BURMA: THE REGIME HARDENS ITS POSITION ON ASEAN,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001097 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM ECON PREL BM SUBJECT: BURMA: THE REGIME HARDENS ITS POSITION ON ASEAN, THE OPPOSITION, AND ETHNIC MINORITIES REF: RANGOON 363 RANGOON 00001097 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: P/E Chief Leslie Hayden for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Burma's ruling Generals are the hardest of the hardliners. They have made decisions to harden their positions on ASEAN, the democratic opposition, and the ethnic minorities. Only high-ranking UN representatives may be allowed access to Aung San Suu Kyi; visiting ASEAN representatives will not be permitted to see her or discuss human rights and democratic reforms. Senior General Than Shwe sees his relationship with ASEAN only in terms of economic cooperation. The regime will resume the next session of the National Convention in October and draw the constitution making process out while it carefully monitors the mood of the armed ethnic groups. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) In a July 28 meeting with Pol/Econ Chief, veteran Burmese journalist and foreign correspondent U Hla Htway (PROTECT) recounted his conversations with Burmese Senior Generals a month ago in the new capital of Nay Pyi Daw. According to Htway, Senior General Than Shwe frequently cites the ASEAN policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of member nations and sees Burma's relationship with ASEAN based solely on economic cooperation. The regime will engage visiting ASEAN Heads of State and Foreign Ministers on the subjects of ASEAN solidarity, economic cooperation, and bilateral relations. However, human rights, democratic reforms, and Aung San Suu Kyi will not be on the table for discussion. Htway claims Than Shwe has firmly decided that no ASEAN envoy will be allowed to see Aung San Suu Kyi. Only requests by high-ranking UN representatives to visit the imprisoned Nobel Peace Prize winner will be considered. ¶3. (C) Confirming what we already know, Htway said that the Burmese Foreign Minister has no authority, influence or decision making power and can only parrot the regime's lines in his public statements during trips abroad. Unlike Cabinet officials in the USG who can resign and pursue opportunities outside of government if they disagree with U.S. policy, Burmese officials must resign if they dare to contradict Than Shwe. Once they resign, the doors of business and society are closed to them. They will not find another job. ¶4. (C) Htway claims Than Shwe has no economic or political advisors who dare tell him the truth. He is a self-declared expert on all subjects "from steel to chopsticks." Than Shwe dismisses outside criticism of dismal economic conditions in Burma. The Generals are willing to accept a bad economy as long as "the people are not starving," although they recognize that if rice becomes unaffordable, political unrest could soon follow. ¶5. (C) Embarrassed by the regime's economic policies, respected Burmese economist Brigadier General D. Abel begged Htway to stop referring to him as an "advisor" to Than Shwe in his articles, claiming he could not give Than Shwe sound economic advice. Rather, he could tell the Senior General only what he wanted to hear. As a result, inefficient economic policies continue in Burma. Htway told us that when he wrote a feature article for the Japanese paper he works for on the regime's enthusiastic planting of the physic nut to convert into bio fuel (reftel),his editor called him from Japan laughing because he thought Htway had submitted the article as a joke. The editor said only those with no knowledge of bio fuel could think physic nut was a efficient and practical crop for this purpose. RANGOON 00001097 002.2 OF 002 ¶6. (C) Htway told us the Generals have also decided to take a harder line toward the opposition and the ethnic minorities. The Senior Generals are more concerned about the armed ethnic groups than the non-violent, democratic opposition. The Generals have a "military mentality" and only respect those with weapons. Consequently, the armed ethnic groups command more respect and clout, and the regime is willing to negotiate with them. In contrast, the regime has no intention of compromising with the political opposition groups. ¶7. (C) Htway says the Generals will reconvene the National Convention in October and drag out the constitution drafting process, based on the mood of the ethnic groups. The Generals fear the consequences when the ethnic groups realize the regime will not meet their key demands: their own state constitutions, control of natural resources, and the right to have armed, state militias. The Generals are currently most worried about the New Mon State Party (NMSP) ending its cease-fire agreement. Unlike former Chief of Military Intelligence Khin Nyunt, who was skilled at negotiating with the ethnic groups, the Generals are uneducated and unsophisticated. Htway emphasized that the future of Burma cannot be shaped without the participation of the ethnic groups. Their leaders are conscious of what their people have been fighting for fifty years. They have reduced their demands from full independence to limited autonomy. When the constitution is finished and they have no real autonomy, many of the cease-fires could dissolve into full-scale fighting. ¶8. (C) COMMENT: Htway has known many of the top Generals for several years and considers them friends. He told us that during his visit to Nay Pyi Daw, the Generals made clear they were speaking to him as a friend and not as a journalist. His information is reliable and he has been a source in the past on the inner dynamics between Burma's top military leaders. His insight explains the regime's recent treatment of visiting ASEAN representatives such as Malaysian Foreign Minister Hamid and that of UN U/SYG Gambari. The Generals want ASEAN membership on their own terms, picking and choosing the economic benefits while rejecting the social responsibilities membership to such an international organization entails. Their irresponsible policies threaten the populations of their neighbors and closest economic partners. Htway's information underscores the importance of encouraging those who hold economic sway over Burma and access to Than Shwe, such as China and India, to deliver strong messages on the importance of real dialogue with the opposition and the social and economic realities inside Burma. In the meantime, we should expect conditions in Burma to continue to deteriorate. END COMMENT. VILLAROSA