Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06RANGOON1136
2006-08-10 07:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rangoon
Cable title:  

WA TURNING TO CHINA RATHER THAN BURMA

Tags:  PGOV SNAR PREL BM 
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VZCZCXRO6530
RR RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHGO #1136/01 2220740
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 100740Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY RANGOON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4945
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1052
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 9824
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 4281
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1743
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 3471
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0466
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 6921
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 4537
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA 0859
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 0862
RUDKIA/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 0560
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2807
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0450
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 RANGOON 001136 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/2016
TAGS: PGOV SNAR PREL BM
SUBJECT: WA TURNING TO CHINA RATHER THAN BURMA


RANGOON 00001136 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: CDA Villarosa for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 RANGOON 001136

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/2016
TAGS: PGOV SNAR PREL BM
SUBJECT: WA TURNING TO CHINA RATHER THAN BURMA


RANGOON 00001136 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: CDA Villarosa for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (SBU) Summary: The Wa are rapidly being pulled into
China's orbit and will resist any new concessions to the
Burmese regime that would restrict their current relative
autonomy. While they will talk with the Burmese, the Wa have
no intention of ever giving up their arms. The ban on opium
cultivation seems real probably because the Wa leaders have
found more legitimate money-making opportunities courtesy of
the booming Chinese economy, as well as less conspicuous
trafficking opportunities in methamphetamine production.
However, the Wa leaders do little for their own people. They
welcome UNODC and other international efforts to assist poor
villagers make up for the loss of their cash income from
opium cultivation. Unlike areas controlled by the Burmese,
UN agencies and INGOs have relatively unhindered access to Wa
territory. End Summary


2. (SBU) Charge visited Wa Special Region 2 July 26-30. Wa
Special Region 2, created as part of a ceasefire agreement
with the Burmese military, is in Northeastern Burma next to
the border with China. Chinese influence predominates: the
Chinese yuan is the currency; television broadcasts originate
from China; Chinese script alternates with local languages;
many of the schools teach a Chinese curriculum; the Chinese
provide teachers and doctors to assist the local populations;
Chinese investments have entered to produce goods for China;
the gas stations are Chinese. UNODC funds its Wa operations
out of a Chinese bank account, completely bypassing the
Burmese banking system, and pays all salaries in Chinese
yuan. It is also easier for Wa people to travel to and from
China, which only requires their signature at a border
crossing, than to travel inside Burma because most of the
population lacks a Burmese identity card.


3. (SBU) We traveled by road through the rugged mountainous
area mostly above the clouds for four days. Wa Special
Region 2 appeared relatively more prosperous than most parts
of Burma. Casinos attract large numbers of Chinese gamblers,

despite Chinese efforts to discourage casino visits. UNODC
local employees said the Chinese could get across the border
upon paying a US$25 fee to the Chinese immigration officials.
Many of the villagers possess healthy looking livestock
(cattle, pigs and chickens). Vast rubber plantations have
been established on previously deforested land, although the
more lushly forested northern part of Special Region 2 has
some rubber plantations as well. Mango plantations had been
established to sell to the Chinese market, and we saw a
manganese mine owned by one of the Wa leaders. In addition
to halting opium production, reportedly the Wa have halted
illegal logging, at least temporarily, although piles of logs
could still be seen in various sites. A Chinese speaker in
our group spotted numerous signs announcing log-weighing
stations throughout our journey. We saw relatively new model
SUVs and buses on the roads in comparison with the rickety,
belching cars and buses common in the rest of Burma.


4. (C) The Wa have built roads and hydroelectric facilities
throughout, with Chinese financing and often Chinese labor.
The Wa also operate three TV stations. Wa leaders finance
these projects through "contributions." The Deputy for
External Affairs said he contributed 50,000 yuan
(approximately US$ 7,000) for recent road improvements around
Mong Maw. He added other leaders contributed from 200,000 to
10,000 yuan depending on their positions. Most of the
villages appeared to have some electricity, which is not the
norm elsewhere in Burma. The Wa authorities, however,
provide negligible funding for schools and health clinics,
relying primarily on international donors and Chinese or
Burmese teachers and medical personnel. No education beyond
high school is available in Wa territory; the few high school

RANGOON 00001136 002.2 OF 004


graduates are employed by the Wa as government officials.
Most Wa leaders send their children to school in China,
Singapore, or Pyin Oo Lwin (Maymyo) in Burma.

