SAHRAWI ACTIVISTS OUTLINE GRIEVANCES AND POSSIBLE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RABAT 001983

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2016
TAGS: PHUM PREL PGOV KPKO MA WI
SUBJECT: SAHRAWI ACTIVISTS OUTLINE GRIEVANCES AND POSSIBLE
STEPS FORWARD


Classified by Political Counselor Craig Karp for Reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

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Summary
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1. (C) During a mid-October visit to Western Sahara, Sahrawi
human rights activists indicated profound alienation from
Moroccan authorities and deep skepticism about any autonomy
package the GOM might be preparing, charging that human
rights practices in the region were getting worse. They
viewed CORCAS as an unrepresentative instrument of the
"occupation." They spoke of a Sahrawi "intifada," although
their own account of the situation was less dramatic. To
reverse their lack of confidence in the Moroccan government,
they demanded:

-- Removal of the GUS, the national police tactical squad,
deployed since 2005 and famed for cracking heads;

-- Cessation of repression, torture, disappearances, and home
invasions by security forces;

-- Allow the Sahrawis freedom of expression, even if that
means a few Polisario flags;

-- Liberate 33 remaining political prisoners; and

-- Officially recognize/register human rights and civil
society groups.


2. (C) Separately, the leader of a pro-GOM Sahrawi NGO
offered a diametrically opposite (and relatively less
representative) view, claiming that the Polisario were
"Algerian Sahrawi" pretenders with no credible claim to the
former Spanish Sahara. Claiming to be Tekla Sahrawis, a
coastal tribe, versus the mostly Raguibat Polisario, they
reminded us of the tribal aspect of the conflict. Both
sides, however, indicated distrust of MINURSO, and both
offered either sparse or no recent data on instances of
political violence or abuses. Both sides told us that any
autonomy plan had to include Sahrawization of the police.
End summary.

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Sahrawi Activists Paint a Bleak Picture
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3. (C) During their mid-October visit to Western Sahara,
poloffs were invited to share an Iftar (the meal which breaks
the daily Ramadan fast) with a group of seven Sahrawi human
rights activists sympathetic to the Polisario liberation
movement. Most had spent at least some time in Moroccan
jails. One attendee had spent more than four years in prison
in Morocco in the 1970s, in what he described as extremely
inhumane conditions.


4. (C) Key points emerging from the meeting included:

-- A sense of profound alienation from the Moroccan
authorities, perceived as occupiers thwarting native
Sahrawis' right to self-determination;

-- The low credibility of CORCAS, the Royal Commission formed
by the GOM ostensibly to represent Sahrawi views in the
policy process. The activists claimed recent CORCAS
"consultations" in the region were actually occasions to
threaten locals with retaliation if they did not submit to
Moroccan control;

-- Given the perceived hegemonic agenda and brutal
track-record of the GOM, the Sahrawis dismissed talk of an
autonomy plan as empty propaganda;

-- A contention that Moroccan human rights practices in the
region have deteriorated in the past year after a slight
improvement in the initial period following the death of
Hassan II and the succession of King Mohammed VI (though they
could offer few recent examples since the crackdown after the
May 2005 demonstrations to support the claim);

-- Two cases - the death of Sahrawi activist Hamdi Lembarki
at a Layoune pro-independence demonstration in October 2005,
and the overnight detention and rough handling of a
pro-independence teenager in February 2006, were cited as
examples of ongoing excessive force;

-- Also cited was the 2005-06 arrest and detention of our
host, Sahrawi activist Brahim Dahane (strictly protect),who

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was detained in late October 2005 and released mid-April.
Dahane implied that his arrest had been prompted either by
his meeting with U.S. Emboffs during their October 2005 visit
to Layoune, his role in publicizing internationally the
Lembarki case, or both;

-- Two other members of their circle, activists Saber Brahim
and Subai Ahmed, are currently languishing in a Moroccan
jail, the activists added;

-- Further allegations that Moroccan security forces
routinely order Sahrawi "trouble-makers" to emigrate from the
territory or face death;

-- A vague (and seemingly paradoxical) story offered in the
same breath about a boatload of a dozen Sahrawis which
recently disappeared in an Atlantic fog as they tried to make
their way to the Canary Islands, speculating that the boat
had been seized by Moroccan authorities and the passengers
were being held incommunicado;

-- Complaints of the lack of good educational, vocational,
and economic opportunities for native youth in the territory.
The stagnant environment was causing a drain of native
Sahrawis from the area, the activists claimed, leaving behind
in Layoune a growing majority of transplanted Moroccans;

-- Frustration and even disdain voiced toward MINURSO, which
they believed "had accomplished nothing" for the cause of
Sahrawi self-determination and did not even employ any local
Sahrawis at their Layoune headquarters, they claimed;

--Repeated references to a Sahrawi "intifada" and predictions
that if MINURSO was withdrawn there would be war in the
territory -- not on the berm, but in the streets of Layoune;

and

--Dismay that their efforts to work the Moroccan legal system
had been rebuffed and that their efforts to register as a
legal NGO denied.


