Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06RABAT498
2006-03-21 08:29:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Rabat
Cable title:
STAFFDEL PHELAN'S WESTERN SAHARA MEETINGS
how-toVZCZCXYZ0014 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHRB #0498/01 0800829 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 210829Z MAR 06 FM AMEMBASSY RABAT TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3132 INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 3822 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 2834 RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 5400 RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 3047 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 4072 RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 1438 RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 8703 RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA PRIORITY 1411 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0479 RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0946
C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000498
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/MAG AND H
LONDON FOR TSOU
PARIS FOR ZEYA
ROME FOR ROSE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2011
TAGS: PREL PBTS OREP MO
SUBJECT: STAFFDEL PHELAN'S WESTERN SAHARA MEETINGS
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Wayne J. Bush for Reasons 1.5 (b
) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000498
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/MAG AND H
LONDON FOR TSOU
PARIS FOR ZEYA
ROME FOR ROSE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2011
TAGS: PREL PBTS OREP MO
SUBJECT: STAFFDEL PHELAN'S WESTERN SAHARA MEETINGS
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Wayne J. Bush for Reasons 1.5 (b
) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: Staffdel Phelan and EconCouns visited
Laayoune, Western Sahara on March 18 as swarms of workers
readied the city ) festooned with Moroccan flags -- for King
Mohammed VI's imminent arrival. MINURSO officials briefed
Phelan on the mission's activities, previewed the draft SYG
report to be released in April, and discussed potential
security threats. Hamid Barez, Morocco's Deputy Coordinator
with MINURSO, reviewed the GOM positions, but was not very
forthcoming on the King's schedule of activities or his
expectations for the visit. He said Mohammed VI planned to
"expand" the royal Saharan council and consult with local
stakeholders on the autonomy plan being developed. Phelan
urged the GOM to present a concrete and clear autonomy plan
that would serve as the basis for real negotiation. End
summary.
MINURSO Briefing
--------------
2. (SBU) MINURSO Force Commander General Kurt Mosgaard, the
Secretary General's Special Representative Francesco
SIPDIS
Bastagli, and Political Officer Carmen Johns briefed SFRC
Staffer Michael Phelan and EconCouns on the situation in
Western Sahara, prospects for MINURSO's future, and
expectations for King Mohammed VI's imminent visit, the
King's first visit to the Western Sahara since March 2002.
MINURSO officials thanked Phelan for Senator Lugar's role in
the August 2005 POW release and for his continued interest
and engagement in Western Sahara. Bastagli and Mosgaard
noted that MINURSO's recently expanded activities -)
including the addition of night patrols )- made them a more
effective monitoring force; however, they reported a
decreasing number of violations. Bastagli described the
success of the family visit and telephone call programs, part
of the UN's CBM program. Imploring the United States and
other UN members not to overlook the less urgent and
immediate concern Western Sahara, Mosgaard said that the
MINURSO force could not be reduced or assigned more
restrictive duties ) "it is already at the minimum operable
level." Bastagli and Mosgaard explained that the vast
majority of civilian UN employees in Western Sahara support
the military. Only a few positions would be saved if the UN
decided to curtail confidence building measures and
refugee-related activities.
3. (C) Bastagli gave Phelan and Econcouns an overview of
his draft of the SYG's report (that he was to transmit to
DPKO on March 19),noting Van Walsum and the Secretariat in
New York were likely to edit it thoroughly. He noted that
the report described the expanding MINURSO role, underscored
the need to make progress on the long-standing stalemate, and
analyzed the social impact on the Saharan people. It
outlined three simple choices: 1) Remove MINURSO, leaving de
facto Moroccan control of the region; 2) reduce MINURSO's
role to simply monitoring of the cease fire, which would save
little money and reduce MINURSO staff only slightly; or 3)
extend the status quo and maintain confidence building
measures and refugee related activities.
