BURMA,S NGOS OPERATING IN AN UNSTABLE ENVIRONMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 RANGOON 001014

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ECON EAID PREL BM
SUBJECT: BURMA,S NGOS OPERATING IN AN UNSTABLE ENVIRONMENT

REF: A. RANGOON 622

B. RANGOON 171

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Classified By: Acting P/E Chief Mark B. Taylor for Reasons 1.4 (b, d)

1.(C) SUMMARY: Reflecting the country,s vast humanitarian
needs, according to an NGO registry compiled in mid-2005,
there are now 50 international NGOs (INGOs) operating in
Burma. Focused largely on health care (particularly HIV/AIDS,
malaria and tuberculosis),as well as basic community
development and education, this INGO influx has occurred
despite general regime suspicion and hostility to INGOs and
an unstable operating environment. The regime,s heightened
xenophobia gives most INGOs a more uncertain future in Burma.
Local and expatriate staff face increasing restrictions on
their movements, directed from both the new capital in
Naypyitaw and from autonomous regional military commanders.
INGOs are facing tough decisions this year on whether to
accept reduced effectiveness under worsened conditions or to
pack up and leave. END SUMMARY

2006 GOB Guidelines for NGOs
--------------

2.(C) In February 2006, the GOB floated a new set of
guidelines for the operation of UN agencies and the 50 INGOs
in-country. (see reftels) Inconsistencies between the Burmese
and English versions created confusion that the regime has
done little to resolve.

3.(C) To date the government has not moved seriously to
implement the guidelines, much to the relief of UN agencies
and INGOS. The INGOs and UN agencies have formed a forum,
lead by UNDP, to meet once a month to track the GOB,s
behavior towards the foreign organizations and to discuss
common concerns. In discussions with Emboffs, some INGOs
told us that the Ministry of National Planning and Economic
Development, the purported author of the new guidelines, has
found itself inadequately prepared to implement them with its
small and inexperienced staff. Others believe it the new
guidelines were an uncoordinated effort by a small number of
officials, who now find less support with regime leaders.
INGO representatives claim that the guidelines were already
disseminated to all regional military commanders, but were
not accompanied by any particular instructions or tasking, so
local authorities are either ignoring them or assume they are
to be implemented exclusively by Naypyitaw.

Will The &3 D Fund8 Set The guidelines?
--------------

4.(C) Some UN and INGO observers point to the new European
donor-led &3 D Fund8 to address HIV/AIDS, malaria, and TB
in Burma (replacing the Global Fund on HIV/AIDS) as setting
de facto operational guidelines for the broader community of
foreign assistance organizations. The &3 D Fund,8 while
not yet formally launched, has been approved reportedly by
the GOB, along with less restrictive conditions on expatriate
access, accountability, and transparency, upon which onors
insisted. More cynical observers note that these provisions
were already in many of the individual INGO MOUs previously
signed by the regime, but are not always honored.

Expatriate Staffing ) the Key Issue
--------------

5.(C) In the absence of clear guidelines from the central
government and with varying degrees of restrictions imposed
by local army commanders, international NGOs must decide by

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themselves where to draw the line on their role and staff
mobility and the level of restrictions from local commanders
they are willing to accept. Some NGOs do not feel any need
to place expatriate personnel in the field. Washington
DC-based Population Services International (PSI),for
example, relies largely on its Burmese staff to implement its
anti-AIDS and anti-malaria prevention work and its social
marketing of condoms, water purification agents, and mosquito
repellent bed nets throughout rural Burma. Visiting the PSI
office in Kengtung on July 13, Emboff found the four-member
Burmese staff highly competent and engaged in building strong
relationships with rural/ethnic communities, despite the
local commander,s recent requirement of clearances for all
of their travel and activities. Others, such as the various
affiliates of Medicins San Frontiers (MSF),place a higher
priority on having expatriate doctors working in field
clinics. It was the GOB,s refusal to fully satisfy this
requirement last year for MSF-France, which was operating
clinics in the highly sensitive Mon and Kayah states, that
forced MSF-France to leave Burma.

6.(C) Experiences differ radically on this issue. AZG
(MSF/Holland),one of earliest INGOs to establish in Burma,
is able to station expatriate doctors at 16 different sites
throughout the country, including sensitive Hpakant (a site
of jade mines) and Myitkyina in Kachin State. This
achievement, however, took several years of effort, according
to AZG director Frank Smithuis (strictly protect),who has
worked in Burma for over 13 years. He disclosed that the GOB
frequently attempted to interfere with his expatriate
doctor,s work in the field, and on several occasions, AZG
had to tell the regime that it would close down if its
expatriate staff were denied access to clinics AZG had set up
up-country. Each time the bluff worked, and the regime
backed down.

Political Litmus Tests
--------------

7.(C) AZG,s director also disclosed to Emboff that the
Minister of Health recently questioned whether AZG provides
medical services to any NLD members and requested, on behalf
of more senior regime officials, that AZG provide formal
assurances that it would not provide any aid to NLD members.
Smithuis told the Minister that AZG provides service to all
those in need, and does not inquire about a potential
patient,s political affiliations. He also reminded the
Minister that AZG has provided care to soldiers in the
Burmese Army. On several separate occasions since, Smithuis
says that Ministry of Health officials have asked for the
names of any local AZG employees who are NLD members.
Smithuis has refused to respond, pointing out that he has no
way of knowing the political affiliations of individual
employees, since this is not something AZG requires. The
ministry has attempted to deny registration of some Burmese
doctors employed by AZG, but Smithuis stated that he overcame
these hurdles by enlisting local military commanders,
support for the AZG clinics where the doctors work.

