WESTERN SAHARA: CORCAS SEEKS US MEDIATION WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 001087 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, IO; GENEVA FOR RMA E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2009 TAGS: MO PBTS PHUM PREL SUBJECT: WESTERN SAHARA: CORCAS SEEKS US MEDIATION WITH POLISARIO REF: RABAT 537 Classified By: Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: During a 90-minute meeting with Ambassador Riley on May 31, President of the Royal Council for Saharan Affairs (CORCAS) Khalihenna Ould Er Rachid requested US help in starting a dialogue between CORCAS and the Polisario. Khalihenna said he had made informal contacts with the Polisario, and they were promising, but he had received nothing official from the Polisario, and Abdelaziz was silent. He needed outside help to go further and specifically requested US assistance in deepening contact with the Polisario. He stressed that CORCAS was ready to talk to the Polisario without conditions, though "independence" is off the table, he said. He stressed there were only two choices for the Western Sahara: the status quo, which was potentially destabilizing, and autonomy. Khalihenna described his organization's primary function as promoting reconciliation between the Moroccan state and the Sahrawi people. He affirmed the GOM would present an autonomy plan to the UN prior to the October 31 rollover. The meeting was widely covered by the Moroccan media. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Ambassador Riley met with CORCAS President Khalihenna Ould Er Rachid on May 31 at CORCAS headquarters in Rabat, the first call by an ambassador on CORCAS. Ambassador was accompanied by DCM, Polcouns, and POLFSN, while Khalihenna was flanked by a dozen members of the council, including Secretary General Moulainine. The Ambassador congratulated SIPDIS Khalihenna on his appointment as president, noted the US was following the activities of CORCAS with interest, but said it was somewhat unclear what CORCAS's primary objectives were: to develop an autonomy plan? to promote development in the Western Sahara? to stimulate public debate on the Western Sahara among Moroccans? We're Different -------------- ¶3. (C) Khalihenna responded that the CORCAS of 2006, revitalized by the King's March 27 speech in Laayoune (Ref A),had nothing to do with its earlier incarnation, created by Hassan II in 1981. The older version was headed by the Ministry of Interior and did not have a writ to promote autonomy. It was a council that belonged to former Interior Minister Basri and lacked direction. The council did not include Sahrawis and achieved no notable successes. The current council is different, Khalihenna insisted. The primary goal of the new CORCAS is to foster reconciliation between the Moroccan state and the Sahrawi people, whether they reside in the Western Sahara or elsewhere. The way to do that was to promote autonomy in the territory. King Mohammed -- not "the palace" -- is personally invested in this. That is new. King Mohammed decided that the Western Sahara conflict could not be solved without reconciliation between the state and the Sahrawi people. The challenge is to preserve the Sahrawi people and the territorial integrity of Morocco at the same time. It's All in the Family -------------- ¶4. (C) Gesturing to his deputy, Khalihenna said SecGen Moulainine studied medicine with (Polisario "president") Abdelaziz in Rabat. Abdelaziz was part of the first generation of post-independence Sahrawis that created the Polisario in 1973. At that time Morocco was unstable, wracked by political violence. There were coup attempts against Hassan II, and the region suffered from inter-Arab conflicts. The Polisario demanded rights for the Sahrawi people. The Western Sahara conflict was created amidst this context. The Sahrawis are an ensemble of tribes living in a vast territory that far exceeds the territory of the Western Sahara. Unlike many of us, Khalihenna said, Abdelaziz did not grow up under Spanish administration. He grew up in Morocco. (Khalihenna noted that he had not only Spanish citizenship but a Spanish identity card. He said Franco had at one point considered appointing him president of the Spanish Western Sahara). Those of us who grew up under Spanish administration in the former Spanish Western Sahara had no gripe with the Moroccan state. We did not suffer from Moroccan administration. The people who created the Polisario did not represent all of the Sahrawi tribes, he said. ¶5. (C) Khalihenna said an independent state in the Western Sahara was not an option, nor was a referendum. A state based on tribal lines cannot succeed in Africa, he said. A referendum was not humanly or politically feasible, as Sahrawis are scattered over a number of countries in the region. Why then does Algeria focus solely on Sahrawis living in the Western Sahara? Why is Algeria not concerned with Sahrawis living in Mali and Algeria? Khalihenna said perhaps extending autonomy to the Sahrawis would lead Sahrawis in neighboring states to pursue autonomy as well. CORCAS composition and objectives -------------- ¶6. (C) Ambassador asked Khalihenna what the main objectives of CORCAS are. Khalihenna acknowledged CORCAS was "named, not elected." Members were carefully selected, not voted in. Nevertheless, it represents all 34 tribes of the Sahrawis, in proportion to their size. Khalihenna explained that CORCAS is made up of members of parliament, municipal counselors, women leaders, sheikhs, and youth -- a mix of generations and the sexes. The King selected the members based on the best representatives of each tribe -- the most respected, the best known, the most honest. Many were elected officials, but not all elected Sahrawis were members of CORCAS. No Sahrawi could say he was not represented by CORCAS, or that he was badly represented, Khalihenna contended. Ambassador Riley interjected that CORCAS does not include members of the Polisario. Khalihenna said CORCAS was indeed open to members of the Polisario. We want them to be part of CORCAS, he said. The Polisario is made up of Sahrawis. Even though they are an armed movement and not just a political organization, they are not excluded. On the contrary, CORCAS is open to dialogue and conversation with the Polisario. They are our brothers, our family, he said. ¶7. (C) The problem with the Polisario, Khalihenna continued, is that they reject the concept of autonomy. The Polisario has not criticized CORCAS, since they cannot because we are all Sahrawis. But there are only two choices for the Western Sahara: the status quo, which is potentially unstable given the illegal migration, smuggling, and trafficking in persons that goes on in the territory. The