SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION ON WESTERN SAHARA

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000729 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2016 TAGS: PREL PINR KPKO UNUS MO AG SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION ON WESTERN SAHARA REF: A. 05 RABAT 2120 ¶B. USUN NEW YORK 794 ¶C. RABAT 772 Classified By: Amb. Thomas T. Riley for reasons 1.4 B and D ¶1. (C) Summary: Morocco is engaging in a disingenuous process to delay movement toward a negotiated settlement of the Western Sahara conflict. Its domestic consultations on autonomy for the Western Sahara cannot be taken seriously, and have thus far excluded those who might offer differing points of view. The Palace currently has sufficient political party support to move ahead with an autonomy proposal, but Morocco views perpetuating the status quo as working in its favor. Quiet discussions between Morocco and the Polisario as suggested by Ambassador Bolton, with Algeria sitting in, are a good idea in that they could help to create a sense of inevitability about autonomy and lead to negotiations. If they go ahead, we should keep the French closely apprised, and consider starting joint demarches with the French in Rabat and Algiers. Embassy concurs that a MINURSO renewal should be limited to 90 days. During this 90 day period Morocco should also be required to advance progress on an autonomy plan and discussions with the Polisario. This time should be used to examine ways to transfer responsibility for preventing conflict directly to Morocco and Algeria, and identify ways to more effectively address the equally serious threats related to illicit trafficking and terrorism in the Western Sahara and Pan-Sahel. End summary. Consultations not serious -------------- ¶2. (C) Embassy's view of current Moroccan actions is similar to that conveyed by USUN in ref (B). Morocco has begun what can only be viewed as another slow roll on the Western Sahara, sharing not an autonomy plan but a plan for protracted domestic consultation to justify more time from the Security Council and avoid direct action that could lead to a settlement of the conflict. While there is a kernel of truth in Moroccan emphasis on building a national consensus through a broad consultative process, this argument appears intended primarily to appeal to U.S. and other international sensibilities. In reality, the King and government currently have broad support from the political parties to move forward with an autonomy proposal. This has been borne out in recent weeks in comments from political parties across the spectrum during the Ambassador's series of consultations with party leaders, who also appear to recognize that resolving the conflict will require risk and sacrifice. ¶3. (C) The Embassy's view is that the consultative process currently being managed on behalf of the King by the Royal Consultative Council on Sahrawi Affairs (CORCAS) cannot be taken seriously. The council's members are hand-picked by the Palace and have convened in Rabat, not Laayoune. Those who might offer differing points of view have thus far been shut out, despite Minister-Delegate for Foreign Affairs Taieb Fassi Fihri's assurances to the Ambassador (ref c) that debate on the way forward would be serious and credible. Why the delay? -------------- ¶4. (C) Why has Morocco elected again to delay? Likely factors are: (a) Morocco continues to see its success in outliving the Baker plan and maintaining its de facto control over the territory as working in its favor; (b) Morocco does not believe that a satisfactory settlement will be possible while Bouteflika is in power in Algeria; and/or (c) the Palace fears that one or more political parties may try to oppose autonomy and use it as a platform to break away from the others in the 2007 parliamentary elections. (Fassi Fihri suggested as much to the Ambassador, and though his concern appears to us to be overstated, it probably enters into the mix and may have been a key factor in Morocco's apparent last minute decision to pull back from sharing an autonomy plan with the U.S. during Fassi Fihri's recent visit to Washington.) The only factors motivating Morocco toward a solution are its desire for international recognition of its sovereignty over the Western Sahara, and international criticism of its human rights abuses in the territory. Quiet discussion could help -------------- ¶5. (C) One issue on which Morocco is probably right is the need to create within the region a sense of inevitability about autonomy as the eventual outcome as a means to induce the Polisario to negotiate on a serious proposal. The possible willingness of both Morocco and the Polisario to have a conversation somewhere out of the limelight is also an important sign. Facilitating a quiet dialogue between Morocco and the Polisario as Ambassador Bolton suggests, with Algeria sitting in, would be a constructive U.S. role at this stage, in that it could lead to an agreement for direct negotiations. Algeria should be invited -- if they attend it could be useful, if not, they will show their hand at really wanting to help. We should anticipate that any initial exchanges will be about differences and past injuries rather than shaping the future, but such exchanges could nevertheless serve as the first step along the road to real negotiations. At the same time, a 90-day versus six-month MINURSO renewal would be a clear signal to Morocco that Security Council patience with delay is not unlimited, and that the Security Council does not acquiesce to an increasingly ambiguous Moroccan timetable. Work with the French -------------- ¶6. (C) In addition to a 90-day MINURSO renewal and quiet direct dialogue between the parties, we should consider working more closely with the French. Discussions with the French Embassy here suggest that the French see little substantive difference with the U.S. on the Western Sahara, and view this conflict as an area with the potential for close U.S.-French cooperation. U.S. efforts to facilitate the release of Moroccan prisoners of war last August caught the French by surprise, and raised concern in Paris that the U.S. might strike out on its own on this issue. A new sense and appearance of common purpose concerning the Western Sahara between Morocco's two most important international partners would send a strong message, short circuit Morocco's efforts to play Security Council members off one another, and increase pressure for progress on Morocco and Algeria. Cooperation should include keeping the French well briefed on conversations between Morocco and the Polisario if they occur (although their actual presence in the room might scare away the Polisario). It could also mean joint demarches by the French and U.S. Ambassadors in Rabat and Algiers to encourage a serious autonomy proposal and negotiations. Apart from a potentially constructive French role, there is no helpful EU consensus on the issue; other EU members are divided across a spectrum ranging from those focused strongly on human rights issues (the Nordics) to those concerned with preserving their own complicated territorial interests (Spain). Focus security responsibility on Morocco and Algeria -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) A second factor that should be considered in conjunction with MINURSO renewal is an assessment of ways in which greater responsibility for security could be transferred from MINURSO directly to Morocco and Algeria. These two countries have primary esponsibility for preventing renewed armed conflict, and the Security Council should look at ways in which they could shoulder that responsibility directly. In addition, countering trafficking of all kinds and denying safe haven to terrorists in the Pan Sahel region are two security concerns related to the Western Sahara that are as significant as the possibility of a renewed military conflict between Moroccan forces and the Polisario. Cooperation between Morocco and Algeria on addressing these threats is virtually nonexistent, creating a vacuum that allows illicit activity to continue which MINURSO has no mandate to confront. ****************************************** Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat ****************************************** Riley