Wa Leader Welcomes US
--------------


5. (C) We had dinner with Xiao Ming Ling, the Vice Chairman
of the Wa Central Committee and public face of the Wa due to
the illness of Wa Chairman Bao You Xiang. Xiao, is
relatively well educated by Wa standards, having graduated
from a Chinese middle school. Most of other Wa leaders can
do little more than sign their names. He proved an adept
debater engaging in an extended back and forth with Charge
that mystified some of our dinner companions. He sought
increased U.S. assistance, claiming that withdrawal of U.S.
support has been interpreted by the Wa as the U.S. not
supporting the halt in opium cultivation. Charge repeatedly
stated that we do support the halt, but cannot go to areas
where death threats have been made against Americans. Xiao
pointed out the high Wa regard for an American working for
UNODC and added that Charge did not have to worry about her
own safety. Charge responded that she was responsible for
ensuring all Americans are safe. Xiao made the only
reference to the U.S. indictments of Wa leaders for drug
trafficking, noting that since the U.S. indictments, Burmese
military leaders have refused to come to Wa territory.


6. (C) Xiao shifted the discussion by pleading for
assistance for former opium cultivators, who face problems of
food security with their loss of a cash income. Charge noted
the evident signs of wealth she had seen, such as vast rubber
plantations, and asked what the Wa leaders were doing to help
their people. Xiao replied that the rubber trees were still
young so have yet to generate much of a cash flow. He did
not offer any explanation, despite repeated questions, on
what was done with the proceeds from logging, gambling, and
Wa business interests elsewhere in Burma. Charge also asked
why wealthy Wa leaders took land from poor villagers, when he
claimed that poor villagers do not have enough to eat. Xiao
indirectly acknowledged the land issue saying the central
committee has been meeting on that problem, although,
according to UNODC, these meetings have gone on for years.

No Way We'll Give Up Our Arms
--------------


7. (C) Xiao had just returned from meeting Vice Senior
General Maung Aye. Asked to compare Maung Aye (well-known
for his hardline against ethnic minorities) with Senior
General Than Shwe, Xiao expressed greater confidence in Than
Shwe to honor the ceasefire agreement the Wa reached with now
deposed General Khin Nyunt: "The status quo is best with
Than Shwe." Charge also asked how the Wa viewed the
pro-democracy opposition. Xiao stated his admiration for
Aung San Suu Kyi, but questioned her ability to maintain
stability. A Burmese Army major introduced as the liaison
officer sat at the next table. The Burmese Army has two
liaison officers assigned to Wa territory, and approximately
25 soldiers, but they are not allowed to leave the city
limits of Phan Kham and one other city without Wa approval.
We had greater freedom of movement. According to UNODC, the
only INGO workers who experience problems traveling around Wa
are the ones who try to speak Burmese; they raise Wa
suspicions that they might be spies.


8. (SBU) Although the Wa are participating in the National
Convention, we did not find any Wa willing to give up their
arms. (Note: the regime assumes with the adoption of a new
constitution that the ethnic minorities will lay down their
arms. End Note.) Anyone with pretensions to leadership had

RANGOON 00001136 003.2 OF 004


a pistol stuffed down his trousers, and many traveled with
armed bodyguards. Asked if these people had anything to
fear, a UNODC local employee said the weaponry only served to
make them look important. A village headman told us that the
first two sons of every family had to join the Wa Army at the
age of 16 and serve for seven years. We saw numerous young
faces in uniform, but the youngest did not usually carry
weapons, and acted more as orderlies. Almost everyone we saw
from toddlers to ancient men wore some form of military garb,
and the markets were full of military clothing. Apparently,
the favored military clothing has U.S. emblems attached.


9. (C) We spent another evening with the Wa Deputy External
Affairs Minister who participated in the ceasefire
negotiations with Khin Nyunt. He claimed the agreement
provided for the ceasefire, Wa right of self-government, and
the right to keep arms. He said the Wa objective in the
National Convention is separate statehood from Shan State, so
the Wa could deal directly with the central government. He
acknowledged that the small population of the Wa might
prevent full statehood, but said special region status would
be acceptable. He said that the Burmese offer security in
return for peace if the Wa give up their arms, but the Wa
believe that only the security of their arms will ensure
their peace. In addition, he complained that the Burmese
sought to reduce the townships under Wa control from 30 to 6,
eliminating all those along Thai border. He claimed the Wa
Army had 20,000 armed soldiers now, but in the event of
renewed fighting, all Wa would join in support.

