Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06RABAT968
2006-05-19 16:20:00
SECRET
Embassy Rabat
Cable title:  

MOURAD EL HAMYANI DEPORTATION

Tags:  MO PHUM PREL PTER 
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VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRB #0968/01 1391620
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 191620Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3776
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 3988
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA PRIORITY 1706
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNFB/FBI WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T RABAT 000968 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR S/CT, L, NEA, DS;
FBI FOR ITOS I/CONUS II/TEAM 3
FBI PLEASE PASS NEWARK DIVISION

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2009
TAGS: MO PHUM PREL PTER
SUBJECT: MOURAD EL HAMYANI DEPORTATION

REF: RABAT 517

Classified By: Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for Reasons 1.4. (b) and (d)

S E C R E T RABAT 000968 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR S/CT, L, NEA, DS; FBI FOR ITOS I/CONUS II/TEAM 3 FBI PLEASE PASS NEWARK DIVISION E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2009 TAGS: MO PHUM PREL PTER SUBJECT: MOURAD EL HAMYANI DEPORTATION REF: RABAT 517 Classified By: Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for Reasons 1.4. (b) and (d) ¶1. (S) Embassy Rabat provides the following background concerning the possible deportation of Moroccan terrorist suspect Mourad El Hamyani to Morocco. The Moroccan police have an arrest warrant for El Hamyani for criminal activity, including armed robbery with the intent to use the profits to fund terrorist activity. Having supplied the US with substantial information concerning El Hamyani's activities and whereabouts, and as strong partner of the US in the war on terror, the GOM would not understand a US decision to allow self-deportation, which would allow El Hamyani to move to another destination and elude capture. Such actions on our part could erode our high level of security cooperation with the Moroccans over the long term. The strong consensus of the security agencies at post, including ORA, Legatt, and RSO, is that the US should cooperate with Morocco to the greatest extent possible to ensure that the Moroccan judicial system is able to try El Hamdani. Background -------------- ¶2. (S) In August 2003, Moroccan authorities provided information to Legatt indicating that in August-September 2001 Mourad El Hamyani attended a training camp in Afghanistan identified as Abu Yahya, which is believed to be run by the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). The camp is believed to be located north of Kabul. ¶3. (S) The Moroccan authorities advised that El Hamyani was a member of an Al Qaeda cell which committed an armed robbery in Sale, Rabat's twin city, on Redal Utility Company on December 24, 2001. The Moroccan authorities have produced an attested arrest warrant for this crime and have issued an Interpol diffusion notice. Abdellatif Mourafik (AKA Malek al Andaloussi, Mourafik),Abdelkrim Chadli (AKA Chadli),Youssef Fikri (AKA Fikri) Abdelmalek Bouzgarne (AKA Bouzgarne),and Mohamed Damir (AKA Abou Al Harith, Damir) are five individuals who are currently being incarcerated by Moroccan authorities and who have directly alleged that El Hamyani has acted as an al Qaeda operative. Statements from these individuals have linked El Hamyani to the Abu Yahya paramilitary training camp to learn weapons handling in Afghanistan and to the Redal armed ro
bbery. ¶4. (S) According to these statements, El Hamyani was a direct participant in the Redal attack. El Hamyani's presence in Morocco is corroborated by passport entries indicating that he arrived in Morocco on September 15, 2001. The attack was reportedly carried out by a Salafist terrorist cell led by Youssef Fikri. On July 29, 2002, in Moroccan interview proceedings, Fikri indicated that El Hamyani served as the "lookout" during the Redal armed robbery, and El Hamyani allegedly alerted other members of the terrorist cell that a Redal vehicle was departing the Redal Company building in the Rahma quarter in Sale. Fikri also identified El Hamyani as being someone whom Fikri met in the Abu Yahya camp and who lived in New Jersey and was married to an American citizen. ¶5. (S) Fikri explained further that El Hamyani took part in the operations of the cell in order to raise funds to take to Afghanistan. Similarly corroborating witness statements have been provided by the individuals referenced above. The statements associate El Hamyani with other terrorist plots as well. Authenticated copies of these statements have been provided to Legatt. Deportation -------------- ¶6. (S) The US routinely deports Moroccans, escorted and unescorted, to Morocco for a range of violations of US criminal statutes. The GOM would likely jail El Hamyani on arrival and hold him until his trial. Establishing new conditions for the deportation of terrorist or criminal suspects to Morocco could have far-reaching consequences for US law enforcement efforts and cooperation. It could establish an important new precedent and set Morocco apart from how similar countries are treated by the US with regard to deportation. ¶7. (S) Based on past experience, we do not believe the GOM will provide assurances about the possible treatment of El Hamyani upon his return to Morocco. The Mission sought written assurances from the GOM concerning the return to Morocco of detainees from Guantanamo, who were returned in two groups in 2004 and 2005. The GOM provided oral assurances that the returnees would be treated by the judicial system in accordance with Moroccan law (one of the Guantanamo returnees is in prison, while the others are free on bail pending additional judicial action). The Moroccan parliament passed a law criminalizing torture in March 2006 (reftel). ****************************************** Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat ****************************************** Riley

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