ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR BELKHEIR'S VIEWS ON WESTERN

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000316 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA/MAG, IO E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2010 TAGS: KPKO MO PBTS PGOV PREL SUBJECT: ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR BELKHEIR'S VIEWS ON WESTERN SAHARA, RELATIONS WITH MOROCCO REF: A. 04 RABAT 2542 ¶B. SECDEF 151336Z FEB 06 Classified By: Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Ambassador hosted Algerian Ambassador Larbi Belkheir for an informal tea and conversation on the Western Sahara and Morocco-Algeria relations the afternoon of February 16. Belkheir had just returned from Algiers the previous day. Present were Algerian DCM Ginad Boumedienne, NEA/MAG Director William Jordan, DCM, and Polcouns. Belkheir reiterated Algeria's long-standing position on the Western Sahara conflict, stressing that a solution required Morocco and the Polisario to negotiate directly. He was skeptical that a Moroccan autonomy plan could satisfy the Polisario's demand for self-determination and thus serve as a basis for negotiations. Withdrawing MINURSO would be a mistake, Belkheir said, as it would be the combatants face-to-face with no buffer between them. Belkheir noted that he had met with King Mohammed "fifteen days ago," and the two reaffirmed that Morocco and Algeria should try to make progress in their bilateral relations while putting the Western Sahara conflict to the side. Belkheir stressed that his role as Ambassador was to make progress in the bilateral relationship, not to focus on the Western Sahara issue. Algeria was fully committed to improving the bilateral relationship, and things could proceed better if there were less clamor and "more calm." Belkheir defended Algerian weapons purchases, stressing they were strictly for self-defense "even though Algeria has no enemies." End Summary. ¶2. (C) Following up a lunch invitation last November (Ref A),thus far not reciprocated, Ambassador invited Algerian Ambassador Belkheir to Villa America the afternoon of February 16 for an informal dialogue on the Western Sahara and Morocco-Algeria relations, in honor of the visit of NEA/MAG Director William Jordan. Belkheir had just returned from Algiers the previous day. Opening the one-hour conversation, Ambassador noted that King Mohammed had remarked to SecDef Rumsfeld during their February 13 meeting in Ifrane, Morocco (Ref B) that he had met recently with Belkheir, and had told Rumsfeld that Belkheir's appointment as Ambassador to Morocco was a positive sign. (Comment: Ambassador did not relay the full exchange between the King and SecDef Rumsfeld on this subject; i.e., that the SecDef said Belkheir's appointment must be a good sign in that Bouteflika was sending such an important and trusted advisor to Morocco, to which the King responded: sometimes you must be wary when things appear to be too good. End Comment). Belkheir said he and the King had had a good meeting, and restated their mutual commitment to improving relations between Morocco and Algeria, and not allowing the Western Sahara issue to serve as an impediment. ¶3. (C) Jordan noted that the US was awaiting the Moroccan autonomy plan and was urging the Moroccans to expand their thinking on autonomy and make it real and credible to the Sahrawi people. The US anticipated that a credible autonomy plan could serve as the basis for negotiations between the parties, which would include a role for Algeria in addition to the Polisario. The US had publicly called for Morocco to negotiate with the Polisario. Jordan noted that his visit would continue to Algiers and Tindouf, where he anticipated meeting with the Polisario leadership. He would urge the Polisario, in turn, to give serious consideration to Morocco's autonomy plan and to agree to contacts and to start negotiations without preconditions. ¶4. (C) Belkheir expressed skepticism that Morocco's autonomy plan would provide sufficient scope for Sahrawi self-determination, and was thus unsure it would prove attractive enough to bring the Polisario to the negotiating table. Belkheir said the Baker Plan was an intelligent plan. It was too bad that another American had not replaced Baker. Nevertheless, Algeria would support a solution agreed to by Morocco and the Polisario. Algeria had a long-standing and well-known position on the Western Sahara; this was an issue of decolonization, and Algeria could not abandon its commitment to self-determination for the Sahrawis. In the end, a solution could be reached; all sides wanted a solution for the good of the Maghreb, and a just solution could be found creating neither victor nor vanquished. ¶5. (C) In response to questions concerning his reading of the Polisario, Belkheir emphasized that he was not in Morocco to focus on the Western Sahara issue. His mandate was to focus on the bilateral relationship between Morocco and Algeria. He had been well-received in Morocco since his arrival in late 2005, but it was time for relations between the two countries to move forward in a more concrete way. Algeria was committed to a better relationship, and had always worked toward that end. There was tremendous scope for an improved relationship. "We can go a long way with Morocco," he said. He reiterated that the Western Sahara issue would not be a casus belli between the two countries. In response to Jordan's question about the status of efforts to reopen the Morocco/Algeria border, Belkheir reiterated the long-standing Algerian position that the two sides still needed to resolve technical issues. Belkheir indicated there was no point in opening the border now only to close it again in a few years; there had to be assurances the border issues would be resolved before re-opening. (Comment: this is perhaps a good example of the stubbornness that both sides have exhibited with regard to bilateral relations. Despite the advantages to both sides of re-opening the border, as seen from Rabat it appears the GOA has decided to hang on to this "card" for later. End comment). Jordan lamented that the situation had apparently not changed in well over a year and noted that progress in this area would be the most tangible sign of a meaningful bilateral rapprochement. MINURSO -------------- ¶6. (C) DCM asked Belkheir how the Algerians saw MINURSO's role at this point. Belkheir said withdrawing MINURSO could be destabilizing. The removal of a buffer between Moroccan and Polisario forces could be dangerous. DCM noted that the Polisario could not survive without tacit Algerian support, as it was based on Algerian territory. Belkheir said the GOA of course discouraged any resort to violence, but the Polisario was not limited to Algerian territory. Polisario forces extended most of the way to the berm, i.e., in those areas of the Western Sahara not under Moroccan control. Arms Sales -------------- ¶7. (C) DCM queried Belkheir on Algerian motives for recent weapons purchases. Belkheir said any weapons purchases were strictly for self-defense. He sought to put the acquisition of new aircraft in the context of a technical upgrade from existing and increasingly obsolete equipment. Algeria never questioned Morocco on its weapons purchases or military agreements. Morocco was a sovereign state and was entitled to do what it wished to guarantee its own security. Algeria operated on the same basis. DCM wondered who Algeria's enemies were. Belkheir said in fact Algeria did not have any enemies. In a slightly awkward historical allusion, Belkheir recalled the start of Algeria's arms relationship with Russia in the post-independence era. At that time, only the USSR and its eastern bloc allies were willing to provide Algeria weapons in response to Morocco's occupation of Tindouf as part of a border dispute. ¶8. (U) NEA/MAG Jordan cleared this message. ****************************************** Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat ****************************************** Riley