WESTERN SAHARA: MINURSO'S HOPES AND FRUSTRATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000240 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA/MAG, DRL, IO; GENEVA FOR RMA E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2011 TAGS: KPKO MO PBTS PGOV PHUM SUBJECT: WESTERN SAHARA: MINURSO'S HOPES AND FRUSTRATIONS REF: A. 05 RABAT 2262 ¶B. USUN 98 Classified By: Pol/C Timothy Lenderking, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: During NEA/MAG desk officer's January 23-27 visit to Morocco and the Western Sahara, Poloffs and desk officer met over dinner with Francesco Bastagli, the Secretary General's Special Envoy to the Western Sahara and SIPDIS MINURSO Chief of Staff Philippe Elghouyal on January 25 in Laayoune. Deskoff and Poloff also attended an updated (and vastly improved) military briefing with MINURSO military staff on January 26 at headquarters. Bastagli, Elghouyal, and the military briefers all expressed frustration with the current state of affairs and limited MINURSO mandate. Bastagli argued that three options lie before MINURSO: it either reshapes its role to include humanitarian efforts, and, (once an agreement between the parties gets underway) guarantees Moroccan commitments in the territory; second, pares down to a military presence only; or, third, is eliminated. He appeared to favor the first option and clearly feels that MINURSO is under pressure to demonstrate its utility to the international community. Bastagli speculated that the Polisario might actually be edgy about the demonstrations in Laayoune, concerned perhaps that new leaders could emerge west of the berm and not be under the control of the Polisario leadership in Tindouf. End Summary. -------------- Whither MINURSO? -------------- ¶2. (C) On January 25, NEA/MAG Desk Officer, Polcouns and Poloff met over dinner in Laayoune with Francesco Bastagli, the Secretary General's Special Envoy to the Western Sahara and Chief of Staff Philippe Elghouyal. Bastagali bluntly expressed increasing frustration over the history of the MINURSO program: fifteen years and no resolution. He stated that there are three options available for MINURSO: expand the program to include humanitarian relief; maintain the military presence only; or eliminate MINURSO entirely. Bastagli favored expanding MINURSO,s role, suggesting that if the GOM put forward an autonomy proposal for the Western Sahara, MINURSO could be the key international guarantor of Moroccan commitments in the territory. Bastagli said he could not rule out that removing MINURSO from the picture entirely could precipitate conflict in the territory. ¶3. (C) Bastagli and Elghouyal characterized the GOM,s attitude toward MINURSO as "arrogant and paranoid.8 They said the GOM continues to obstruct MINURSO operations not specifically outlined in the MINURSO mandate. The GOM knows MINURSO operates under constraints and takes advantage, Bastagli said. Despite GOM obstacles, Bastagli still hopes to expand the confidence-building measures (CBMs) and conduct non-political seminars in order to increase people-to-people contact. (Note: GOM MINURSO Coordinator Hamid Chabar told Polcouns February 8 that he was pleased with the CBMs so far and was fully on board with expanding them, provided UNHCR remained committed to implementing them "transparently" and demanded strict adherence to the agreements by the Polisario. End Note.). Bastagli wondered if there could be a role for the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) in promoting CBMs for the Western Sahara. ¶4. (C) Bastagli complained that MINURSO continued to exist in a bubble, due mainly to constraints placed on contact with the local population. While MINURSO has little contact with Sahrawis, Bastagli noted that the Polisaro has frequent contact with MINURSO in and around Tindouf and the berm. Despite such contact, Bastagli said he could not comment with any certainty on fissures within the Polisario leadership or reported &tensions8 in the Tindouf camps. He said he had a feeling, though, that the Polisario leadership was not entirely comfortable with the demonstrations in Moroccan-controlled Sahara. He had a sense that the Polisario was concerned about not being able to control the popular mood west of the berm, and a new leadership could emerge in Laayoune that was home-grown and not entirely under the sway of the Polisario. ¶5. (C) Bastagli said MINURSO,s night patrols, which started in November, were continuing but were not as effective as they could be due to the lack of night-vision equipment. Without such, Bastagli said the patrols cannot do much. Bastagli said a request was being made through formal channels for the proper equipment. -------------- Security Situation in Laayoune -------------- ¶6. (C) When asked about the current situation in Laayoune, Bastagli said