FEAR AND INTIMIDATION AT WORK IN BURMA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 001010 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MLS; PACOM FOR FPA E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2026 TAGS: PGOV PREL BM SUBJECT: FEAR AND INTIMIDATION AT WORK IN BURMA REF: A. A) RANGOON 1001 ¶B. B) RANGOON 543 ¶C. C) RANGOON 287 Classified By: CDA Shari Villarosa for Reasons 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The Charge met with Deputy Foreign Minister Kyaw Thu on July 18 to determine whether there was genuine regime interest in re-engaging with the international community as UN U/SYG Gambari had indicated. Kyaw did not respond directly, but made it clear that his ability to meet with the Charge had been circumscribed, notwithstanding his previous bravado (ref C). He seemed interested in finding a way to maintain dialogue in the current more constrained environment. But it seemed clear that any regime interest in engagement, if it exists at all, does not include us. End Summary. ¶2. (C) After initial pleasantries, Charge described the positive reception she received in Washington about the possibilities of doing more inside Burma. She also encouraged more visitors from Washington to see the situation inside Burma directly. She said congressional staffers and Government Accounting Office investigators might be visiting in the next few months. Kyaw Thu replied that these visits "should be possible in 2007," and offered his assistance in facilitating the visits. Limit Contacts with U.S. -------------- ¶3. (C) Charge said that our ability to do more inside Burma would depend on whether Gambari had accurately described a new willingness to re-engage the international community by Burmese leaders. She asked for the Deputy Foreign Minister's impressions of the Gambari visit. He did not respond directly, but said he wanted to explain some recent developments. First, he explained why he did not attend our July 4 reception. He said he had been asked on July 3 by "number 2" (likely referring to Vice Senior General Maung Aye) if he would be attending the July 4 reception. Kyaw Thu replied affirmatively, noting the Foreign Minister was out of the country. "If that's what you want to do," came the reaction. Kyaw Thu responded that it was not a matter of "wanting" but his duty. To which number he again got the same response: "if that's what you want to do." Thus, Kyaw Thu concluded that he should not attend. We were told two hours before the reception that Kyaw Thu had been "suddenly called back to the capital, Naypyitaw," an excuse the lower level officials who did attend also repeated to us. ¶4. (C) Further emphasizing the pressure to minimize meetings with us, he went on to describe the circumstances surrounding the scheduling, canceling, then rescheduling of this meeting. A lower level official apparently noticing that a meeting with the Charge had been scheduled took it upon himself to cancel it, informing Kyaw Thu that the Foreign Minister had said no one above the Director-level should meet with the Charge. Kyaw Thu insisted on rescheduling the meeting, but indicated that this would likely be our last official meeting for a while. He added that the fact that he preferred meetings without notetakers had also been noticed with suspicion. Keeping Lines of Communication Open -------------- ¶5. (C) Charge expressed regret, saying it would be difficult to keep lines of communication open if one party chose not to communicate. She added that reducing already minimal contacts would contradict Gambari's message that there was a greater willingness to engage with the international community. Kyaw Thu recounted a discussion the Director General for Political Affairs had at a recent meeting in RANGOON 00001010 002 OF 003 Europe. Some Europeans privately asked the DG who could speak "authoritatively" for the regime. The DG replied that senior generals and ministers, who could not receive visas, were the only ones who could speak authoritatively, which ended the discussion. ¶6. (S) Kyaw Thu did not close off the possibility of further meetings, and asked if Charge had any suggestions. The Charge noted that she had been informed that the Minister of Planning was interested in meeting with her, which she would pursue. She reiterated her willingness to meet with anyone at anytime to discuss any issue, and said she would emphasize to the Planning Minister the importance of greater openness to the international community. Kyaw Thu asked if we could assist in non-political areas. Charge responded that we have been assisting in the health sector, and that we were pursuing his earlier suggestion (ref B) of distributing books more widely. However, ultimately political issues had to be addressed to enable Burma to achieve its full potential and become a peaceful, prosperous country-a goal all should share. ¶7. (S) Kyaw Thu pursued other ways to communicate. He suggested other Americans might be able to relay messages, but then acknowledged that it could not be anyone on the current Embassy staff. He asked if Charge could meet in Bangkok, which she replied was possible there or anywhere else in the region. She added that our Ambassador in Thailand was very knowledgeable about Burma and might be willing to meet him. Kyaw Thu noted that his invitations to Thailand also get treated with suspicion and that he is asked why he cannot travel there and back in the same day. He said bilateral relations have improved under Thaksin as compared with "the previous government," but indicated that his opinion was not widely shared. Charge also noted that senior USG officials who could not visit Burma, might be willing to quietly exchange views with senior Burmese officials should their paths cross elsewhere in the region. ¶8. (S) Charge said that she had begun writing letters to the Foreign Minister to convey our views on policy issues, always offering to meet to discuss further. We had been pleasantly surprised that our offer was taken up regarding North Korea (ref A). Kyaw Thu said letters are not opened or censored, noting that the Chinese and Thais sometimes deliver urgent messages to his house directly, then adding that we could not do that. He said that mail addressed to him will get delivered, emphasizing that his staffers were personally loyal to him. He said telephones and faxes are monitored, noting that his wife even has to caution their son calling from India, where he is studying. Charge suggested that a trusted member of his staff could relay messages to one of our local employees. He described a member of his staff who could do this, but added that the Home Affairs Ministry monitors most of the Embassy local staff. He asked if a lower profile local Embassy employee could be found who is not closely monitored. Charge replied that he would probably have more information on that than we did. She asked if he had any other suggestions, and he replied that he had asked Charge for advice. We concluded the meeting agreeing to think about how to maintain some sort of dialogue. ¶9. (S) Comment: Kyaw Thu is not a happy man. When Charge asked if the fences she saw around the ministries in Naypyitaw were to keep things out or to keep people in, he replied there was nothing to keep out. When asked about the sense of the scattered layout of the new capital, he called it "stupid." His earlier bravado has disappeared, and now he is just another senior official who has been intimidated. The order to limit contacts with us probably arises out of senior pique over our efforts to pursue a UN Security Council resolution. Kyaw Thu could defy the warnings, but then he would risk his relatively privileged position. He does seem genuinely to want to find a way to keep a dialogue going, RANGOON 00001010 003 OF 003 although it could be more for his own sanity, rather than because he believes he can make a difference. The regime he works for, however, is not interested in the views of the international community, only absolute power. VILLAROSA