status quo could lead to another Somalia, where there is neither order nor security. Autonomy, backed by the King, gives most Sahrawis what they want, in Khalihenna's view. ¶8. (C) The Ambassador posed a hypothetical situation, saying if CORCAS were selling camels, but the buyer not only believed the price was too high but also would not even enter the market to negotiate, as seemed to be the case with the Polisario, then what? Then I go to you, the buyer, Khalihenna said. I seek you out. CORCAS sought to do that with the Polisario. But the Polisario needed to understand there was no workable option other than autonomy. ¶9. (C) Khalihenna said CORCAS had started drafting an autonomy plan. CORCAS members discussed the issue of autonomy during their May 25-27 meeting in Rabat. Morocco would present the autonomy plan before October 31, he confirmed. "We will give water to the camels," Khalihenna said. Debating the price of the camels was the easy part, he said. The hard part was breaking down the psychological wall that exists between Morocco and the Polisario. Mediation -------------- ¶10. (C) Khalihenna said he had had some informal contact with the Polisario about the possibility of dialogue, and the response informally was encouraging. Members of the Polisario were saying they were ready. But there was no official response. CORCAS sought a mediator and a quiet place to talk. CORCAS had asked for Spanish and French help during Khalihenna's visit to Madrid and Paris in May. Contact with the Polisario needed to be private and discreet, at least at the outset. We do not know how to reach Abdelaziz or the Algerians, though, he said, and he asked for US assistance in helping bring this about. The Ambassador made no promises but said the US would discuss the idea internally. ¶11. (C) As for reaching out to dissident Sahrawis in the Western Sahara, Khalihenna said, "We talk to them on a regular basis." He insisted the dissidents were a tiny minority in the Western Sahara, who criticized Morocco wherever they went, including abroad. He said it was unfortunate one could not know more about the views of the Sahrawis living in Tindouf. ¶12. (C) DCM pressed Khalihenna for his reading of the Polisario. What were their goals? Khalihenna said the Polisario seeks to help Algeria enlarge its territory and its sphere of influence. Beyond that, he did not know what the Polisario wanted. But Morocco was prepared to offer the Sahrawi people all the rights they sought, even "quasi-independence." The DCM asked how self-determination would be achieved. "Through autonomy," Khalihenna responded. The Sahara would be very decentralized. There could be no democracy there without decentralization. CORCAS needed US help to get there. DCM stressed that that the use of terms such as "reconciliation," "self-determination," and "decentralization" were important for people to hear, and were a way of demonstrating Morocco's seriousness about resolving the conflict. Khalihenna responded he had offered the Algerians "gifts." He had taken the Algerian insistence on not being a party to the Western Sahara conflict at face value, and he was not pushing at present for engagement with Algeria. ¶13. (C) The Ambassador commented that US Ambassador to Algeria Erdman had joined him at a meeting recently with Moroccan Deputy FM Fassi Fihri, at which the US had stressed the importance of words and rhetoric in the Western Sahara context. The GOA was very sensitive to Moroccan rhetoric. Claiming that the Baker Plan is dead, for example, only adds fuel to the fire. "Win-lose" rhetoric is provocative and should be avoided by both sides, especially in the coming months, the Ambassador stressed. Khalihenna agreed, noting he was attacked by the Moroccan press for saying Algeria was not involved in the Western Sahara conflict. He acknowledged that both Algeria and the Polisario needed their honor and dignity to remain in tact. He joked that perhaps he should describe the Baker Plan as "sick" rather than as "dead." ¶14. (C) The DCM asked whether there was debate within CORCAS about the way forward, given the "diversity" of CORCAS as characterized by Khalihenna. Khalihenna said the recent three-day meeting in Rabat had been very lively, even in CORCAS meetings were closed to the outside (Comment: senior MFA and MOI officials have attended at least parts of both meetings. End Comment). He gave everyone a chance to speak, with opportunities to talk about the constitution of CORCAS, relations between Sahrawis and the state, the disposition of resources in the Western Sahara. Many ideas were presented, which were being developed into a non-paper. With its second meeting, CORCAS moved from generalities into details. People were reticent the first day, Khalihenna said, but on the second day the gloves came off. It was a democratic discussion, he said, and very passionate. ¶15. (C) Polcouns asked how the autonomy process that CORCAS was spearheading related to the discussions political parties had held in March, and to the autonomy ideas the political parties had developed and submitted to the palace. Khalihenna said CORCAS had nothing to do with the political parties. These were separate tracks coordinated by the Palace. ¶16. (U) The meeting between the Ambassador and CORCAS was widely covered by the Moroccan media. A two-minute segment appeared on the evening news May 31 in both French and Arabic. Reporters were on hand to photograph the Ambassador's arrival at CORCAS, capture the opening courtesies on film, and to interview both the Ambassador and Khalihenna at the conclusion of the meeting. Comment -------------- ¶17. (C) By creating CORCAS, Morocco has effectively established an entity that allows the palace to play (publicly) a more back-seat role in the promotion of an autonomy plan. CORCAS is now empowered to meet with the Polisario, and to take the lead on the autonomy plan, though it is clear the King and select advisors (will Khalihenna be among them?) will be calling the major shots. While we have no illusions about the transparency of CORCAS, it is now the Palace's front in moving forward on the Western Sahara. Since we are keen to bring Morocco and the Polisario together, and see that as a logical next step, Embassy Rabat believes we should considering responding positively to Khalihenna's request for help in bringing the two sides together. Before responding to the GOM, we might consider a quiet approach to the Polisario to encourage a meeting with CORCAS. It would be a breakthrough to get the two together, even if little concrete was accomplished in the meeting. ****************************************** Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat ****************************************** Riley