UNODC working with poor villagers
--------------


10. (SBU) UNODC works in 250 villages identified as the
poorest out of 1200-1300 villages in aSpecial Region 2.
The population totals around 450,000 with sizeable
populations of Lahu, Akha, Shan, and others, in addition to
Wa. 60 percent of the people practice animism, with the rest
divided evenly between Christians and Buddhists. One local
UNODC worker ascribed the success of one village to its being
Christian, and therefore, better organized. The rate of
childhood mortality throughout the region is very high,
primarily due to diarrhea. We met one villager who said 6 of
his 11 children died in infancy, which UNODC told us is the
norm.


11. (SBU) We visited five villages in different parts of the
region, some more successful than others. In the poorest
village, UNODC had provided an irrigation project to open up
more land for rice farming for 33 previously landless
families. The villagers, many of whom were former opium
addicts, have proven reluctant to help themselves. As a
result, UNODC refused to provide further assistance until
they agreed to build fences to keep livestock out of paddy
fields. A school set up by UNODC halted when the villagers
refused to continue paying the teacher's salary. Most of the
other villages had experienced more success. One village had
begun planting tea for a supplemental cash income, and the
village women praised UNODC water pumps for improving the
health of the population in general while reducing the
women's workload. In most of the villages, the women do most
of the farming and also must fetch water from distant streams
down the mountain, absent a water pump. However, in this
village, the headman engaged in illegal logging which could
degrade the recently opened paddy land due to runoff from the
denuded slopes.


12. (SBU) Most of the village schools we visited had received
assistance from UNODC, and more parents were sending their
children to school. However, in several villages a sizeable
portion of the families still do not send their children to

RANGOON 00001136 004.2 OF 004


school because they cannot afford the school fees, which one
villager estimated as the equivalent of US$ 20 per year, or
because the parents were sick and needed the children to help
at home or in the fields. The teachers in the schools were
Chinese or from other parts of Burma and taught a mixed
Burmese and Chinese curriculum, with some instruction in the
local dialect. According to UNODC, many of the villagers
prefer a Chinese curriculum over Burmese because so many
families suffered losses during the decades of fighting
between the Wa and the Burmese. Most of the villages also
offer adult education programs in the local dialect, which
have been supported by UNODC.


13. (SBU) The villagers primarily engage in subsistence
agriculture and do not appear to have much of a political
role, particularly if they are women. One group of villagers
told us that their headman is selected by township officials,
who then permit some discussion when the new headman is
introduced. Can a woman become a headman? The quizzical
response: women can only be leaders of cooking and dancing
groups. In another village only heads of households
participate in discussions, which also serves to exclude most
women. However, UNODC designated a young Wa woman as its
village facilitator after they discovered she had graduated
from high school in Rangoon, and she had been well accepted
by the villagers.

Comment
--------------


14. (C) The Wa, from the leaders to poor villagers, display
a dignity that no doubt derives from their readiness to
fight. In other ceasefire areas, the fighters tired, turned
to making money and permitted the Burmese to enter and take
over. Ethnic minorities elsewhere appear completely cowed by
the Burmese Army. The Wa, on the other hand, have almost
complete autonomy now, and the leaders have taken advantage
of the booming Chinese economy to go legit or lower their
profile by turning to methamphetamine production. The Wa
leaders do little for the villagers, but the Burmese Army
would likely abuse them like they abuse other more
defenseless villagers throughout the country. So it does not
appear in the Wa interest to ever reach an agreement with the
Burmese that would reduce in any significant way the autonomy
they have now. In the meantime, China benefits from the
current situation since it was the major market for Wa opium
and heroin. By promoting the development of money-making
crops and providing schoolteachers and doctors to the Wa,
China can stabilize its border with relatively friendly
people. While we do not need to provide direct assistance,
it is in our interest as well to promote the development of
the Wa territory and encourage them to hold out from signing
on to a sham constitution. Most observers in Burma believe
that the only thing preventing the regime from announcing the
completion of their new constitution is the unwillingness of
the ethnic minorities to agree to emasculation. Since
several of the ethnic minorities, like the Wa, can generate
incomes--illegal or otherwise--it may be a long wait.
VILLAROSA