that the atmosphere was tense, demonstrations continue, and that security had increased in the city. (Comment: The increase in security was evident during our visit, more than ever before. Emboffs saw an usual number of security vehicles on the streets, belonging to gendarme, army, and urban security, and in one vacant lot near the UNHCR office two truck loads of officers in riot gear. End Comment). He added that some of the conflicts were largely youth-based and the result of tense relations between Moroccan and Sahrawi students. He did, however, stress that MINURSO had little or no contact with the local population and his observations were largely secondhand. He said the recent series of demonstrations did not constitute an &intifada8 as the Polisario contended, but there was "popular support" for the demonstrations. He said the GOM was trying to "win hearts and minds," but their crackdown on demonstrators made their efforts seem "schizophrenic." ¶7. (C) Bastagli said that the area around MINURSO is now blocked off, following an early January attempt by apparent Sahrawi demonstrators to gain access to the compound. A GOM security patrol is now posted outside of MINURSO headquarters. -------------- Military Briefing at MINURSO -------------- ¶8. (C) Deskoff and Poloff had an updated military briefing at MINURSO headquarters January 26. The military briefers indicated that they rarely see heavy Polisario military equipment and are aware that most of the Polisario's remaining functioning equipment is kept in Rabouni. This equipment is of Russian origin, visibly aging, and, according to MINURSO, very little looks functional. MINURSO is expecting that the remaining working equipment will be used on the Polisario side of the berm February 27, Polisario "national day," and they are preparing for instability on both sides of the berm during the celebrations. All at MINURSO suspected a negative and swift reaction by the GOM to any celebrations of Polisario &independence.8 ¶9. (C) According to the MINURSO briefers, there are approximately one million mines along the berm. These mines were placed by the GOM and the Polisario, explode frequently, and have killed and injured both people and livestock over the years, though in small numbers in the recent past. MINURSO has requested a "mine coordinator" from New York to explore ways to eliminate this problem. ¶10. (C) As noted Ref B, on January 15, the Polisario agreed to allow the MINURSO military freedom of movement. The GOM, however, has not agreed to allow MINURSO freedom of travel and continues to require permission for MINURSO movements in the Western Sahara. MINURSO expressed frustration with other GOM restrictions that prevent Moroccan weaponry from being checked and limit MINURSO free discussions to only certain military personnel. MINURSO military officials commented that the GOM is fearful that any information learned during discussions with the Moroccan military might be passed to the Polisario, which, according to MINURSO, has happened in the past. Whereas MINURSO views the officer corps in the Moroccan military as professional, the enlisted military does not garner the same respect. ¶11. (C) There are currently 232 peacekeepers in the MINURSO force, including the force commander. The forces have never encountered a skirmish between the Polisario and the GOM -- the situation is static. Briefers said the night patrols to date have encountered vehicles during their patrols, but have not investigated these vehicles. MINURSO had no information on the region being a transit area for terrorists. According to MINURSO, the Polisario is still housing 48 illegal migrants, mostly sub-Saharans and South Asians. MINURSO would not comment on alleged Polisario involvement in illegal migration. MINURSO confirmed they had assisted illegal migrants that were likely released in the Sahara by the GOM and also stated the GOM had killed two illegal sub-Saharan migrants within the recent past. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶12. (C) Bastagli made his pitch on the relevance of MINURSO to maintaining the cease-fire and ensuring stability as a buffer between Morocco and the Polisario, in spite of the constraints that MINURSO faces. While understanding the concern of the international community and Van Walsum that MINURSO has essentially never fulfilled its mandate, he clearly believes MINURSO has a role to play, and if anything needs to be armed with more political resolve and more resources to enhance its effectiveness. MINURSO staff emphasized frustration with the GOM while remaining more upbeat about their dealings with the Polisario. ¶13. (U) This cable was cleared by Y. Robert Ewing. ****************************************** Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat ****************************************** Riley