4. (C) EconCouns thanked MINURSO officials for their
constructive role defusing tensions during the late February
2006 30th anniversary of the founding of the Saharan
Republic. Mosgaard and Johns reported that Moroccan General
Benanni told them he could not rule out Moroccan military
action should the POLISARIO continue building civic
structures in Tifariti in the buffer zone. (Comment: It is
unclear whether this was an authentic report of a Moroccan
threat, a veiled attempt to justify MINSURO's continued
existence, or both. End comment)
GOM Gives the Party Line
--------------
5. (C) Since most Moroccan officials in Laayoune were
seized with preparations for the King's arrival, Hamid Barez,
the GOM's Deputy MINURSO Coordinator briefed Staffdel Phelan.
Barez recounted the decades of disappointment that led to
today's mistrust and reiterated Morocco's search for a
solution within unquestioned Moroccan sovereignty. Phelan
recalled Senator Lugar's role in the August 2005 POW release
and noted that his visit testified to the U.S. Senate's
continued interest in the issue. Phelan emphasized that
Lugar and his colleagues believe that the onus is on Morocco
to present a concrete, clear, and reasonable autonomy
proposal that can serve as the basis for real negotiations.
If the GOM can announce such a detailed plan, the USG and the
U.S. congress will expect the other parties to respond
appropriately. Phelan reminded Barez that the GOM should not
be negatively swayed by Algeria's public polemic, but should
concentrate on private exchanges in the context of
negotiations toward a solution. Barez did not share details
of the King's itinerary ) "no one can know" ) but noted
Mohammed VI planned to consult with local stakeholders on his
autonomy plan and to expand the royal council for Saharan
affairs. At one point, apparently slipping up, he described
the situation with regard to Moroccan administration of the
provinces and included the phrase "for the time being,"
indicating some sort of change was generally expected.
Fit for a King
--------------
6. (SBU) Laayoune was undergoing the requisite orgy of
decoration that precedes any royal visit in Morocco.
Hundreds of new Moroccan flags and colorful banners placed
around the city, clearly visible on approach to the airport,
lent a festive mood to the remote and rather lackluster city.
Royal Moroccan tents and Saharan tents were erected in
parking lots and public plazas. Workers were repainting
everything in sight ) from the roof of the control tower at
the airport, to curbs and flag poles throughout the city.
New flower beds and rows of palms were being planted. The
plastic chairs in the airport lounges were removed in favor
of overstuffed divans covered in lush fabrics. Fights to
sleepy Laayoune were overbooked and there was not a single
available hotel room in the whole city. The staffs of
Laayoune's three hotels were suspended and replaced with
palace cooks, waiters, and chambermaids. Even Bastagli was
evicted from his hotel suite for the preparation and duration
of the visit.
7. (U) Staffdel Phelan did not have an opportunity to clear
this message
******************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat
******************************************
Riley
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/MAG AND H
LONDON FOR TSOU
PARIS FOR ZEYA
ROME FOR ROSE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2011
TAGS: PREL PBTS OREP MO
SUBJECT: STAFFDEL PHELAN'S WESTERN SAHARA MEETINGS
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Wayne J. Bush for Reasons 1.5 (b
) and (d)
1. (C) Summary: Staffdel Phelan and EconCouns visited
Laayoune, Western Sahara on March 18 as swarms of workers
readied the city ) festooned with Moroccan flags -- for King
Mohammed VI's imminent arrival. MINURSO officials briefed
Phelan on the mission's activities, previewed the draft SYG
report to be released in April, and discussed potential
security threats. Hamid Barez, Morocco's Deputy Coordinator
with MINURSO, reviewed the GOM positions, but was not very
forthcoming on the King's schedule of activities or his
expectations for the visit. He said Mohammed VI planned to
"expand" the royal Saharan council and consult with local
stakeholders on the autonomy plan being developed. Phelan
urged the GOM to present a concrete and clear autonomy plan
that would serve as the basis for real negotiation. End
summary.
MINURSO Briefing
--------------
2. (SBU) MINURSO Force Commander General Kurt Mosgaard, the
Secretary General's Special Representative Francesco
SIPDIS
Bastagli, and Political Officer Carmen Johns briefed SFRC
Staffer Michael Phelan and EconCouns on the situation in
Western Sahara, prospects for MINURSO's future, and
expectations for King Mohammed VI's imminent visit, the
King's first visit to the Western Sahara since March 2002.
