message to the regime that
the international community expects concrete actions that
show the regime has the political will to move Burma toward
democracy. This includes genuine dialogue with the
pro-democracy opposition and ethnic minority representatives,
as well as the resumption of ICRC visits to Burmese
prisoners. We should emphasize to Gambari that the National
Convention can be a vehicle for bringing democracy to Burma
only if the regime allows more inclusive participation and
real debate. End Summary.


2. (C) The UN has publicly acknowledged it is considering
sending Gambari on a second visit, possibly in October. The
UNSC will also be discussing Burma this month. Post offers
the following thoughts on how the UN can best advance a
viable transition to democracy in Burma

Emphasize Results
--------------


3. (C) Post believes the UN has the potential to play a
constructive role in bringing all parties to the table for a
genuine dialogue on a realistic transition to democracy in
Burma. However, the U.S. and democratically-minded
countries should remain actively engaged to divert the UN
from blessing actions that the regime labels as steps toward
democracy, which are in fact carefully manipulated shams that
exclude the pro-democracy opposition and maintain the
military's chokehold on power.


4. (C) It is no coincidence that the regime announced that
the National Convention would resume October 10, immediately
after the U.S. announcement that it would seek to place Burma
on the UNSC agenda, and no coincidence that Gambari
reportedly plans a return visit in October. Many here
believe that Gambari is ready to side with the regime by
blessing the National Convention as the way forward. NLD
leaders who met with Gambari in May told us he pressured them
to rejoin the National Convention as a face-saving gesture to
the regime (Ref B). We need to emphasize to Gambari that the
National Convention can only be a vehicle for bringing
democracy to Burma if it is substantially revised to permit
real debate, public discussion, and more representative
participation. Asking the NLD to rejoin the process without
addressing the issues that muted its voice and caused it to
leave will not be good enough. Gambari should deliver a
strong message during his second visit that the UN and the
international community expect concrete evidence of political
will from the regime to move Burma toward democracy.

Bring NLD and the Ethnics In
--------------


5. (C) The regime continues to isolate, harass, and arrest
members of the opposition. Gambari's visit could be useful
in leveling the playing field if he emphasized to the regime

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that they must include the NLD in any political discussion as
a step forward. The international community cannot allow the
results of the 1990 election to be ignored or forgotten.
Popularly-elected representatives should not be bound by a
roadmap imposed by the generals. The NLD put forward a
compromise offer to the SPDC on February 12 and again on
April 21 that offers the best opportunity in years for
compromise and a meaningful dialogue (Ref E). These offers
appealed to the regime to form a People's Parliament, based
on the results of the 1990 elections, which would in turn
recognize the ruling State Peace and Development Council
(SPDC) as a transitional "legitimate ruling council." The
offer also underscored the need to include ethnic groups in
the political dialogue and included an appeal to work
together to meet the humanitarian needs of the Burmese
people.

Push for Access for Humanitarian Agencies
--------------


6. (C) Gambari should also be prepared to discuss the
continuing restrictions for international humanitarian
agencies. During his May visit, he cited this area as having
the best potential for early action. Nevertheless, we have
seen no concrete progress yet. Not only are foreign
providers of assistance still restricted from traveling to
project sites, local NGOs are now being ordered to cease
their humanitarian activities. Gambari should insist
specifically that the regime permit the ICRC to resume
unaccompanied visits to prisons and labor camps. Until
recently, ICRC has been active and effective in Burma,
improving conditions for prisoners, providing prosthetics and
physical rehabilitation for thousands of land mine victims,
and protecting internally displaced persons (Ref C). It has
earned worldwide respect for its impartiality and discretion
in promoting international humanitarian law.

Consult the Experts
--------------


7. (C) Post recommends urging Gambari to meet with Leon de
Riedmatten, who was a principal mediator between ASSK and the
regime, before he returns to Burma for another visit. De
Riedmatten is a skilled and credible diplomat who has for
over a decade been closely involved in international efforts
to achieve an inclusive political dialogue in Burma. He is a
trusted confidant of Aung San Suu Kyi. De Riedmatten also
was the former head of the ICRC in Burma and served for
several years as former UN Special Envoy Razali's liaison to
the regime and the pro-democracy opposition (Ref G). We
believe it would be worth Gambari's time to speak with
someone who has dealt extensively with both sides and can
explain what approaches have been tried before, and offer
valuable insights. De Riedmatten will be in the Washington
September 25 and 26 and would be willing to travel to New
York September 27.

Control the Schedule
--------------


8. (C) While Gambari's first visit resulted in meetings with
the two senior generals and Aung San Suu Kyi, the regime
tightly scripted his agenda, directing that all meetings with
the NLD and ASSK take place at the Government Guest House
(where they could be easily monitored). Gambari met with no
representatives of ethnic minority parties. The regime even
tried to prevent him from visiting UN staff in their offices,
which he managed to evade. A second visit should remain
under UN control to ensure that he meets not only with
representatives of the GOB and the NLD, but also with leaders
of Burma's ethnic minorities. In addition, the UN should

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insist that Gambari be permitted to visit people where they
prefer, rather than on GOB miked premises. Specifically, he
should insist on meeting Aung San Suu Kyi at her compound.


9. (C) Comment: We should support Gambari's efforts and
encourage the UN to stay engaged in helping to find common
ground between the regime and its political opponents. The
first visit permitted Gambari and Than Shwe to get
acquainted. On his second visit, Gambari needs to show Than
Shwe that he is serious about seeking progress by offering
specific suggestions. Otherwise Gambari's involvement
becomes just another excuse the regime will cite (as their
Foreign Minister just did at the ASEM Summit in Helsinki) to
avoid substantive discussion. This is also the appropriate
time to divert Gambari from taking the path of least
resistance and endorsing the sham National Convention. End
Comment.
VILLAROSA