Capricious Rules from Commanders
--------------

8.(C) Regardless of the type or style of work, all NGOs
operating outside of Rangoon have felt the long arm of
military commanders, who have grown in power in recent years.
INGOs often have to seek the blessing of relevant local army
commanders before they can begin operating a project or open
an office in areas under the commander,s control. Some NGOs
have learned this lesson the hard way, with ongoing

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operations shut down or stalled by a local commander. One
NGO, appealing such a restriction with a regional commander,
showed the military leader a copy of the NGO,s valid MOU
with the Ministry of Health. The commander retorted:
&That,s the national government. I didn,t sign it.8 In
some cases, the local military commanders have facilitated
INGOs, especially if they venture into areas not covered by
an MOU.

9.(C) While Burmese staff of INGOs do not need central
government permission to travel in-country, many find that
local military commanders insist on being informed or
providing approval for field travel in their relevant region.
While visiting PSI,s Kengtung office in Shan State,
operated entirely by local staff, we were told by health
workers that they must apply for permission from the regional
commander,s office ten days in advance of any travel outside
of town. This requirement started four months ago, they
stated, and has significantly hurt their ability to carry out
many of their HIV/AIDS and malaria prevention projects.

MOUs Lose Value, But Still Required
--------------

10.(C) In the Khin Nyunt era (prior to 2004),most INGOs
sought to secure their operations in Burma through memoranda
of understanding with the GOB ministry(s) relevant to their
field of work. These MOUs, usually drafted and signed in
English, served the dual purpose of providing the NGO with
formal GOB approval for its work and securing cooperation of
the ministry,s field level staff in implementing programs.
MOUs usually specified the geographical areas (and
limitations) of the NGO,s work. Starting in 2005, some NGOs
were instructed to obtain additional MOUs from the Ministry
of National Planning and Economic Development, which the 2006
regulations tried to mandate.

11.(C) Today most INGOs find their old MOUs carry little
weight with the national government and are already
considered invalid by local commanders. Most MOUs include
provisions allowing INGOs to import goods and equipment
(including vehicles) for project implementation. Every INGO
we contacted in the last month said that this key provision
of the MOUs is not being honored. Save the Children and
World Vision told us that they cannot import vehicles, and
that even medicines are now very difficult to get through
Customs.

12.(C) Similarly, while access to project sites by expatriate
and local staff is specified in most MOUs, INGOs and UN
agencies face more stringent requirements for greater advance
notification of intentions to travel. World Vision and PSI
staff recent told Emboff in separate meetings that their
proposed expatriate staff travel now requires six to eight
weeks advance notification to the GOB. The expatriate staff
must then wait for explicit approval to be given by the
government, often just prior to the planned trip.
Furthermore, they have no flexibility in a planned itinerary;
any change in date or routes requires a new six-to-eight week
advance notification.

13.(C) This had led most NGOs to rely much more heavily on
Burmese staff for field visits. Our visit to one of World
Vision,s field offices found that the last time one of the
INGO,s expatriate staff had been there was in early 2005.
While some NGOs express confidence in their local staff,s
ability to implement and monitor projects with minimal
expatriate oversight, others recount tales of increased GOB
pressure on local staff when expatriates are not around. The

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office of the regional commander in Mandalay recently
attempted to obtain a list of all local employees, including
the names of their parents and ther national identify
numbers, of a foreign NGO operating in the city.

14.(C) The past two years have placed many INGOs in a
difficult dilemma, facing the termination of their old MOUs
and unable to draft new MOUs that adequately cover their
current work. Some feel they had no choice than to continue
working under an expired MOU or to &stretch8 existing MOUs
to cover expanded work in functional or geographical areas
not covered by the original agreement. Although MOUs
stipulate where the INGO can operate, the partnering GOB
ministry will not defend the INGO if a local military
commander attempts to block the INGO,s work in the relevant
area. World Vision in July 2005 saw its Mandalay drop-in
center for street children unexpectedly shut down by the
regional commander, who did not like to see the foreign NGO
operating in that neighborhood. Since World Vision,s
Mandalay center was not specified in its existing MOU, the
INGO could not push back on the case through the Ministry of
Health. However, World Vision and other INGOs told us that
even armed with a valid MOU, the Ministry of Health is loath
to defend a foreign NGO in an argument with a regional
commander.

15.(C) COMMENT: Conditions for the operation of UN agencies
and INGOs have never been great, but they are increasingly
uncertain. The lack of clear signals from Naypyitaw and the
power of regional commanders forces INGOs to forge informal
agreements that can suddenly change when the commanders
transfer. Even Naypyitaw approval to work in Burma means
nothing if the local commander is against a project. While
the regime may have postponed broad implementation of its
February 2006 guidelines, INGO staff find it ever harder to
travel and import needed materials. As their ability to
deliver assistance to targeted communities is increasingly
threatened by the GOB,s unpredictability and hostile working
environment, many of the 50 INGOs are asking the tough
question this year of whether to stay or pack it in. END
COMMENT
VILLAROSA