MINURSO officials thanked Phelan for Senator Lugar's role in
the August 2005 POW release and for his continued interest
and engagement in Western Sahara. Bastagli and Mosgaard
noted that MINURSO's recently expanded activities -)
including the addition of night patrols )- made them a more
effective monitoring force; however, they reported a
decreasing number of violations. Bastagli described the
success of the family visit and telephone call programs, part
of the UN's CBM program. Imploring the United States and
other UN members not to overlook the less urgent and
immediate concern Western Sahara, Mosgaard said that the
MINURSO force could not be reduced or assigned more
restrictive duties ) "it is already at the minimum operable
level." Bastagli and Mosgaard explained that the vast
majority of civilian UN employees in Western Sahara support
the military. Only a few positions would be saved if the UN
decided to curtail confidence building measures and
refugee-related activities.
3. (C) Bastagli gave Phelan and Econcouns an overview of
his draft of the SYG's report (that he was to transmit to
DPKO on March 19),noting Van Walsum and the Secretariat in
New York were likely to edit it thoroughly. He noted that
the report described the expanding MINURSO role, underscored
the need to make progress on the long-standing stalemate, and
analyzed the social impact on the Saharan people. It
outlined three simple choices: 1) Remove MINURSO, leaving de
facto Moroccan control of the region; 2) reduce MINURSO's
role to simply monitoring of the cease fire, which would save
little money and reduce MINURSO staff only slightly; or 3)
extend the status quo and maintain confidence building
measures and refugee related activities.
4. (C) EconCouns thanked MINURSO officials for their
constructive role defusing tensions during the late February
2006 30th anniversary of the founding of the Saharan
Republic. Mosgaard and Johns reported that Moroccan General
Benanni told them he could not rule out Moroccan military
action should the POLISARIO continue building civic
structures in Tifariti in the buffer zone. (Comment: It is
unclear whether this was an authentic report of a Moroccan
threat, a veiled attempt to justify MINSURO's continued
existence, or both. End comment)
GOM Gives the Party Line
--------------
5. (C) Since most Moroccan officials in Laayoune were
seized with preparations for the King's arrival, Hamid Barez,
the GOM's Deputy MINURSO Coordinator briefed Staffdel Phelan.
Barez recounted the decades of disappointment that led to
today's mistrust and reiterated Morocco's search for a
solution within unquestioned Moroccan sovereignty. Phelan
recalled Senator Lugar's role in the August 2005 POW release
and noted that his visit testified to the U.S. Senate's
continued interest in the issue. Phelan emphasized that
Lugar and his colleagues believe that the onus is on Morocco
to present a concrete, clear, and reasonable autonomy
proposal that can serve as the basis for real negotiations.
If the GOM can announce such a detailed plan, the USG and the
U.S. congress will expect the other parties to respond
appropriately. Phelan reminded Barez that the GOM should not
be negatively swayed by Algeria's public polemic, but should
concentrate on private exchanges in the context of
negotiations toward a solution. Barez did not share details
of the King's itinerary ) "no one can know" ) but noted
Mohammed VI planned to consult with local stakeholders on his
autonomy plan and to expand the royal council for Saharan
affairs. At one point, apparently slipping up, he described
the situation with regard to Moroccan administration of the
provinces and included the phrase "for the time being,"
indicating some sort of change was generally expected.
Fit for a King
--------------
6. (SBU) Laayoune was undergoing the requisite orgy of
decoration that precedes any royal visit in Morocco.
Hundreds of new Moroccan flags and colorful banners placed
around the city, clearly visible on approach to the airport,
lent a festive mood to the remote and rather lackluster city.
Royal Moroccan tents and Saharan tents were erected in
parking lots and public plazas. Workers were repainting
everything in sight ) from the roof of the control tower at
the airport, to curbs and flag poles throughout the city.
New flower beds and rows of palms were being planted. The
plastic chairs in the airport lounges were removed in favor
of overstuffed divans covered in lush fabrics. Fights to
sleepy Laayoune were overbooked and there was not a single
available hotel room in the whole city. The staffs of
Laayoune's three hotels were suspended and replaced with
palace cooks, waiters, and chambermaids. Even Bastagli was
evicted from his hotel suite for the preparation and duration
of the visit.
7. (U) Staffdel Phelan did not have an opportunity to clear
this message
******************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat
******************************************
Riley