WESTERN SAHARA: TECHNOCRAT TAKES THE REINS OVER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RABAT 001984 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL MA WI SUBJECT: WESTERN SAHARA: TECHNOCRAT TAKES THE REINS OVER RESTIVE TERRITORY REF: A. RABAT 1983 ¶B. RABAT 1982 ¶C. RABAT 1976 ¶D. RABAT 1975 ¶E. RABAT 1963 Classified by Political Counselor Craig Karp for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The newly appointed Wali (governor) of Layoune, territorial seat of Western Sahara, told visiting Embassy team he was sent to build up the Sahara rather than impose order. Polcouns underscored the U.S. view that an agreed settlement was the best way forward and emphasized that any autonomy plan put together by Morocco would need buy-in from skeptical Sahrawis. Polcouns urged that the GOM seek ways to counter local perceptions of heavy-handed policing, an idea the Wali took on board. Coincidentally, an elite national police unit with a bad reputation in Western Sahara (and elsewhere) was dissolved by the GOM two days after our conversation. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) M'hammed Dryef, the newly appointed governor ("Wali") of Layoune, and surrounding regions, encompassing most of the Western Sahara, received Polcouns, poloff, and Army Attache on the afternoon of October 13. Unlike his predecessor Driss Charki, Dryef's background is technocratic rather than security-focused. He is an urban planner, trained in France. Dryef has risen to the senior tier of the Moroccan civil service. He previously served as the Wali in Fes and for the entire region of Casablanca, where he focused on urban development, before a stint in the Interior Ministry as coordinator of all the Walis. ¶3. (C) Still glowing from his early October appointment, which included a formal ceremony officiated by the King, Dryef told us he was committed to improving economic opportunities for the people of Western Sahara and was optimistic about the prospects, particularly given the GOM's major investment of resources and effort in the area. ¶4. (C) Polcouns asked whether the Wali's MOI inbriefs had included discussion of the ongoing GOM effort to design an autonomy plan for the territory. The Wali admitted he had little detail to offer at this stage - autonomy blueprints were still being worked on by CORCAS (the Royal Commission on Sahrawi Affairs) and discussed in Rabat. He acknowledged that greater local control of governance in Western Sahara was highly desirable, but cautioned that the issue was one of 
great sensitivity in the broader Moroccan political context. The GOM simply could not afford to devise and implement with haste an autonomy plan. ¶5. (C) Polcouns underlined the U.S. view that an agreed, negotiated settlement was Morocco's best chance to escape the current impasse over Western Sahara. We have been pressing the GOM on this point, he added. The key was credibility - the plan should be detailed and offer a meaningful devolution of authority. Polcouns cautioned the Wali that the native Sahrawi population would have to be won over. Even before a plan is unveiled, concrete steps on the ground would need to be taken. From our observations, many Sahrawis were alienated, with some referring to an "intifada" against Moroccan rule. Even among the most pro-Morocco Sahrawis there was concern about the security forces and a desire for the Sahrawization of law and order. ¶6. (C) The Wali asserted that of Layoune's 200,000 citizens, all but perhaps 500 "troublemakers" were law abiding, peaceful people. He underscored that he was prepared to accept peaceful expressions of dissent but insisted that acts of violence and sabotage could not be tolerated. He complained that the international media had focused on alleged police brutality in dealing with a pro-independence demonstration in Layoune, while overlooking the violent behavior of some of the demonstrators, who threw rocks, sticks, and Molotov cocktails at police and private property. Just two days before there had been a sabotage attack on the Bou Craa phosphate conveyor belt (ref C). ¶7. (C) Polcouns replied that the USG fully appreciated and supported his rejection of violent resistance but suggested that the Wali nonetheless look at creative ways to create domestic confidence building measures and counter the perception among Sahrawis of heavy-handed policing. The GUS (the Groupement Urbaine de Surete) in particular has come in for criticism from locals, Polcouns noted, perhaps the Wali could conduct an experiment by pulling the GUS off their patrols for several days and seeing if it has a positive or negative impact. The Wali welcomed the idea and promised to RABAT 00001984 002 OF 002 give it consideration. ¶8. (C) Note: Coincidentally, the GOM announced on October 16 that it would be disbanding the GUS, which had been formed in 2004 in an attempt to counter rising crime in Morocco's urban centers. In the two years since its creation, the GUS has earned a bad reputation for brutality, and has been implicated in several deaths, including that of Sahrawi demonstrator Hamdi Lembarki in October 2005. We also heard that Royal confidante and Minister-delegate of the Interior Fuad El-Himma led a high-level security delegation to meet with the Wali in Layoune, possibly in response to the October 10 conveyor belt bombing (ref C). End note. ¶9. (C) On the margins, as requested by MINURSO, Polcouns mentioned to the Wali the UN's longstanding request for planning permission for some modest physical security measures for its Headquarters compound. The Wali raised his own concerns about the sensitivity of the UN mission, but promised to look into the issue before his anticipated meeting with MINURSO acting head Gen. Mosgaard. 10.(C) Comment: The appointment of a very senior urbanist like Dryef could itself be interpreted as a potential confidence building measure. A self-assured leader, if given sufficient authority, he may be someone who could work a hearts and minds campaign. The measures he puts in place will help shape the receptivity of the Sahrawis to the autonomy plan being worked out in Rabat. End comment. ****************************************** Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat ****************************************** Riley