WESTERN SAHARA: TECHNOCRAT TAKES THE REINS OVER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RABAT 001984

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL MA WI
SUBJECT: WESTERN SAHARA: TECHNOCRAT TAKES THE REINS OVER
RESTIVE TERRITORY

REF: A. RABAT 1983

B. RABAT 1982

C. RABAT 1976

D. RABAT 1975

E. RABAT 1963

Classified by Political Counselor Craig Karp for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: The newly appointed Wali (governor) of
Layoune, territorial seat of Western Sahara, told visiting
Embassy team he was sent to build up the Sahara rather than
impose order. Polcouns underscored the U.S. view that an
agreed settlement was the best way forward and emphasized
that any autonomy plan put together by Morocco would need
buy-in from skeptical Sahrawis. Polcouns urged that the GOM
seek ways to counter local perceptions of heavy-handed
policing, an idea the Wali took on board. Coincidentally, an
elite national police unit with a bad reputation in Western
Sahara (and elsewhere) was dissolved by the GOM two days
after our conversation. End summary.


2. (SBU) M'hammed Dryef, the newly appointed governor
("Wali") of Layoune, and surrounding regions, encompassing
most of the Western Sahara, received Polcouns, poloff, and
Army Attache on the afternoon of October 13. Unlike his
predecessor Driss Charki, Dryef's background is technocratic
rather than security-focused. He is an urban planner,
trained in France. Dryef has risen to the senior tier of the
Moroccan civil service. He previously served as the Wali in
Fes and for the entire region of Casablanca, where he focused
on urban development, before a stint in the Interior Ministry
as coordinator of all the Walis.


3. (C) Still glowing from his early October appointment,
which included a formal ceremony officiated by the King,
Dryef told us he was committed to improving economic
opportunities for the people of Western Sahara and was
optimistic about the prospects, particularly given the GOM's
major investment of resources and effort in the area.


4. (C) Polcouns asked whether the Wali's MOI inbriefs had
included discussion of the ongoing GOM effort to design an
autonomy plan for the territory. The Wali admitted he had
little detail to offer at this stage - autonomy blueprints
were still being worked on by CORCAS (the Royal Commission on
Sahrawi Affairs) and discussed in Rabat. He acknowledged
that greater local control of governance in Western Sahara
was highly desirable, but cautioned that the issue was one of
great sensitivity in the broader Moroccan political context.
The GOM simply could not afford to devise and implement with
haste an autonomy plan.


5. (C) Polcouns underlined the U.S. view that an agreed,
negotiated settlement was Morocco's best chance to escape the
current impasse over Western Sahara. We have been pressing
the GOM on this point, he added. The key was credibility -
the plan should be detailed and offer a meaningful devolution
of authority. Polcouns cautioned the Wali that the native
Sahrawi population would have to be won over. Even before a
plan is unveiled, concrete steps on the ground would need to
be taken. From our observations, many Sahrawis were
alienated, with some referring to an "intifada" against
Moroccan rule. Even among the most pro-Morocco Sahrawis
there was concern about the security forces and a desire for
the Sahrawization of law and order.


6. (C) The Wali asserted that of Layoune's 200,000 citizens,
all but perhaps 500 "troublemakers" were law abiding,
peaceful people. He underscored that he was prepared to
accept peaceful expressions of dissent but insisted that acts
of violence and sabotage could not be tolerated. He
complained that the international media had focused on
alleged police brutality in dealing with a pro-independence
demonstration in Layoune, while overlooking the violent
behavior of some of the demonstrators, who threw rocks,
sticks, and Molotov cocktails at police and private property.
Just two days before there had been a sabotage attack on the
Bou Craa phosphate conveyor belt (ref C).


7. (C) Polcouns replied that the USG fully appreciated and
supported his rejection of violent resistance but suggested
that the Wali nonetheless look at creative ways to create
domestic confidence building measures and counter the
perception among Sahrawis of heavy-handed policing. The GUS
(the Groupement Urbaine de Surete) in particular has come in
for criticism from locals, Polcouns noted, perhaps the Wali
could conduct an experiment by pulling the GUS off their
patrols for several days and seeing if it has a positive or
negative impact. The Wali welcomed the idea and promised to

RABAT 00001984 002 OF 002


give it consideration.


8. (C) Note: Coincidentally, the GOM announced on October 16
that it would be disbanding the GUS, which had been formed in
2004 in an attempt to counter rising crime in Morocco's urban
centers. In the two years since its creation, the GUS has
earned a bad reputation for brutality, and has been
implicated in several deaths, including that of Sahrawi
demonstrator Hamdi Lembarki in October 2005. We also heard
that Royal confidante and Minister-delegate of the Interior
Fuad El-Himma led a high-level security delegation to meet
with the Wali in Layoune, possibly in response to the October
10 conveyor belt bombing (ref C). End note.


9. (C) On the margins, as requested by MINURSO, Polcouns
mentioned to the Wali the UN's longstanding request for
planning permission for some modest physical security
measures for its Headquarters compound. The Wali raised his
own concerns about the sensitivity of the UN mission, but
promised to look into the issue before his anticipated
meeting with MINURSO acting head Gen. Mosgaard.

10.(C) Comment: The appointment of a very senior urbanist
like Dryef could itself be interpreted as a potential
confidence building measure. A self-assured leader, if given
sufficient authority, he may be someone who could work a
hearts and minds campaign. The measures he puts in place
will help shape the receptivity of the Sahrawis to the
autonomy plan being worked out in Rabat. End comment.


******************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat
******************************************

Riley