5. (C) Also present at the Iftar were two Spanish lawyers
from Barcelona, visiting Layoune as international human
rights observers of a trial the next day of a Sahrawi
dissident. They anticipated no problems, although the
Sahrawis maintained they themselves would be barred from the
courthouse. When asked how their presence squared with the
refusal to allow the visit of a European parliament
delegations, the attorneys replied that lawyers, with a
reputation for impartiality, are generally permitted to come
in and observe, even when journalists and politicians were
not.

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Visit to a Pro-Moroccan Sahrawi NGO
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6. (C) At the other end of the Sahrawi political spectrum,
poloffs visited on October 13 the Layoune offices of the
Sahrawi Association for Victims of Polisario. Chairman Dahia
Aguai showed off the groups' premises, which featured large
murals on the office walls depicting alleged Polisario
atrocities, each labeled "Torture methods practiced by the
Polisario." The crude paintings portrayed several torture
scenes, including one of a man being drawn-and-quartered in
the desert by four camels, at the direction of men wearing
olive fatigues, their faces shrouded in sinisterblack
turbans. Aguai and other interlocutors idntified themselves
as members of the Tekla tribeof Sahrawis, traditionally
resident in coastal aeas, and a tribe with longstanding ties
to the Moroccan throne.


7. (C) With an otherwise silent prticipant by his side
taking copious notes of hi own presentation, Aguai offered a
drawn-out accunt of the position of pro-Moroccan Sahrawis:

- The Polisario, based in Tindouf, Algeria, are actually
Algerian Sahrawis of the Raguibat tribe with no credible
claim to the former Spanish Sahara. (Note: The Raguibat's
traditional territory does extend from the northeast of the
former Spanish Sahara well into western Algeria end note.);

-- Algeria is cynically supporting the Tindouf Sahrawis'
claim to Spanish Sahara to preempt any Sahrawi separatism
within its own borders;

-- MINURSO, and the UN as a whole, has no credibility - they
have been consistently biased toward the Polisario and
unfairly hostile to Morocco;

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-- The recent report of the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights is proof of the UN's bias - they disregarded all of
the information Aguai's group had provided regarding
Polisario atrocities;

-- Several attendees told us they had been prisoners of the
Polisario during the 1970s and 80s. One showed us his badly
scarred back, which he said was the result of torture by the
Polisario;
-- The group offered no details of any recent cases of abuse
by the Polisario, but claimed to regularly receive
information from sympathetic contacts inside the
Polisario-controlled refugee camps in Algeria;

-- Unexpectedly asked what they thought would be essential
elements of a prospective autonomy plan, they replied that
the police and other security forces should be Sahrawi.

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Comment
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8. (C) Of the two groups, we judge the dissidents who offered
us Iftar the more credible and representative of Sahrawi
views and attitudes. The "Victims of the Polisario" NGO was
an unsophisticated showpiece, obviously sponsored by the GOM,
to counter the information put out to the world by
Polisario-leaning human rights activists. It was noteworthy
that both groups, from their opposing perspectives,
criticized MINURSO, which suggests that the UN Mission is
fairly successfully refraining from playing favorites, and
both sides thought the Security forces needed a Sahrawi
character.


9. (C) It was particularly significant that neither the
fervently pro-independence activists, nor their pro-GOM
adversaries, could offer much data or detail on recent
instances of political violence or human rights violations.
While local grievances are real and deeply felt, the
intensity and magnitude of this conflict pales in comparison
to other trouble spots on the African continent or elsewhere
in the world. Indeed, while the heavy police presence on
Layoune's streets was clearly incongruent with the city's low
crime rate, the territorial capital did not feel like a "city
under siege." Each evening during our visit, crowds of
native Sahrawis, Moroccan migrants, and the occasional
foreigner, jammed the city's sidewalks and squares to enjoy
the festive Ramadan atmosphere. End comment.


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Riley