AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON SECURITY CZAR YASSINE MANSOURI

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000441

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG, IO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2010
TAGS: ASEC MO PBTS PGOV PREL PTER
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON SECURITY CZAR YASSINE MANSOURI

REF: A. 05 RABAT 303


B. USUN 401

Classified By: Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Ambassador called on Director General of
the DGED (Direction General des Etudes and Documentation) on
March 8 at DGED headquarters in Rabat. While ostensibly a
courtesy call in recognition of Mansouri's appointment as
head of DGED in 2005, the meeting provided the opportunity to
discuss a wide range of issues, including the Western Sahara
and the King's recent Africa trip, with a key member of the
King's kitchen cabinet. On the Western Sahara, the
Ambassador stressed the importance of Morocco producing a
credible autonomy plan. Mansouri advised against pre-judging
Morocco's autonomy plan, as the King had made very clear that
there was to be process of public consultation, which was now
underway. The Ambassador and Mansouri agreed that
cooperation between the US and Morocco on security was
excellent. End Summary.


2. (C) Ambassador, accompanied by DCM and Polcouns, called
on DGED Director General Yassine Mansouri on March 8 at DGED
headquarters in Rabat. While the Ambassador and Mansouri
have had numerous encounters, including an informal dinner
hosted by MOI Deputy Fouad Ali El Himma in early 2005 (Ref A)
and a small dinner hosted by General Laanigri on the occasion
of FBI Director Mueller's February visit to Morocco (septel),
this was the Ambassador's first official call on Mansouri
since Mansouri became head of DGED. The mission maintains
regular contact with Mansouri on security matters, however.


3. (C) Mansouri was relaxed and jovial throughout the
45-minute meeting and warmly welcomed the Ambassador, noting
that he was receiving him in his personal office rather than
a conference room normally reserved for official calls.
Mansouri commented that his visit to Washington in October
2005 had been very successful, and he particularly
appreciated meetings with John Negroponte David Welch, Elliot
Abrams, and at the Pentagon. He felt there was a good and
important level of cooperation between the US and Morocco and
thanked the embassy for its strong support of bilateral
relations. He looked forward to A/S Welch's March 13-14
visit (comment: subsequently canceled); the Ambassador noted
that A/S Welch hoped to see Mansouri during the visit.
Mansouri said he would be honored and referred to his
exchange of letters with A/S Welch following the Washington
visit, commenting that he appreciated the direct contact with
A/S Welch "even if our areas of responsibility don't
completely overlap."

Western Sahara
--------------


4. (C) The Ambassador raised the Western Sahara, noting that
Morocco was in the midst of preparing an autonomy plan and
commenting that he was glad that new Moroccan PermRep Sahel
had had a chance to call on Ambassador Bolton in New York
(Ref B). The Ambassador relayed that the consultations on the
Western Sahara underway in Morocco were a good idea, and the
US looked forward to seeing Morocco's next autonomy plan.
This is a moment, the Ambassador stressed, for Morocco to do
something different and help change direction on the Western
Sahara.


5. (C) Mansouri said one cannot prejudge how different
Morocco's autonomy plan would be from what Morocco had
submitted in 2003. King Mohammed had called recently for
consultations among political parties and NGOs, and the
political parties were in the process of defining their
positions. Things were on the right path; consultations
could only be positive when pursued in a democratic process.
A good comparison, Mansouri said, was the recent political
party law, about which there had been substantial debate
before the draft law was submitted to parliament. The
Ambassador noted that consultations on the FTA had been
vigorous, and the MCA needed a similar degree of consultation.


6. (C) The DCM asked Mansouri what were the most difficult
aspects of autonomy for Morocco, and did Mansouri believe the
plan would contain the right elements for there to be serious
engagement with the parties. Mansouri punted, again saying
it was difficult to prejudge the outcome since a process of
consultation was underway. There needed to be a gestation
period. Sheikhs and elected officials in the Sahara were
engaged in consultation. The hardest points of the issue for
Morocco, he said, are already known.


7. (C) DCM responded that for the Baker Plan to be taken off
the table, there needed to be a new plan to replace it,
containing elements that were sufficiently interesting and
striking for the other side to respond to. Mansouri
disagreed with the idea that the Baker Plan was still on the
table since Morocco had already rejected it. He countered
that Morocco's strategy now focusing on presenting a new
autonomy plan. The DCM stressed the importance of Morocco's
plan containing enough elements for the US and Morocco's
friends to attract the other side into a negotiation. The
plan needed to be sufficiently meaty to disrupt the status
quo and provide the basis for a new effort to resolve the
conflict.


8. (C) Mansouri agreed, noting that the King had a clear
vision about the way forward. Implying that the Western
Sahara should be seen in this context, Mansouri said the King
was vigorously promoting reform -- of the family code, of
human rights through the Equity and Reconciliation
Commission. This was a new path for Morocco.


9. (C) Comment: at the end of the meeting, Mansouri
remarked that he hoped he had answered our questions on the
Western Sahara satisfactorily. He said he found the
questions as interesting as we might have found his
responses.

Security
--------------


10. (C) The Ambassador raised security cooperation between
the US and Morocco, commenting that our security services
work well together. Mansouri agreed that security
cooperation was excellent; it would be painfully obvious if
it were otherwise (i.e., there were would be more security
problems in Morocco). Mansouri said the good cooperation was
not limited to the DGED but existed with other agencies as
well, and with the FBI. There were, in fact, no problem
areas either in information sharing or in cooperation. With
such good collaboration, it was a win-win situation for both
sides. The Ambassador agreed the FBI was playing a positive
role.


11. (C) Mansouri believed the US and Morocco shared the same
analysis on security in the region. Both shared concerns
about possible terrorism in the Sahel region. Morocco
remained concerned about the Polisario as well. Morocco did
not want the Sahel to become another Afghanistan.

Africa Trip
--------------


12. (C) The Ambassador asked Mansouri about the King's just
completed trip to three African countries (Gambia, Congo
Brazzaville, and DROC). Mansouri said it was the first visit
by a Morocco king to the two Congos, and the Congolese people
were very responsive. King Mohammed is giving Africa a lot
of attention in the interest of promoting cooperation.
Mansouri said Morocco is not a rich country but can impart
its "savoir faire" (know-how) and experience in diverse
fields such as banking and agriculture. The people in the
three stops appreciated the King's visit. The King also
sought to emphasize reform.


13. (C) The Ambassador agreed Morocco had much to offer
other African countries. He recalled that Morocco had
extended assistance to neighboring countries during the
locust plague last year. During their July 2004 meeting in
Washington, President Bush had told King Mohammed he could be
a leader in the region -- not just in the Middle East but
also in Africa.




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Riley