Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06RANGOON1241
2006-08-30 09:34:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rangoon
Cable title:
RESPONSES ON KARENNI NATIONAL DEFENCE ARMY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001241
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA; PRM/A:TRUSCH AND
S/CT:TKUSCHNER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINS PREF PTER BM
SUBJECT: RESPONSES ON KARENNI NATIONAL DEFENCE ARMY
REF: A. SECSTATE 133124
B. RANGOON 1184
RANGOON 00001241 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: PolOff Dean Tidwell for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001241
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA; PRM/A:TRUSCH AND
S/CT:TKUSCHNER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINS PREF PTER BM
SUBJECT: RESPONSES ON KARENNI NATIONAL DEFENCE ARMY
REF: A. SECSTATE 133124
B. RANGOON 1184
RANGOON 00001241 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: PolOff Dean Tidwell for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: Little information is available about the
Karenni National Defence ARMY (KNDA) outside of open sources.
Post has no information or evidence that the KNDA has
engaged in any activities that are considered acts of
terrorism, nor has it posed any threat to U.S. national
security or to the security of U.S. nationals or allies. The
KNDA operates as a proxy of the Burmese ARMY and reportedly
attacked a refugee camp in Thailand in 1997 resulting in
civilian deaths. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) We have no information that the Karenni National
Defence ARMY (KNDA) or its political wing, the Karenni
National Defence Party, has engaged in hijacking or sabotage
of civilian conveyances. Our local source, Karenni
politician Raphael P. Thaung (PROTECT) of the Democratic
Organization for Kayan National Unity, knows of no efforts by
the KNDA to develop, acquire, or use weapons of mass
destruction.
3. (SBU) According to the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG),
after the KNDA split from the Karenni National Progressive
Party (KNPP) (ref B) and allied itself with the Burmese
regime in 1996, it attacked Karenni Refugee Camp 2 in
Thailand in 1997, killing three refugees and wounding nine
others. Some observers suspect the attack was not carried
out by the KNDA, whose base was far away from the refugee
camp, but by the Burmese Army, which "forgetfully" left a
KNDA military uniform at the scene to implicate the KNDA.
Although the KNDA has not kidnapped civilians per se, KNDA
deserters reported that the KNDA coerced former KNPP soldiers
and Karenni villagers to take up arms with them, become
porters, or face imprisonment.
4. (C) Our sources estimate that the KNDA has no more than
200 soldiers, of whom no more than 50 are armed. The KNDA
essentially serves as a proxy ARMY of the SPDC, to provide
the Burmese ARMY a cloak of legitimacy for "defending" the
Karenni people against the KNPP. Former KNDA soldiers report
that the KNDA does not operate independently and follows
orders from the Burmese Army. The KNDA joined with the
Burmese ARMY to attack KNPP positions as recently as 2005.
According to the KHRG, in recent years, the KNDA increasingly
has come under the influence of the Karenni Nationalities
People's Liberation Front (KNPLF),another larger Karenni
proxy ARMY of the SPDC.
5. (C) Post knows of no suspected links between the KNDA and
USG-designated terrorist organizations. Post has no
information to suggest that the KNDA poses any threat to the
security of U.S. nationals or to the security of the United
States or its allies.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
6. (U) KNPP soldiers Zaw Hla and Lee Reh broke with the KNPP
after it reneged on its cease-fire with the SPDC. They
formed the KNDA and signed a cease-fire agreement with the
Burmese regime on November 5, 1996. Based in Demoso
township, ten miles south of the Kayah State capital of
Loikaw, the KNDA initially was comprised of up to 150 KNPP
soldiers, other Karenni civilians, and a few ex-KNPP soldiers
whom it coerced to take up arms. According to the KHRG, the
KNDA now has only about 35 armed soldiers. Our sources
disagree on the full name of the KNDA, which some, including
the KHRG, call the "Karenni National Democratic Army." The
RANGOON 00001241 002.2 OF 002
Karenni refer to the KNDA as "Naga Ni" (red dragons) after
their uniform badge. Unlike other KNPP splinter groups, to
which the regime granted "special regions," the KNDA
apparently received no grants of territory in Kayah State.
