DEPUTY FM FASSI FIHRI VENTS ON THE WESTERN SAHARA

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000442 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, IO E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/09/2016 TAGS: MO PBTS PHUM PREL SUBJECT: DEPUTY FM FASSI FIHRI VENTS ON THE WESTERN SAHARA REF: A. RABAT 433 ¶B. RABAT 441 ¶C. RABAT 431 Classified By: Ambassador Thomas Riley, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Ambassador telephoned Deputy FM Fassi Fihri midday on March 8 to inform him about the cancellation of A/S Welch's planned March 13-14 visit to Morocco. A fifty-three minute conversation ensued. Fassi Fihri pressed regarding the rest of the trip, and the Ambassador said A/S Welch still might keep the Algeria and Tunisia stops, but only because he had not visited those two countries since taking his current job. Fassi Fihri reacted strongly that this would send a signal that GOM had nothing to add to the discussion on the Western Sahara. ¶2. (C) Fihri spoke for some minutes about what he said is a disturbing trend to let the GOA off the hook and focus on the Polisario. He referred to a letter from UN Special Envoy Van Walsum to UNSYG Kofi Annan on February 18 saying that the Western Sahara is a problem between Morocco and the Polisario. Fassi Fihri commented that the DCM had similarly told MFA Director of Bilateral Affairs Amrani during a March 2 meeting between Amrani, DCM, and Polcouns (Ref A) to "ignore Algeria." (Comment: the DCM told Amrani that Morocco should be prepared to negotiate with the Polisario but did not suggest the GOM should ignore Algeria. End Comment). The Ambassador corrected Fassi Fihri's perception. ¶3. (C) Fassi Fihri pointed out that two Algerian ministers participated in the Polisario anniversary celebrations, including the minister in charge of the Maghreb, in Tifariti on February 27. Tifariti, according to Fassi Fihri, is part of Morocco. The GOA keeps saying "we refuse to be a part of the Western Sahara issue." Fassi Fihri continued that in the meantime, Morocco was working very hard to try to move forward without creating a domestic problem. He said we are talking to the cabinet, parliament and the political parties in order to prepare them and get their support for our autonomy proposal. This is not easy. Algeria is trying to create a "piege ("booby trap"),a military piege, and we don't want to fall into it." ¶4. (C) Fassi Fihri said the GOA asked Morocco to place the berm away from the border to ease friction, and now the GOA is taking advantage of Morocco's absence from the east side �0A;of the berm. Fassi Fihri emphasized that the GOM has to be very careful about making a public proposal, and it does not "feel" that Washington is confident that Morocco will follow through. Fassi Fihri assured the Ambassador "but you know we will as we always do." ¶5. (C) The Ambassador said that the USG is hoping to see a dramatic new proposal that could be the basis of really moving things in a new direction, and that he thought this was a real window of opportunity for Morocco. The Ambassador continued by saying that he had recently met with Yassine Mansouri (Ref B); Fassi Fihri said he was aware of the meeting. The Ambassador reinforced the point, saying that no one at the UN has ordered the Baker Plan to be shredded. No one has taken a vote to say it should never be discussed again. Take advantage of this opportunity, the Ambassador said, and give it your best. ¶6. (C) Fassi Fihri digressed back to the GOA,s "theater" SADR celebrations, orchestrated by the GOA, and said the GOA now believes there are six countries in the Maghreb. It was fortunate, Fassi Fihri said, that nothing bad happened during the anniversary events, and he thanked the Ambassador for US assistance in calming the situation. Fassi Fihri went on to say that the GOM was very serious, and had made progress domestically for an autonomy proposal, and would move forward very soon, but that it had to be careful. Fassi Fihri mentioned the conference the Islamist party PJD is hosting on regionalization (Ref C) March 10-11, and said this was a good sign of support and the progress the GOM had made with the political parties. ¶7. (C) Fassi Fihri then asked the Ambassador what was wrong with the GOM's last autonomy proposal? Was it architecture, delegation, detail? Ambassador said certainly detail was lacking for it to be a real basis for discussion. Fassi Fihri then went on a long monologue saying Morocco could give the US the details of what we are willing to do, but we cannot make that part of our public offer, since this is a negotiation. As the King had mentioned in late 2005, we are consulting the political side and the Sahrawi people (he did not elaborate) and since then even having discussions with NGOs and others. So we are almost ready to go forward and we can be counted on. But if necessary, we will give you the full plan in detail privately so you can see where we're going and give us your support. We would do this with you and no more than two other countries (which he did not name, but he was presumably referring to France and Spain). ¶8. (C) The Ambassador responded with an analogy, apologizing for the crude comparison, but wanting to be sure he understood clearly what Fassi Fihri was proposing. "So if you were making an offer on a car," the Ambassador began, "and you were willing to offer 30,000 dirhams, you would make your first offer 10,000 dirhams but let us know you were willing to go to 30,000." Yes, Fassi Fihri confirmed, and the market price for the car is 30,000 dirhams, he added. Maybe, Ambassador said. Fassi Fihri continued that he was concerned that the other side would come back with 50,000 or 100,000 dirhams and keep raising it. And, he added, warming to the car talk, Algeria doesn't even want to sell at any price. And in the spirit of taking the analogy way too far, he added, "and they are getting new expensive cars from Moscow!" Anyway, he confirmed that yes, this was his idea. He also raised the role of MINURSO, and his concern that it should not be cut back. ¶9. (C) Fassi Fihri said these were his personal comments, not official, and he did not want them shared. He was just venting. Ambassador asked, though, whether he could relay Fassi Fihri's proposal to share more detail with the US? Fassi Fihri said yes. ¶10. (C) Before closing, Fassi Fihri said he was hearing through several channels that the US was not confident that messages were getting through to the "boss." Fassi Fihri clarified he was speaking about his boss, i.e. the King. Ambassador said he really had not heard anything like this. Ambassador said that whenever we had any message to deliver to the GOM from the President or Secretary, we had a very efficient and effective channel and complete confidence it was getting to "the boss." ¶11. (C) Fassi Fihri apologized for the length of the call and suggested a meeting before the Ambassador's travel to the US (he seemed very pleased to know Ambassador would be in Washington with PM Jettou). When Ambassador said he was leaving the following day, Fassi Fihri responded that we should talk as soon as the Ambassador returned to Rabat. ****************************************** Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat ****************************************** Riley