7. (C) COMMENT: We doubt that KNDA supporters would feel
comfortable residing in Karenni refugee camps in Thailand
that are primarily populated with KNPP supporters. That
being said, it is possible that KNDA deserters and their
families may have sought refuge in Thailand. END COMMENT.
8. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Bangkok and
Consulate Chiang Mai.
VILLAROSA
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA; PRM/A:TRUSCH AND
S/CT:TKUSCHNER
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINS PREF PTER BM
SUBJECT: RESPONSES ON KARENNI NATIONAL DEFENCE ARMY
REF: A. SECSTATE 133124
B. RANGOON 1184
RANGOON 00001241 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: PolOff Dean Tidwell for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: Little information is available about the
Karenni National Defence ARMY (KNDA) outside of open sources.
Post has no information or evidence that the KNDA has
engaged in any activities that are considered acts of
terrorism, nor has it posed any threat to U.S. national
security or to the security of U.S. nationals or allies. The
KNDA operates as a proxy of the Burmese ARMY and reportedly
attacked a refugee camp in Thailand in 1997 resulting in
civilian deaths. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) We have no information that the Karenni National
Defence ARMY (KNDA) or its political wing, the Karenni
National Defence Party, has engaged in hijacking or sabotage
of civilian conveyances. Our local source, Karenni
politician Raphael P. Thaung (PROTECT) of the Democratic
Organization for Kayan National Unity, knows of no efforts by
the KNDA to develop, acquire, or use weapons of mass
destruction.
3. (SBU) According to the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG),
after the KNDA split from the Karenni National Progressive
Party (KNPP) (ref B) and allied itself with the Burmese
regime in 1996, it attacked Karenni Refugee Camp 2 in
Thailand in 1997, killing three refugees and wounding nine
others. Some observers suspect the attack was not carried
out by the KNDA, whose base was far away from the refugee
camp, but by the Burmese Army, which "forgetfully" left a
KNDA military uniform at the scene to implicate the KNDA.
Although the KNDA has not kidnapped civilians per se, KNDA
deserters reported that the KNDA coerced former KNPP soldiers
and Karenni villagers to take up arms with them, become
porters, or face imprisonment.
4. (C) Our sources estimate that the KNDA has no more than
200 soldiers, of whom no more than 50 are armed. The KNDA
essentially serves as a proxy ARMY of the SPDC, to provide
the Burmese ARMY a cloak of legitimacy for "defending" the
Karenni people against the KNPP. Former KNDA soldiers report
that the KNDA does not operate independently and follows
orders from the Burmese Army. The KNDA joined with the
Burmese ARMY to attack KNPP positions as recently as 2005.
According to the KHRG, in recent years, the KNDA increasingly
has come under the influence of the Karenni Nationalities
People's Liberation Front (KNPLF),another larger Karenni
proxy ARMY of the SPDC.
5. (C) Post knows of no suspected links between the KNDA and
USG-designated terrorist organizations. Post has no
information to suggest that the KNDA poses any threat to the
security of U.S. nationals or to the security of the United
States or its allies.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
6. (U) KNPP soldiers Zaw Hla and Lee Reh broke with the KNPP
after it reneged on its cease-fire with the SPDC. They
formed the KNDA and signed a cease-fire agreement with the
Burmese regime on November 5, 1996. Based in Demoso
township, ten miles south of the Kayah State capital of
Loikaw, the KNDA initially was comprised of up to 150 KNPP
soldiers, other Karenni civilians, and a few ex-KNPP soldiers
whom it coerced to take up arms. According to the KHRG, the
KNDA now has only about 35 armed soldiers. Our sources
disagree on the full name of the KNDA, which some, including
the KHRG, call the "Karenni National Democratic Army." The
RANGOON 00001241 002.2 OF 002
Karenni refer to the KNDA as "Naga Ni" (red dragons) after
their uniform badge. Unlike other KNPP splinter groups, to
which the regime granted "special regions," the KNDA
apparently received no grants of territory in Kayah State.
7. (C) COMMENT: We doubt that KNDA supporters would feel
comfortable residing in Karenni refugee camps in Thailand
that are primarily populated with KNPP supporters. That
being said, it is possible that KNDA deserters and their
families may have sought refuge in Thailand. END COMMENT.
8. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Bangkok and
Consulate Chiang Mai.
VILLAROSA